By Stephen Roach
On the surface, China appears to be leading the world from recession to recovery. After coming to a virtual standstill in late 2008, at least as measured quarter-to-quarter, economic growth accelerated sharply in spring 2009.
A back-of-the envelope calculation suggests China may have accounted for as much as 2 percentage points of annualised growth in inflation-adjusted world output in the second quarter of 2009. With contractions moderating elsewhere, China's rebound may have been enough in and of itself to allow global gross domestic product to eke out a small positive gain for the first time since last summer.
That's the good news. The bad news is that China's recent growth spurt comes at a steep price. Fearful that its recent economic short- fall would deepen, Chinese policymakers have opted for quantity over quality in setting macro-strategy, the centrepiece of which is an enormous surge in infrastructure spending funded by a burst of bank lending.
Sure, developing nations always need more infrastructure. But China has taken this to extremes. Infrastructure expenditure (including Sichuan earthquake reconstruction) accounts for fully 72 per cent of China's recently enacted Rmb4,000bn ($585bn) stimulus. The government urged the banks to step up and fund the package. And they did. In the first six months of 2009, bank loans totalled Rmb7,400bn – three times the pace in the first half of 2008 and the strongest six-month lending surge on record.
This outsized bank-directed investment stimulus leaves little doubt as to how bad it was in China in late 2008 and early 2009. An unprecedented external demand shock, stemming from rare synchronous recessions in the developed world, devastated the export-led Chinese growth machine. That triggered sackings of more than 20m migrant workers in export-intensive Guangdong province. Long fixated on social stability, Beijing moved to arrest this deterioration. The government was determined to do whatever it took to restore rapid growth.
Yet there can be no avoiding the destabilising consequences of these actions. Surging investment accounted for an unprecedented 88 per cent of Chinese GDP growth in the first half of 2009 – double the average contribution of 43 per cent over the past decade. At the same time, the quality of Chinese bank lending most assuredly suffered from the rash of credit disbursements in the first half of this year – a trend that could sow the seeds for a new wave of non-performing bank loans. Just this week, Chinese regulators told banks that new loans must be used to bolster the real economy and not for speculation in equities and real estate.
A little over two years ago, premier Wen Jiabao warned of a Chinese economy that was becoming increasingly “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable”. Prescient words. Yet rather than act on those concerns by implementing a pro-consumption rebalancing, growth-hungry China was seduced by the boom in global trade and upped the ante on its most unbalanced sectors. By 2007, investment and exports accounted for about 80 per cent of Chinese GDP. And now, in the face of a severe global recession, China has compounded the very problems the premier warned of: aiming a massive liquidity-driven stimulus at its most unbalanced sector.
This is not a sustainable outcome for any economy – or sustainable support for the world economy. China must redirect economic growth towards internal private consumption. This may require a compromise on the quantity dimension of its growth outcome. But to the extent that leads to improved quality in the Chinese economy, a short-term growth sacrifice is well worth the effort.
Unlike most, I have been a steadfast optimist on China. Yet I am starting to worry. A macro strategy that exacerbates worrying imbalances is ultimately a recipe for failure. In many respects, that's what the global crisis and recession of 2008-09 are all about. China will not get special dispensation from the most critical lesson of this post-crisis era.
The writer is chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia and author of ‘The Next Asia' (Wiley), due out in September
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
2009年8月1日 星期六
INVESTORS ARE FLOUNDERING IN POST-TRAUMATIC SYNDROME
By Gillian Tett
Jim O'Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, has recently been sounding out the US bank's clients over their inflation fears.
The results are striking. Nine-tenths of the companies questioned report feeling worried. But the number fretting about inflation is similar to those concerned about deflation - with almost no one sitting on the fence.
Welcome to the disorientating investor landscape of 2009. Just three years ago, when the world's big investment banks made inflation forecasts, economists got excited if they varied by a half a percentage point.
For back then, in the era known (infelicitously) as the "Great Moderation", most investors assumed that the financial world was a pretty stable, predictable place.
No longer. If you look at current inflation forecasts, the headline numbers do not look too shocking. JPMorgan, for example, has just surveyed 1,800 investors (see right), in which median expectations for inflation in the US, eurozone and UK are 1-1.5 per cent by late 2010. But behind the seemingly reassuring "median" number, there lies seething insecurity and intellectual dispute. At several large investment banks, the macro-economic teams are clashing with their fixed-income departments because each has strikingly different price expectations. And in the investment and corporate world, opinions are often equally polarised. "There is real uncertainty," observes Mr O'Neill. "People seem more unsure than I have ever seen."
On one level, that is no surprise. Goldman Sachs has an internal index that it uses to track liquidity conditions in the financial markets. This shows that in the past two years, investors have suffered a more violent rollercoaster ride than they have ever seen before in their careers. That has left investors disorientated and - crucially - newly aware of what is sometimes called "fat tail risk" (the statistical jargon for extreme events.) In a sense, investors are gripped by a phenomenon akin to the type of post-traumatic syndrome seen after a war: whenever they hear a "bang!", they jump in panic, since they no longer dare assume that the world is benign - in relation to inflation, deflation or much else.
Worse, investors lack the intellectual framework to make sense of what is currently going on, let alone predict the future with confidence. Recent research from Pimco illustrates the problem*. Until the 1980s, it points out, the expansion of nominal gross domestic product tracked the volume of outstanding private credit closely. But since then credit dramatically has outstripped economic growth, as securitisation took hold.
Before the bubble burst, few investors properly understood the impact of securitisation. But now the securitisation market has frozen, they do not really understand the implications of this new shift.
The old models that appeared to link credit growth, economic expansion and monetary policy with reassuringly neat precision no longer look reliable. Thus investors are faced with numerous uncertainties: is the world facing a bout of extended deleveraging that will drag prices down? Can the securitisation - and credit creation - machine start again? And if the government keeps pouring money into the markets, what impact might that have?
If the JPMorgan survey is correct, investors - on average - do not expect serious deflation to emerge from this unknowable mix.
Instead, on average, they predict low inflation in the UK, UK and eurozone this year, followed by inflation in the US and UK from late 2010 on.
But I rather suspect that one reason why so few investors predicted deflation in this survey is that very few have ever seen it. Similarly, the inflation projection for the UK and US probably reflects a generalised concern about quantitative easing - not because investors understand what this might do to prices, but because they are uncertain how it does (or does not) work.
Incentives may also have had an impact. The JPMorgan survey suggests hedge funds have more polarised inflation/deflation views than mainstream asset managers. Those working in the government bond markets and asset-liability sphere are more confident that governments will deliver low, stable inflation than, say, macro-economists.
Such variations do not mean that surveys are useless: on the contrary, the question of how inflation expectations could affect outcomes needs even more research. But as Mr O'Neill says: "It is very hard to forecast beyond six months now, with real confidence."
"Our analysis suggests that there will be a strong [economic] rebound for the next six months or so. But after that - who knows?" he adds, with a flash of humility rarely seen on Wall Street. It is a mantra that should perhaps be pinned on the desk of every investor right now - in relation to inflation, and much else.
* The Dog that Didn't Bark, Pimco July 2009
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
Jim O'Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, has recently been sounding out the US bank's clients over their inflation fears.
