作者:余楠 发表于:2009-11-07
http://www.ebusinessreview.cn/c/articlesingle-layoutId-54-id-3325.html
一个自称不以利润为主要考核目标的企业，却每年进账3亿元，同时在餐饮业内拥有数一数二的顾客满意度和员工忠诚度。
这些令人艳羡的表象让人禁不住探究：其内在的驱动力究竟何在？
长江商学院EMBA14期学员、海底捞董事长张勇忽然决定到他的西单分店吃顿晚饭的时候，秘书告诉他，所有包间都已经订满，实在无法安排。最终，他这个董事长所能够享有的最大特权，也就是在大堂拥有几个不用排队的散座。就连享受这点特权，也得穿过门前几十位正在下跳棋、打扑克、吃瓜子的等位顾客狐疑的眼光，他们仿佛在问：这家伙为什么不排队？
海底捞在食客中以“等位”而著名。曾经有一位火锅业同行在夜里10点慕名前往，服务员的一句话让他终身难忘，服务员真诚地说：“哥，您别等了，今天吃不上了。改天给我们打个电话我们提前给您留个位。”此时离打佯时间还有近3个小时。等待区人声鼎沸但其乐融融，并非通常所见的抱怨和焦急。人们喝着免费豆浆、柠檬水，亲朋好友间或是在惬意地聊天，或是已经摆开了牌局。除此之外，等位的顾客还可以享受到免费擦鞋、免费上网或免费美甲的服务。等待尽管漫长到两三个小时，但一点都不煎熬。
而店堂中的繁忙景象一如所有曾经有的描写或者网友热情的评论：满座的顾客，穿梭来去笑意盈盈的服务员，他们的服务完全像传说当中一样殷勤。旁边一桌客人点了面条，服务生——或许应该称之为表演者——将一根面条舞动得像长了眼睛一般，逗得一桌子小姑娘咯咯发笑。
还是那个夜晚，当张勇在9点左右结束晚饭出门时，门口蔚为壮观的景象让记者有点惊讶——虽然早已对海底捞的火暴有所耳闻，但在炎热的夏季夜晚，围绕着数十张小方桌的上百位等位者所制造出的喧闹气氛和巨大声浪，还有他们似乎超出常人的耐心，还是显得令人讶异。
海底捞遍布全国的30多家分店在顾客眼里都是这样自如运转的赚钱机器，但张勇却声称自己并不以利润为主要考核目标。如果企业本身具有意识，它首先拿来为自己辩护的一定是财务报表。事实上，当我们判断一家企业的价值时，利润是最简单有效的衡量标准。当一位企业家声称利润并非他看重的主要指标，而实际上他的生意正如日中天时，我们难免会质疑这个声称的真诚度。
传说中的海底捞
火锅是中国民间最为流行的美食之一，在任何一座城市经营火锅店都非易事，在中国创造一个火锅品牌更是充满挑战。1994年在四川简阳起步的海底捞火锅不过是4张餐桌的小店。15年后，它已经在北京、上海、西安、郑州等地拥有36家分店，成为全国知名火锅品牌之一。
凡来过海底捞的人，恐怕都很难不对细致入微的服务留下强烈的印象，有人夸张地称之为“变态伺候”：顾客入座后，立马会送上绑头发用的皮筋、围裙、手机套，就餐期间会有服务员不时递上热毛巾。更深的感触是服务员个个精神饱满，快乐感染了每位顾客。在“大众点评网”上，很多顾客对这种贴心服务感到“受宠若惊”， 感慨“终于找到了做上帝的感觉”。
到目前为止，海底捞无疑是一个成功的商业故事，有管理学教授跟踪探访海底捞的商业智慧。在餐饮业中，火锅是对食物烹调要求相对较低的一种。缺乏差异化使得火锅业竞争异常激烈，经营者往往会尽量降低运营成本而与竞争对手区分开。但这些途径往往很快被整个行业复制，包括曾经被披露的反复使用锅底等行业黑幕。海底捞的菜品在顾客中以干净、新鲜以及分量适宜而著称。结合他们的超品质服务，我们不免好奇海底捞的利润如何，又来自哪里？
也许正如海底捞自己的广告语：“好火锅自己会说话”，它每年3亿元的营业额来自这些表象下面埋藏着的未知的内在驱动力。
被误解的海底捞
所有顾客都是“上帝”吗？
在张勇看来，顾客满意度和忠诚度要远比简单的利润加减法重要得多。他们所提供的无与伦比的服务，似乎也证明了他们在争取每一位顾客时付出的努力。 海底捞的北京分店大部分时间能保持每晚高达3到5桌的翻台率，堪称餐饮界的奇迹。海底捞不断在菜品与服务上创新，以求为顾客带来意想不到的体验，但并非每一位等待要求被满足的顾客都能在海底捞如愿。