The results are striking. Nine-tenths of the companies questioned report feeling worried. But the number fretting about inflation is similar to those concerned about deflation - with almost no one sitting on the fence.
Welcome to the disorientating investor landscape of 2009. Just three years ago, when the world's big investment banks made inflation forecasts, economists got excited if they varied by a half a percentage point.
For back then, in the era known (infelicitously) as the "Great Moderation", most investors assumed that the financial world was a pretty stable, predictable place.
No longer. If you look at current inflation forecasts, the headline numbers do not look too shocking. JPMorgan, for example, has just surveyed 1,800 investors (see right), in which median expectations for inflation in the US, eurozone and UK are 1-1.5 per cent by late 2010. But behind the seemingly reassuring "median" number, there lies seething insecurity and intellectual dispute. At several large investment banks, the macro-economic teams are clashing with their fixed-income departments because each has strikingly different price expectations. And in the investment and corporate world, opinions are often equally polarised. "There is real uncertainty," observes Mr O'Neill. "People seem more unsure than I have ever seen."
On one level, that is no surprise. Goldman Sachs has an internal index that it uses to track liquidity conditions in the financial markets. This shows that in the past two years, investors have suffered a more violent rollercoaster ride than they have ever seen before in their careers. That has left investors disorientated and - crucially - newly aware of what is sometimes called "fat tail risk" (the statistical jargon for extreme events.) In a sense, investors are gripped by a phenomenon akin to the type of post-traumatic syndrome seen after a war: whenever they hear a "bang!", they jump in panic, since they no longer dare assume that the world is benign - in relation to inflation, deflation or much else.
Worse, investors lack the intellectual framework to make sense of what is currently going on, let alone predict the future with confidence. Recent research from Pimco illustrates the problem*. Until the 1980s, it points out, the expansion of nominal gross domestic product tracked the volume of outstanding private credit closely. But since then credit dramatically has outstripped economic growth, as securitisation took hold.
Before the bubble burst, few investors properly understood the impact of securitisation. But now the securitisation market has frozen, they do not really understand the implications of this new shift.
The old models that appeared to link credit growth, economic expansion and monetary policy with reassuringly neat precision no longer look reliable. Thus investors are faced with numerous uncertainties: is the world facing a bout of extended deleveraging that will drag prices down? Can the securitisation - and credit creation - machine start again? And if the government keeps pouring money into the markets, what impact might that have?
If the JPMorgan survey is correct, investors - on average - do not expect serious deflation to emerge from this unknowable mix.
Instead, on average, they predict low inflation in the UK, UK and eurozone this year, followed by inflation in the US and UK from late 2010 on.
But I rather suspect that one reason why so few investors predicted deflation in this survey is that very few have ever seen it. Similarly, the inflation projection for the UK and US probably reflects a generalised concern about quantitative easing - not because investors understand what this might do to prices, but because they are uncertain how it does (or does not) work.
Incentives may also have had an impact. The JPMorgan survey suggests hedge funds have more polarised inflation/deflation views than mainstream asset managers. Those working in the government bond markets and asset-liability sphere are more confident that governments will deliver low, stable inflation than, say, macro-economists.
Such variations do not mean that surveys are useless: on the contrary, the question of how inflation expectations could affect outcomes needs even more research. But as Mr O'Neill says: "It is very hard to forecast beyond six months now, with real confidence."
"Our analysis suggests that there will be a strong [economic] rebound for the next six months or so. But after that - who knows?" he adds, with a flash of humility rarely seen on Wall Street. It is a mantra that should perhaps be pinned on the desk of every investor right now - in relation to inflation, and much else.
* The Dog that Didn't Bark, Pimco July 2009
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
US HOUSE PRICES
Lex 2009-07-29
http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001027843&lang=en
“Who would sell their house in this market?” For the many who have only known house prices go up, that is a pretty rational position to take. It is impossible, however, to say for sure how many dwellings are waiting to be put on the market. One thing is for certain, however. If the S&P/Case-Shiller Index – which on Tuesday showed house prices in May increasing month-on-month for the first time in three years – is finally turning upward, expect a wave of new For Sale signs.
But if prices are heading higher, why sell now? Because many homeowners are suffering. They are either out of work, or, knowing that unemployment is still rising, worry they soon will be. Foreclosures were up by a fifth in the second quarter versus last year and if anything are accelerating. And for those households still lucky enough to wave someone off to work each day, 20-odd per cent are in negative equity, according to First American CoreLogic data. With stagnant income growth and ongoing worries about the economy (the expectations component of Tuesday's Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index fell yet again in July) many mortgage holders will be tempted to sell the second they can pay off their oversized mortgage off in full – especially now rents are falling.
It is likely that the foreclosure moratoria earlier in the year helped skew recent prices by restricting supply on to the market. Ultimately, the unpalatable truth for the housing market is that it is stuck which ever way the economy turns. If things stay weak and deflation kicks in prices will be bogged down for years. But if confidence returns and prices tick higher, not only will new supply dampen prices again, but so will rising borrowing costs if interest rates are raised.
http://www.ftchinese.com/story.php?storyid=001027843&lang=en
“Who would sell their house in this market?” For the many who have only known house prices go up, that is a pretty rational position to take. It is impossible, however, to say for sure how many dwellings are waiting to be put on the market. One thing is for certain, however. If the S&P/Case-Shiller Index – which on Tuesday showed house prices in May increasing month-on-month for the first time in three years – is finally turning upward, expect a wave of new For Sale signs.
But if prices are heading higher, why sell now? Because many homeowners are suffering. They are either out of work, or, knowing that unemployment is still rising, worry they soon will be. Foreclosures were up by a fifth in the second quarter versus last year and if anything are accelerating. And for those households still lucky enough to wave someone off to work each day, 20-odd per cent are in negative equity, according to First American CoreLogic data. With stagnant income growth and ongoing worries about the economy (the expectations component of Tuesday's Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index fell yet again in July) many mortgage holders will be tempted to sell the second they can pay off their oversized mortgage off in full – especially now rents are falling.
It is likely that the foreclosure moratoria earlier in the year helped skew recent prices by restricting supply on to the market. Ultimately, the unpalatable truth for the housing market is that it is stuck which ever way the economy turns. If things stay weak and deflation kicks in prices will be bogged down for years. But if confidence returns and prices tick higher, not only will new supply dampen prices again, but so will rising borrowing costs if interest rates are raised.
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING
Lex
The suspicious thing about financial conspiracy theories is that they are all alike. A “sophisticated” or “shadowy” investor makes pots of money in ways nobody quite understands. The indignant theorist casts aspersions on their methods, inserts a non sequitur regarding its effects and explains how this is frightfully unfair for the “little guy”. Cue political outrage. The latest involveshigh frequency trading (HFT) and so-called flash orders.
HFT is high-volume trading used by banks' proprietary traders and a new breed of electronic trading outfits. It relies on synthesising information faster than others using powerful computers, often co-located within exchanges. Flash orders are sent to certain traders in a market fractionally before being routed more widely. Its speed of execution can save traders money, if only a sliver of a basis point.
The effects of HFT, which perhaps accounts for 70 per cent of US trading volumes, are ill-understood. There are concerns that its users, as well as providing liquidity, probe the market to extract early information, meaning others lose out. Flash orders may increase that informational advantage.
But it is worth distinguishing between the illegal and the irritating. Frontrunning – or trading ahead of customer orders – is the former. Successfully employing the biggest nerds and the best millisecond-saving technology is not. Markets have always been skewed against retail money, whether information sloshes around an open-outcry pit or a high-tech algorithm. Now, however, cheaper technology, plus the disaggregation of traditional exchanges, means HFT is exploding.
Moves by the Securities and Exchange Commission to review flash orders are welcome, as would be a proper look at HFT. There is a potential investor protection issue. More important, regulators should lead in understanding market changes and how traders make their dough. That does not imply a secret plot. It is just part of their day job.
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
The suspicious thing about financial conspiracy theories is that they are all alike. A “sophisticated” or “shadowy” investor makes pots of money in ways nobody quite understands. The indignant theorist casts aspersions on their methods, inserts a non sequitur regarding its effects and explains how this is frightfully unfair for the “little guy”. Cue political outrage. The latest involveshigh frequency trading (HFT) and so-called flash orders.
HFT is high-volume trading used by banks' proprietary traders and a new breed of electronic trading outfits. It relies on synthesising information faster than others using powerful computers, often co-located within exchanges. Flash orders are sent to certain traders in a market fractionally before being routed more widely. Its speed of execution can save traders money, if only a sliver of a basis point.
The effects of HFT, which perhaps accounts for 70 per cent of US trading volumes, are ill-understood. There are concerns that its users, as well as providing liquidity, probe the market to extract early information, meaning others lose out. Flash orders may increase that informational advantage.
But it is worth distinguishing between the illegal and the irritating. Frontrunning – or trading ahead of customer orders – is the former. Successfully employing the biggest nerds and the best millisecond-saving technology is not. Markets have always been skewed against retail money, whether information sloshes around an open-outcry pit or a high-tech algorithm. Now, however, cheaper technology, plus the disaggregation of traditional exchanges, means HFT is exploding.
Moves by the Securities and Exchange Commission to review flash orders are welcome, as would be a proper look at HFT. There is a potential investor protection issue. More important, regulators should lead in understanding market changes and how traders make their dough. That does not imply a secret plot. It is just part of their day job.
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
Beijing in uneasy embrace of the greenback
By Richard McGregor in Beijing , Daniel Dombey in Washington
When top US and Chinese officials meet on Monday for the first high-level talks of the Obama administration, the American complaints about China's currency that long bedevilled relations will barely be on the table.
For years, Washington alleged that Beijing unfairly manipulated its currency, the renminbi, to support exports, and demanded that China allow it to appreciate to force structural changes in its economy.
Humbled by the financial crisis and heavily reliant on Beijing to climb out of it, Washington has shifted gear, relegating the currency to a subset of its push for broader economic reforms in China.
“The US has for now given up on pushing China on currency issues, partly because Washington has less leverage over Beijing than at any other point in recent history,” says Eswar Prasad of the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“The US now has enormous financing needs for its budget deficit and current account deficit, making it more dependent on China than ever before.”
Other issues have naturally forced themselves higher on the bilateral agenda for this week's meeting in Washington, notably climate change and efforts to extend co-operation on green energy initiatives.
Inter-agency rivalry in Washington over management of the China relationship between the Treasury and the state department has also given the so-called strategic economic dialogue a broader remit.
When the top-level dialogue was founded in 2006 on the initiative of Hank Paulson, the then Treasury secretary ensured that its sessions were focused primarily on economic exchanges.
The irony of the US retreat on the renminbi, though, is that China has been powerless to wean itself off its addiction to buying US debt, the other side of the bilateral financial ledger.
The global crisis does not appear to have lifted the confidence of Beijing in its own currency. Instead, Chinese leaders have repegged the renminbi to the US dollar in the past 12 months in the search for a stable environment to ride out the turmoil.
Beijing broke the decade-old US dollar peg in mid-2005, allowing the renminbi gradually to appreciate against the greenback during the following three years. Alarmed by the emerging financial panic and an abrupt collapse in exports, Beijing called a halt to the appreciation last July. The renminbi has been stable against the greenback ever since.
Chinese analysts insist the repegging is a temporary measure, a safe port in the global storm before it is calm enough for the ship of currency reform to head out into international waters again.
“Right now, we need stability above all. If we get through this crisis, the currency will be back on a more flexible track,” says Peng Xingyun of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
In the meantime, the same problems that forced Beijing's hand in 2005 have returned to haunt Chinese policymakers a second time.
China's foreign exchange reserves burst through the $2,000bn (€1,400bn, £1,217bn) mark in the second quarter, fuelled by speculative inflows of cash trying to take advantage of the rapid recovery in the Chinese economy.
China's commitment to a pegged currency means it must swap the dollars flowing into the country for renminbi. The extra funds injected into the system are adding to the already loose monetary policy introduced late last year to counter the global slowdown.
“Strong pressures on, and market expectations for, the renminbi to appreciate will likely re-emerge as early as the end of this year,” says Wang Qing, Morgan Stanley's China economist.
Beijing's struggle to manage the renminbi underlines the difficulties with its other significant recent announcement – a call for an alternative to the US dollar as a reserve currency.
Within China, support for an alternative to the greenback is seen more as a political signal than a concrete proposal. “It is our way of expressing our unhappiness with the US,” says a senior Chinese economist, adding that Beijing knew there was no alternative in the short term to the dollar.
Beijing is trying to push money offshore, investing in commodities and overseas companies, and gradually trying to internationalise the renminbi by allowing it to be used for some regional trade transactions.
But the size of China's reserves means these initiatives have little measurable impact on the pile of foreign cash the People's Bank of China has under management. In the foreseeable future, the central bank has little choice but to invest its foreign currency holdings in US dollars, because there is no other asset class that can handle such large sums of money.
“The Chinese leadership understands very well that their economy is locked into a difficult and unhealthy embrace with the US and would like to tear themselves away from it,” says Mr Prasad.
“Much as they may detest it, the embrace is only going to get tighter in the short run.”
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
When top US and Chinese officials meet on Monday for the first high-level talks of the Obama administration, the American complaints about China's currency that long bedevilled relations will barely be on the table.
For years, Washington alleged that Beijing unfairly manipulated its currency, the renminbi, to support exports, and demanded that China allow it to appreciate to force structural changes in its economy.
Humbled by the financial crisis and heavily reliant on Beijing to climb out of it, Washington has shifted gear, relegating the currency to a subset of its push for broader economic reforms in China.
“The US has for now given up on pushing China on currency issues, partly because Washington has less leverage over Beijing than at any other point in recent history,” says Eswar Prasad of the Brookings Institution in Washington.
“The US now has enormous financing needs for its budget deficit and current account deficit, making it more dependent on China than ever before.”
Other issues have naturally forced themselves higher on the bilateral agenda for this week's meeting in Washington, notably climate change and efforts to extend co-operation on green energy initiatives.
Inter-agency rivalry in Washington over management of the China relationship between the Treasury and the state department has also given the so-called strategic economic dialogue a broader remit.
When the top-level dialogue was founded in 2006 on the initiative of Hank Paulson, the then Treasury secretary ensured that its sessions were focused primarily on economic exchanges.
The irony of the US retreat on the renminbi, though, is that China has been powerless to wean itself off its addiction to buying US debt, the other side of the bilateral financial ledger.
The global crisis does not appear to have lifted the confidence of Beijing in its own currency. Instead, Chinese leaders have repegged the renminbi to the US dollar in the past 12 months in the search for a stable environment to ride out the turmoil.
Beijing broke the decade-old US dollar peg in mid-2005, allowing the renminbi gradually to appreciate against the greenback during the following three years. Alarmed by the emerging financial panic and an abrupt collapse in exports, Beijing called a halt to the appreciation last July. The renminbi has been stable against the greenback ever since.
Chinese analysts insist the repegging is a temporary measure, a safe port in the global storm before it is calm enough for the ship of currency reform to head out into international waters again.
“Right now, we need stability above all. If we get through this crisis, the currency will be back on a more flexible track,” says Peng Xingyun of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
In the meantime, the same problems that forced Beijing's hand in 2005 have returned to haunt Chinese policymakers a second time.
China's foreign exchange reserves burst through the $2,000bn (€1,400bn, £1,217bn) mark in the second quarter, fuelled by speculative inflows of cash trying to take advantage of the rapid recovery in the Chinese economy.
China's commitment to a pegged currency means it must swap the dollars flowing into the country for renminbi. The extra funds injected into the system are adding to the already loose monetary policy introduced late last year to counter the global slowdown.
“Strong pressures on, and market expectations for, the renminbi to appreciate will likely re-emerge as early as the end of this year,” says Wang Qing, Morgan Stanley's China economist.
Beijing's struggle to manage the renminbi underlines the difficulties with its other significant recent announcement – a call for an alternative to the US dollar as a reserve currency.
Within China, support for an alternative to the greenback is seen more as a political signal than a concrete proposal. “It is our way of expressing our unhappiness with the US,” says a senior Chinese economist, adding that Beijing knew there was no alternative in the short term to the dollar.
Beijing is trying to push money offshore, investing in commodities and overseas companies, and gradually trying to internationalise the renminbi by allowing it to be used for some regional trade transactions.
But the size of China's reserves means these initiatives have little measurable impact on the pile of foreign cash the People's Bank of China has under management. In the foreseeable future, the central bank has little choice but to invest its foreign currency holdings in US dollars, because there is no other asset class that can handle such large sums of money.
“The Chinese leadership understands very well that their economy is locked into a difficult and unhealthy embrace with the US and would like to tear themselves away from it,” says Mr Prasad.
“Much as they may detest it, the embrace is only going to get tighter in the short run.”
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
谁在狙击李嘉诚
英国《金融时报》中文网特约撰稿人席越
7月21日，加拿大竞争局（Competition Bureau of Canada）批准了加拿大第四大石油公司Suncor 能源（Suncor Energy）对加拿大第三大石油公司加拿大石油（Petro-Canada）的合并。合并后的新石油公司成为加拿大第一大石油公司和北美第二大油砂生产商，并继续沿用Suncor 能源这一名称。
合并后的新Suncor 能源估计市值为430亿加元（397亿美元）。原北美最大的油砂生产公司和加拿大最大的石油公司加拿大能源公司（EnCana） 因此落至排名第二，而原来加拿大第二大石油公司即香港富豪李嘉诚控股52%的赫斯基能源（Husky Energy）降级到第三位。加拿大能源公司和Suncor 能源拥有加拿大西部阿尔伯塔省最大的油砂资源，相比之下，相对资源优势并不明显的赫斯基能源将面临和两大超级本土石油公司的竞争。加拿大前三大石油公司的重新排序，两大油砂公司夹击李嘉诚，这让石油价格刚由最低的40美元一桶回升到70美元一桶的能源市场，更有精彩好戏可看。
加拿大竞争局的批准认定将使原定于8月底完成的加拿大两大石油公司的合并重组提前到8月1日。这次价值225亿加元(205亿美元）的并购被视为继2007年澳大利亚力拓（Rio Tinto）公司以381亿美元收购加拿大铝业集团（(Alcan Inc. )之后，最大的联合协议行为；同时是加拿大能源史上最大的一次目标并购。在国际范围里，这是继自2008年7月西班牙天然气公司(Gas Natural) 以204 亿美元入股 西班牙费诺萨联合集团（Union Fenosa） 49.5％股权后全球最大的能源和电力交易。
按照协议，Suncor能源将占有合并公司股份的60%,加拿大石油公司将拥有合并公司股份的40%。虽然加拿大竞争局批准Suncor能源 和加拿大石油公司的合并，但是它对这两家均有零售加油站的公司提出了出售掉104家旗下油站并准许加拿大其他石油零售公司使用合并后新Sunco能源公司的零售渠道十年的附加要求。详细要求是，为Suncor能源 的零售业务竞争对手提供一年11亿升的石油储备运输渠道。将要出售的104家油站（主要分布于加拿大东部的安大略省）占新Suncor能源的所有零售站数量的6.5%。
业内分析认为之所以加拿大竞争局会提出额外要求，是出于担心这两家石油巨人公司的并购会导致汽油的批发价格上升，而间接影响普通消费者的利益。同时也考虑到这两家具有石油开采权和零售渠道业务的公司对同行业其他公司的冲击。
众所周知，在加拿大目前的三大石油公司中，原来最大的加拿大本土石油公司加拿大能源公司并没有零售油站，而赫斯基能源的零售油站基本上和加拿大石油公司 的零售油站数量相当。当两家加油站品牌联手，无疑会在本来竞争已经很激烈的零售市场形成绝对优势。
加拿大石油公司名下拥有同名加油站，并分布加拿大全国。而原Suncor能源旗下的Sunoco 和Pillips （美国油站）品牌油站主要分布在加拿大东部和美国。同市场上占据大份额的荷兰壳牌公司，美孚（Esso），赫斯基能源相比，加拿大石油公司 的加油站因为品牌商标上的枫叶标志而受到广大的加拿大消费者的心理认可。
被低价收购的危险
在经济衰退和原油价格大幅度下跌的2008年下半年和2009年，对那些主要依赖加拿大西部丰富的油砂资源的石油公司来说是一个严峻的考验。因为油砂的提炼要比传统的油井开采的成本高出很多，同时对提炼的厂房设备要求也比油井开采要更高。在2006年原油价格超过140美元一桶的时候，很多加拿大的石油公司不得不和美国大公司签订油砂提炼项目，以借助他们在美国大本营的提炼设备。仅以加拿大能源公司（EnCana）石油公司为例，它在2007年和美国第三大石油公司康菲石油（ConocoPhillips）签署了价值70亿加元（64.7亿美元）的油砂联合提炼项目，把加拿大阿尔伯塔省的油砂运送到美国休斯敦附近的炼油厂提炼。同时，阿尔伯塔省北部也在大规模兴建新的炼油厂和储油罐。
加拿大丰业银行（Scotia Bank）首席投资经济学家Adam Waterous提供给
媒体的数据显示，加拿大的油砂项目在未来的15-20年的时间里依然需要高达1千亿加元（924亿美元）的投资。这样的前提下，加拿大很多公司正在寻求更多的投资资金注入。与此同时，在原油价格大大低于预期价格的时候，加拿大的石油公司均面临市值大规模缩水以及被外国同行业公司低价收购的危险。也正是在法国公司道达尔（Total）在2008年底以197亿加元（182亿美元）的价格对加拿大石油公司Nexen的收购失败之后，2009年3月23日，Suncor能源和加拿大石油公司联合宣布了这两大石油公司的合并。
防守型并购
在2008年公布的数据中，Suncor能源在2007年纯利润为172亿加元（158.9亿美元），加拿大石油公司在2007年的纯利润为217亿加元（200亿美元）。同时加拿大石油公司的投资回报率和固定资产回报率均高于主要依靠油砂生产的Suncor能源。
分析家分析，这次合并的最大收益者应该是Suncor 能源。虽然Suncor能源将会失去专注于油砂业务的长处，但它取得加拿大石油公司的资产后，其油砂生产地位更显重要。同时因为增加了加拿大石油公司在叙利亚、利比亚及北海的采油业务，降低了依靠加拿大本土油砂提炼的区域局限和单一性所带来的风险。这次合并将为新的Suncor带来以下优势：
增加市值，排除被国外同行行业低价收购的危险。
两个盈利良好的大公司的资产合并，大大提高了他们的综合竞争力和抗市场风险的能力。据Suncor公司公布的数据，它们的油气资源储存高达75亿汽油当量（BOE）。合并后的Suncor能源的原油和天然气产量将达到日产量68万汽油当量（BOE）。
提高生产效益，降低生产成本。据Suncor 能源总裁Rick George宣布，这次合并预计将节省公司运营成本的20%，相当于降低每年30亿加元（27.7亿美元）的运营成本。
合理规划各自的开发项目，避免同一地区的同质竞争。加拿大石油公司在去年年底终止了他们的FootHill油砂项目的计划，Suncor将继续它完成了一半的FireBag三期油砂项目，该项目原油日产量为6.8万（桶？）。
增加现金流，增强合并后的资产负债表。合并后的临时债务/总资本比率（pro forma debt to capitalization）为29.6%, 现金流量债务比为1.2。
低成本的国际原油和天然气的开采，包括北海，北非洲和拉丁美洲地区，日提炼量将达到43.3万桶(b/d)。
在今年三月，Suncor Energy和加拿大石油公司公布这次能源合并的时候，宣称在过去的几年时间里他们一直在保持联系，并试图合并。这次合并是一次期待已久的合并。从目前的种种数据来看，它也是一次出奇漂亮的并购操作。
历来在经济衰退时期，是市场优胜劣汰的关键时刻。也是是大公司鲸吞小公司，各种中型公司并购重组的蓄势以发的最好机会。从去年法国道达尔未成功的收购，到将要在8月1日降下帷幕的Suncor能源和加拿大石油公司成功的并购，投资专家们说，这将不是加拿大能源行业并购的结束，也许仅仅是一个序曲。
李嘉诚将如何应对？
名列加拿大三大石油公司赫斯基能源，曾宣布第一季度亏损。在金融危机下加拿大其他公司动作频频之时，赫斯基能源似乎一直保持平静。仅仅在2009年4月时宣布将分拆其位于东南亚的油气资产，在亚洲区内上市。加拿大当地的消息则表示，赫斯基能源的分拆上市计划已进行至处理税务和监管程度。
赫斯基能源公司目前的原油生产主要来源于3个板块，一是位于加拿大西部和美国西北部的石油和天然气，租用面积约3万平方公里。二是位于加拿大阿尔伯塔省北部面积约2200平方公里的油砂项目，估计其中的沥青蕴藏量超过443亿桶。三是在东南亚和其他地区的资产。其加拿大西部的石油天然气和油砂项目依然是赫斯基能源 的盈利和现金流的主要来源。
赫斯基能源在1986年落入李嘉诚囊中时，是当时他在海外最大和最成功的收购，他借助长子的加拿大国籍，成功避过了加拿大法律对外国人投资能源企业的限制，通过家族公司和和记黄埔，收购了赫斯基 能源公司52%的股权。这桩当年32亿港元（4.1亿美元）收购的资产，目前市值已达400多亿加元（约370亿美元）。Suncor能源和加拿大石油公司的这次成功收购，无疑对赫斯基能源在原油生产和零售这两块业务的竞争态势十分不利。
从加拿大石油业的“榜眼”成为当下的“探花”，精明的李超人又将如何应对？
注：本文仅代表作者本人观点。
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7月21日，加拿大竞争局（Competition Bureau of Canada）批准了加拿大第四大石油公司Suncor 能源（Suncor Energy）对加拿大第三大石油公司加拿大石油（Petro-Canada）的合并。合并后的新石油公司成为加拿大第一大石油公司和北美第二大油砂生产商，并继续沿用Suncor 能源这一名称。
合并后的新Suncor 能源估计市值为430亿加元（397亿美元）。原北美最大的油砂生产公司和加拿大最大的石油公司加拿大能源公司（EnCana） 因此落至排名第二，而原来加拿大第二大石油公司即香港富豪李嘉诚控股52%的赫斯基能源（Husky Energy）降级到第三位。加拿大能源公司和Suncor 能源拥有加拿大西部阿尔伯塔省最大的油砂资源，相比之下，相对资源优势并不明显的赫斯基能源将面临和两大超级本土石油公司的竞争。加拿大前三大石油公司的重新排序，两大油砂公司夹击李嘉诚，这让石油价格刚由最低的40美元一桶回升到70美元一桶的能源市场，更有精彩好戏可看。
加拿大竞争局的批准认定将使原定于8月底完成的加拿大两大石油公司的合并重组提前到8月1日。这次价值225亿加元(205亿美元）的并购被视为继2007年澳大利亚力拓（Rio Tinto）公司以381亿美元收购加拿大铝业集团（(Alcan Inc. )之后，最大的联合协议行为；同时是加拿大能源史上最大的一次目标并购。在国际范围里，这是继自2008年7月西班牙天然气公司(Gas Natural) 以204 亿美元入股 西班牙费诺萨联合集团（Union Fenosa） 49.5％股权后全球最大的能源和电力交易。
按照协议，Suncor能源将占有合并公司股份的60%,加拿大石油公司将拥有合并公司股份的40%。虽然加拿大竞争局批准Suncor能源 和加拿大石油公司的合并，但是它对这两家均有零售加油站的公司提出了出售掉104家旗下油站并准许加拿大其他石油零售公司使用合并后新Sunco能源公司的零售渠道十年的附加要求。详细要求是，为Suncor能源 的零售业务竞争对手提供一年11亿升的石油储备运输渠道。将要出售的104家油站（主要分布于加拿大东部的安大略省）占新Suncor能源的所有零售站数量的6.5%。
业内分析认为之所以加拿大竞争局会提出额外要求，是出于担心这两家石油巨人公司的并购会导致汽油的批发价格上升，而间接影响普通消费者的利益。同时也考虑到这两家具有石油开采权和零售渠道业务的公司对同行业其他公司的冲击。
众所周知，在加拿大目前的三大石油公司中，原来最大的加拿大本土石油公司加拿大能源公司并没有零售油站，而赫斯基能源的零售油站基本上和加拿大石油公司 的零售油站数量相当。当两家加油站品牌联手，无疑会在本来竞争已经很激烈的零售市场形成绝对优势。
加拿大石油公司名下拥有同名加油站，并分布加拿大全国。而原Suncor能源旗下的Sunoco 和Pillips （美国油站）品牌油站主要分布在加拿大东部和美国。同市场上占据大份额的荷兰壳牌公司，美孚（Esso），赫斯基能源相比，加拿大石油公司 的加油站因为品牌商标上的枫叶标志而受到广大的加拿大消费者的心理认可。
被低价收购的危险
在经济衰退和原油价格大幅度下跌的2008年下半年和2009年，对那些主要依赖加拿大西部丰富的油砂资源的石油公司来说是一个严峻的考验。因为油砂的提炼要比传统的油井开采的成本高出很多，同时对提炼的厂房设备要求也比油井开采要更高。在2006年原油价格超过140美元一桶的时候，很多加拿大的石油公司不得不和美国大公司签订油砂提炼项目，以借助他们在美国大本营的提炼设备。仅以加拿大能源公司（EnCana）石油公司为例，它在2007年和美国第三大石油公司康菲石油（ConocoPhillips）签署了价值70亿加元（64.7亿美元）的油砂联合提炼项目，把加拿大阿尔伯塔省的油砂运送到美国休斯敦附近的炼油厂提炼。同时，阿尔伯塔省北部也在大规模兴建新的炼油厂和储油罐。
加拿大丰业银行（Scotia Bank）首席投资经济学家Adam Waterous提供给
媒体的数据显示，加拿大的油砂项目在未来的15-20年的时间里依然需要高达1千亿加元（924亿美元）的投资。这样的前提下，加拿大很多公司正在寻求更多的投资资金注入。与此同时，在原油价格大大低于预期价格的时候，加拿大的石油公司均面临市值大规模缩水以及被外国同行业公司低价收购的危险。也正是在法国公司道达尔（Total）在2008年底以197亿加元（182亿美元）的价格对加拿大石油公司Nexen的收购失败之后，2009年3月23日，Suncor能源和加拿大石油公司联合宣布了这两大石油公司的合并。
防守型并购
在2008年公布的数据中，Suncor能源在2007年纯利润为172亿加元（158.9亿美元），加拿大石油公司在2007年的纯利润为217亿加元（200亿美元）。同时加拿大石油公司的投资回报率和固定资产回报率均高于主要依靠油砂生产的Suncor能源。
分析家分析，这次合并的最大收益者应该是Suncor 能源。虽然Suncor能源将会失去专注于油砂业务的长处，但它取得加拿大石油公司的资产后，其油砂生产地位更显重要。同时因为增加了加拿大石油公司在叙利亚、利比亚及北海的采油业务，降低了依靠加拿大本土油砂提炼的区域局限和单一性所带来的风险。这次合并将为新的Suncor带来以下优势：
增加市值，排除被国外同行行业低价收购的危险。
两个盈利良好的大公司的资产合并，大大提高了他们的综合竞争力和抗市场风险的能力。据Suncor公司公布的数据，它们的油气资源储存高达75亿汽油当量（BOE）。合并后的Suncor能源的原油和天然气产量将达到日产量68万汽油当量（BOE）。
提高生产效益，降低生产成本。据Suncor 能源总裁Rick George宣布，这次合并预计将节省公司运营成本的20%，相当于降低每年30亿加元（27.7亿美元）的运营成本。
合理规划各自的开发项目，避免同一地区的同质竞争。加拿大石油公司在去年年底终止了他们的FootHill油砂项目的计划，Suncor将继续它完成了一半的FireBag三期油砂项目，该项目原油日产量为6.8万（桶？）。
增加现金流，增强合并后的资产负债表。合并后的临时债务/总资本比率（pro forma debt to capitalization）为29.6%, 现金流量债务比为1.2。
低成本的国际原油和天然气的开采，包括北海，北非洲和拉丁美洲地区，日提炼量将达到43.3万桶(b/d)。
在今年三月，Suncor Energy和加拿大石油公司公布这次能源合并的时候，宣称在过去的几年时间里他们一直在保持联系，并试图合并。这次合并是一次期待已久的合并。从目前的种种数据来看，它也是一次出奇漂亮的并购操作。
历来在经济衰退时期，是市场优胜劣汰的关键时刻。也是是大公司鲸吞小公司，各种中型公司并购重组的蓄势以发的最好机会。从去年法国道达尔未成功的收购，到将要在8月1日降下帷幕的Suncor能源和加拿大石油公司成功的并购，投资专家们说，这将不是加拿大能源行业并购的结束，也许仅仅是一个序曲。
李嘉诚将如何应对？
名列加拿大三大石油公司赫斯基能源，曾宣布第一季度亏损。在金融危机下加拿大其他公司动作频频之时，赫斯基能源似乎一直保持平静。仅仅在2009年4月时宣布将分拆其位于东南亚的油气资产，在亚洲区内上市。加拿大当地的消息则表示，赫斯基能源的分拆上市计划已进行至处理税务和监管程度。
赫斯基能源公司目前的原油生产主要来源于3个板块，一是位于加拿大西部和美国西北部的石油和天然气，租用面积约3万平方公里。二是位于加拿大阿尔伯塔省北部面积约2200平方公里的油砂项目，估计其中的沥青蕴藏量超过443亿桶。三是在东南亚和其他地区的资产。其加拿大西部的石油天然气和油砂项目依然是赫斯基能源 的盈利和现金流的主要来源。
赫斯基能源在1986年落入李嘉诚囊中时，是当时他在海外最大和最成功的收购，他借助长子的加拿大国籍，成功避过了加拿大法律对外国人投资能源企业的限制，通过家族公司和和记黄埔，收购了赫斯基 能源公司52%的股权。这桩当年32亿港元（4.1亿美元）收购的资产，目前市值已达400多亿加元（约370亿美元）。Suncor能源和加拿大石油公司的这次成功收购，无疑对赫斯基能源在原油生产和零售这两块业务的竞争态势十分不利。
从加拿大石油业的“榜眼”成为当下的“探花”，精明的李超人又将如何应对？
注：本文仅代表作者本人观点。
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综述：二季度GDP降1% 美股涨跌互见
http://www.sina.com.cn 2009年08月01日 04:00 新浪财经
新浪财经讯 标准普尔500指数周五小幅上扬，美国GDP在一季度下降6.4%后在二季度下降了1.0%，降幅低于经济学家此前的1.5%的预期。
政府数据显示消费者开支有所下降，但经济恶化趋势正在缓解。标准普尔500指数过去5个月期间里的总体表现是自1938年以来最好的。
美国二季度GDP报告显示消费者正变得越来越节俭，而这势将影响经济需求，投资者普遍持谨慎态度。本月是道指自1989年以来表现最好的一个7月，标准普尔500指数与纳指也在本月实现自1997年以来涨幅最大的7月。
在GDP报告公布后，大宗商品期货市场开始走强，但安全性投资美国国债市场也有所攀升，说明投资者正变得更为谨慎。
GDP报告显示，二季度消费者支出出现下滑，而消费者支出是上市公司盈利与经济复苏的关键因素。
芝加哥Harris私人银行首席投资官杰克-阿布林(Jack Ablin)指出，“GDP好于预期的一个重要原因是政府增加了开支，而通过政府开支来刺激经济成长显然是不可持续的。”
他表示，“但我仍认为美国经济将在第三季度恢复增长。”
7月芝加哥采购经理人指数从上月的39.9上升至43.4，市场预期为43.0。
截至收盘，道琼斯工业平均指数上涨了17.15点，报收9171.61点，涨幅为0.19%；纳斯达克综合指数下跌了5.80点，报收1978.50点，跌幅为0.29%；标准普尔500指数上涨了0.73点，报收987.48点，涨幅为0.07%。
道指本周累计上涨0.9%，标普500上涨0.8%，纳指上涨0.6%。道指本月共上涨8.6%，标普500上涨7.4%，纳指上涨7.8%。
美国最大的住房、汽车与商业保险公司之一Travelers Cos上涨了2.7%，该公司在昨日上调了全年每股收益目标后，一家券商调升了其评级。
迪士尼下跌了4.2%，因金融危机对广告与消费者支出造成冲击，这一媒体与娱乐巨头上一财季利润下降了26%。
摩根大通将迪士尼评级从“均配”调降至“低配”。
受能源价格下滑以及燃料需求减弱影响，雪佛龙上一财季利润缩水71%，但该公司上调了全年产量目标并表示正在实施削减成本措施，该股上涨了2.6%。
纽约证交所成交量为15.1亿股，去年全年日均成交量为14.9亿股。纳斯达克市场成交量为22.7亿股，去年日均成交量为22.8亿股。
纽约证交所股票上涨与下跌家数比为1879比1137，纳斯达克上涨与下跌家数比为1356比1282。
纽约商业交易所9月原油期货合约上涨2.51美元，收于69.45美元，创一个月来新高，涨幅为3.7%。油价本周累计上涨2%。
8月黄金合约上涨18.80美元，收于 953.70美元/盎司，涨幅为2%。金价(206,1.49,0.73%)本周持平，本月涨2.8%。
欧洲主要股指方面，德国DAX 30指数下跌0.53%，收于5332点。法国CAC-40指数下跌0.27%，收于 3426点。英国富时100指数下跌0.50%，收于4608点。
美国第二季度GDP下滑1.0%
美国商务部公布的第二季度国内生产总值(GDP)首次估算报告表明，今年第二季度美国经济萎缩幅度显著缩小，表明经济衰退状况可能已经见底。
报告表明，今年第二季度美国的实际国内生产总值——即经过通货膨胀和季节性因素调整之后美国经济中所有商品与服务的价值——下滑了1.0%。今年头六个月美国的GDP下滑了5.9%。
此前市场平均预期美国第二季度GDP年率数字将下滑1.2%。在今天的报告中，商务部将第一季度GDP数字从上次公布的下滑5.5%修正为下滑6.4%。
尽管刚刚公布的美国第二季度GDP初次估算数字好于前几个月的报告数字，但由于目前美国经济在大萧条时期以来首次出现连续四个季度负增长，因此本轮经济衰退的严重程度仍然受到市场的密切关注。
过去四个季度内美国经济创纪录的下滑了3.9%，为历史最大的年度跌幅。
从第二季度GDP报告来看，其中最显著的变化是美国企业界不再像从前一样疯狂的削减投资与库存。此外，联邦政府采取的刺激经济增长措施也开始按照原先预想的那样发挥作用，政府开支逐步增长。贸易行业也对第二季度美国经济增长做出了自己的贡献。
第二季度GDP下滑1.0%，稍好于此前接受MarketWatch调查的经济学家平均预期的下滑1.2%。
美联储主席本-伯南克(Ben Bernanke)在本周早些时候表示，美联储预计美国经济将从第三季度开始恢复增长。伯南克在堪萨斯市市政厅举行的特别会议上对当地居民表示，美联储预计今年下半年美国经济增长年率数字将达1.0%。
美国总统奥巴马(Barack Obama)也发表了与伯南克观点类似的讲话。奥巴马在周二表示，他预计美国第二季度经济将出现负增长。奥巴马表示他对周五的GDP数字没有进行预测，但他指出，接受调查的经济学家普遍认为“过去几个月内美国经济萎缩幅度已经大幅放缓。”奥巴马表示，尽管美国的失业率仍然处在过高的水平，但目前失业率的攀升幅度比年初已经有所减缓。
奥巴马表示，“我认为GDP数字仍将表明美国第二季度经济继续萎缩，而且失业人口继续增加将是个非常严峻的问题。我们不仅要看到GDP数字出现技术性的改善，还要看到美国人民的就业前景好转、收入好恢复增长，否则我们不得安宁。实现这些目标还需要一些时间。”
对经济学家而言，第三季度的头一个月份也即将结束，因此第二季度的GDP数字并不是什么新闻。这些经济学家更感兴趣的是进入第三季度时美国经济是否出现了一些新的迹象。从这个角度来看，今天公布的GDP报告整体利好。
商务部今天公布的GDP报告中的一项先行指数，即最终销售指数下滑了0.2%，跌幅远远小于第一季度的-4.1%。最终销售指数是衡量企业界削减库存速度的一项指数。
美国7月芝加哥采购经理人指数升至43.4
芝加哥全美采购经理人协会(National Purchasing Management Association Chicago)报告称，美国7月芝加哥采购经理人指数(PMI)从6月份的39.9%攀升至43.4%，表明美国下半年的经济前景有所好转。
芝加哥全美采购经理人协会(ISM)报告表明，7月份的此项商业景气指数创造了08年9月份以来新高；但该指数低于50%，表明商业状况仍在萎缩。
报告显示，随着商业库存减少、企业界削减商业投资的规模缩小、海外市场需求状况改善，美国企业界活动的萎缩程度正在减缓，这些情况都强化了美国经济衰退将在今年年底结束的市场预期。此外，美国联邦政府实行的“旧车换现金”计划也推动了汽车市场需求回升，有助于汽车行业复苏。
在ISM公布7月采购经理人指数之前，穆迪公司旗下Economy.com的资深经济学家莱恩-斯威特(Ryan Sweet)在宾夕法尼亚州West Chester市表示，“汽车制造业滑坡的最严峻时期可能已经过去。受到汽车行业恢复生产以及库存调整的推动，美国制造业可能将恢复增长动力。”
根据此前接受彭博新闻社调查的51位经济学家预期中值，美国7月芝加哥采购经理人指数将上升至43%；预期范围从38.1%到46%不等。
今天公布的美国7月芝加哥采购经理人指数报告中，订单指数从6月份的41.6回升至48；生产指数从39.3回升至43.3。
报告表明，7月份的雇佣指数从6月的28.9攀升至35.3，创今年最高水平。
7月报告中衡量购买原材料价格的支付价格指数下降至35，表明今年7月份美国企业的成本下降速度比6月份更快。交货时间指数从6月份的43.1跃升至49.6。
经济学家普遍将芝加哥采购经理人指数视为美国制造业整体前景的一项领先指数。制造业在美国经济中的比重约为12%。
美国交通部在7月29日报告称，截至7月29日当天，联邦政府从本月开始实行的“旧车换现金”计划已经促成了1.6351万辆新车销售。该计划的发起者、密歇根州民主党参议员黛比-史戴布诺(Debbie Stabenow)昨天(7月30日)表示，“旧车换现金”计划准备了10亿美元现金，但在实行6天之后就出现现金告急的状况，表明这项计划非常成功。美国国会立法者表示，目前机车换现金计划的资金可以维持到11月1日，预计该计划将刺激2.5万辆新车销售。
美国全国供应管理协会的7月份制造业活动指数将在8月3日公布。目前经济学家平均预期该指数将从6月份的44.8上涨至46.5，创08年8月以来新高。
很多美国企业都预计未来制造业活动将会有所改善，总部位于特拉华州威明顿的美国第三大化工产品生产商杜邦公司(DuPont)便是其中之一。杜邦公司表示，受到削减成本计划以及农作物种子销售增加的推动，第二财季盈利超出市场预期。
杜邦公司首席执行官埃伦-库尔曼(Ellen Kullman)在7月21日发表的声明中表示，“我们采取的积极提高产量以及在公司范围内削减成本的措施，正在收获良好效果。”
纽约油价创1个月新高 本周增2%
纽约市场的主力原油期货合约高收近4%，收盘价突破69美元/桶，创一个月来新高，扭转了本周前几天入不敷出的颓势。美国政府发布的GDP数据显示，第二季度经济的萎缩速度低于预期。在美元汇率下滑的推动下，以美元计价的油价明显上扬。推动油价上涨的因素还有，午后美股维持温和涨势，在整个七月的交易中主要股指均有望大幅收高。
截至周五美东时间下午2:30(北京时间周六凌晨2点30分)，纽约商业交易所9月原油期货合约上涨2.51美元，收于69.45美元，涨幅为3.7%。今天油价的波动较为剧烈，盘中9月合约的最高值为69.74美元，最低为64.96美元。
Tyche资本顾问公司的经理人董事塔里奇-萨希尔(Tariq Zahir)表示：“今天油价转涨得益于美元汇率疲软和股市由跌转升。但是，我们预计未来几周中油价将大幅下滑，过去一周的基本面数据已表明了这一点。”
本周的五个交易日中油价的波动极为剧烈，周三最近期合约重跌近6%。当天上午政府发布的数据表明，上周美国的石油库存因需求下滑而大幅攀升。但是，周四油价又反弹5%以上，几乎收复了周三的全部失地。
德国商业银行的分析师在一份致客户的研究报告中写道：“商品市场的过山车行情将延续一段时间。但是，短期内基本面数据无法支撑油价继续上涨，周三美国的原油库存大幅增加就是明证。”
能源市场投资者关注的经济数据还有今晨商务部发布的GDP报告。第二季美国GDP的年化降幅为1%，低于接受MarketWatch调查的经济学家的平均预期。
虽然第二季GDP的萎缩速度低于预期，但美国经济总量已连续四个季度下滑。自美国于1947年设立GDP统计以来，这种情况此前还从未发生过。
纽约金价突破950美元 本周持平月涨2.8%
纽约市场的最近期黄金期货合约上涨2%，收盘价突破950美元/盎司。今天金价上涨主要得益于美元汇率在GDP数据发布后明显下滑，黄金作为一种替代性投资品的吸引力随之增长。
今晨联邦商务部宣布，第二季度美国GDP的年化降幅为1%。该降幅低于接受MarketWatch调查的经济学家的普遍预期。纽约金市收盘时，美元对主要外币的汇率仍维持跌势，美元指数下跌1.22%，至78.32点。
截至周五美东时间下午1:30(北京时间周六凌晨1点30分)，纽约商业交易所Comex部门上市的8月黄金合约上涨18.80美元，收于 953.70美元/盎司，涨幅为2%。盘中8月合约的最高值为958.10美元，最低为932美元。目前该合约与一周前的收盘价基本持平。依据最近期合约的收盘价计算，整个七月纽约市场的金价上涨约2.8%。
TheBullionDesk.com的分析师詹姆斯-摩尔(James Moore)表示：“未来几周中金价可能受股市和汇市多变情绪的影响，在交易清淡的夏季假期，市场将根据不断变换的经济状况而变化，其连带效应将影响投资者对风险的偏好程度。”
他还称，未来几周金价可能在925至965美元这一较宽区间内波动，而短期内最有可能的走向是大幅回调。
南非金矿商AngloGold Ashanti Ltd。(AU)的股价大幅攀升。稍早时该公司宣布，第二财季的修正利润增至创纪录的1.67亿美元，合每股47美分。前一财季AngloGold的利润为1.5亿美元，合每股42美分。
虽然第二季GDP的萎缩速度低于预期，但是美国经济总量已连续四个季度下滑。自美国于1947年设立GDP统计以来，这种情况此前还从未发生过。
Kitco金属公司的高级分析师乔恩-纳德勒(Jon Nadler)表示：“迄今美国经济还处在转向期。经济萎缩速度的下降可以被视为奥巴马政府的复苏计划已经扎根，而且已开始长出一些绿芽。”
美国最大的黄金ETF：SPDR Gold Trust宣布，截至本周四收盘的黄金持有量为1072.87吨，与一天前持平。过去一个月中SPDR的持金量已下降约50吨。今天金市收盘时SPDR上涨2.14%，至93.58美元。SPDR的持金量可以很好地体现市场对黄金的投资需求。
其他金属期货中，9月铜合约上涨46美分，至2.6175美元/磅，涨幅为3%；9月白银合约的价格下跌46美分，至13.945美元/盎司，跌幅为3%；10月白金合约上涨20.50美元，至1209.70美元/盎司，涨幅为1.7%；9月钯合约上涨5.5美元，至264.85美元/盎司，涨幅为2.1%。
欧洲股市收低 石油板块领跌
周五欧洲股市小幅下滑。意大利石油行业巨头Eni宣布削减股息，令投资者情绪受到沉重打击，导致石油生产商板块普遍走低。此外，美国公布的经济数据好坏不一，使欧洲股市投资者情绪谨慎。
泛欧道琼斯Stoxx 600指数(ST:SXXP)下跌0.15%，收于224.91点。
周四泛欧道琼斯Stoxx 600指数在法国电信等公司利好财报的推动下创下了2009年新高。
周五欧洲股市中的石油生产商板块普遍下滑，其中意大利石油行业巨头Eni (IT:ENI)下跌了7.7%，此前该公司报告称第二财季净盈利同比减少了76%，降至8.32亿欧元。这家公司同时将其股息削减了23%。
Evolution Securities机构分析师表示，“Eni公司宣布削减股息，对欧洲股市造成了严重的负面影响。”
法国石油行业巨头道达尔能源集团(Total) (FR:FP)股价下跌了2.7%，此前该公司报告称第二财季净盈利同比减少了54%，降至21.7亿欧元(30.6亿美元)，原因是能源产品售价下滑、产量降低。
英国石油公司(BP) (UK:BP)以及皇家荷兰壳牌石油公司(Royal Dutch Shell) (UK:RDSA) (RDS.A)等其他欧洲石油行业公司普遍走低。
欧洲主要股指方面，德国DAX 30指数(DX:1876534)下跌0.53%，收于5,332点。法国CAC-40指数(FR:1804546)下跌0.27%，收于 3,426点。英国富时100指数(UK:UKX)下跌0.50%，收于4,608点。(明煜)
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