有人曾经借机问过张勇：“3个小时的等位时间对一些人来说未免太漫长，他们不在乎免费茶水，也不需要擦鞋美甲，你将如何吸引这些顾客？”
张勇的回答简单而干脆：“对时间过于敏感的顾客不会选择吃火锅，也就不会选择海底捞。”
提前预订或者两三个小时的等位时间已经成为海底捞的特色之一。这一特色已经超出了大多数中低档餐饮服务对便利、廉价的追求。海底捞倡导并竭力营造“为家庭、朋友聚会提供优质服务的场所”，定位于看重体验而非效率的顾客。因此，对于等位时间过于敏感的顾客，海底捞也只好放弃。
海底捞的一线服务员都拥有免单权，既简化了流程也加强了服务员应对特殊情况的能力。但也有一些顾客曾利用海底捞这一特色蛮横强行要求免单，这些人的要求当然就不会被满足，同时也不会被任何企业或个人所欢迎。
经营餐饮业最大的成本不是来自食物，而是租用的店面、水电和员工工资等，收入又几乎全部来自食客，因而顾客忠诚度成为企业赢利能力和增长的主要驱动力，也是决定海底捞利润的一个重要因素。但满意的顾客并不一定会是忠诚的顾客，发掘与餐厅理念契合的顾客，并了解他们的需求是海底捞的“顾客经”。
给顾客不可替代的非常体验，令其非常满意，并不是件容易的事，但恰恰激发了员工的创造性。在海底捞的企业内刊上，有很多员工亲自撰写的工作感受，其中有很多是对提高顾客忠诚度的感悟。北京七店的客户经理被员工亲切地称为“干妈”。她的能耐让很多新员工佩服，一问今天哪儿有老顾客？干妈都会顺畅地回答道：“大厅96号，苏打水宋哥;大厅1号，爱美甲的张姐⋯⋯” 任何关于老顾客的问题，她都能倒背如流地回答。
中国作为一个人口众多的餐饮消费大国，餐饮龙头企业发展并不理想，百强餐饮企业的市场份额居然不到10％。在这样一个劳动密集型、低门槛的激烈竞争市场，不少餐厅选择“跟风”来招揽顾客。海底捞并没有为此去开发各式各样的特色应景，而是先确立餐厅文化理念，再选择顾客并培养他们的忠诚度。 企业文化先行的商业理念并不陌生，但与海底捞这样的中档大众餐 厅联系起来让人惊讶。
优质服务可以保证一切吗？
海底捞有一点似乎让人难以理解，它的董事长张勇总是谦虚地说自己对美食并不在行。但他绝对是超一流的服务员。技校出身的他10多年前在街边摆摊卖麻辣烫的时候，就知道自己的麻辣烫味道不是最好的，但他非常朴素地认为令顾客满意的服务一样可以招揽回头客，他独创了接待的招牌动作：右手抚心区，腰微弯，面带自然笑容，左右自然前伸作请状。这个动作今天在海底捞随处可见。
也许正如张勇自己所言：四川火锅味重偏麻辣，吃到最后味觉都麻木了，服务成为差异化的代言。这点对小小麻辣烫摊是适用的，对地方的火锅店也是受用的，但如果在北京这样的大城市在5年间开起了11家分店而且天天火暴，这点朴素的观念显得未免单薄。豪华汽车司机脸上的微笑绝对不能代替豪华汽车。北京城火锅店多如牛毛，如果味道差强人意，无论服务员对顾客多么的尽善尽美，都毫无用处。
服务创新是海底捞最被津津乐道的，但新菜品的开发也一直是海底捞不断追求的。在诸多中华美食中，火锅是相对“粗犷”的一类，食客对菜品本身的烹饪精细程度诉求相对较少，而对其安全、绿色、营养价值格外关注。对于涮锅用肉类食品，海底捞不仅对产地精挑细选，还摸索初加工以及切片工艺保证健康与方便使用。在锅底方面，海底捞自创了鸳鸯无渣锅底和蹄花三鲜锅底等，成为传统四川火锅的补充。除此之外，海底捞还推出了一系列特色凉卤小吃等，其中当数海底捞捞面影响最为广远。它将舞蹈与抻面结合在一起，观赏性极强。不少顾客还制作了视频，并有不少在网络上流传，免费为海底捞进行“口碑传播”。
海底捞对食物品质的注重，甚至体现在他们为等位顾客所提供的免费食品和饮料上。曾经有顾客反映免费豆浆豆渣过多影响口感，海底捞立马改进并提供柠檬水增加顾客的选择。海底捞的免费爆米花也是顾客所津津乐道的，其口味和质量远远超过了电影院里价格奇高的爆米花。
2009年夏天，海底捞底料和蘸酱料陆续开始在超市出售，共分3大系列17品种，并已经在北京、西安和郑州市场上取得了良好的反响。海底捞还计划每年推出1－2款有影响、有效率的火锅品种，每季推出5－10种新菜品。很多服务理论都在关注服务过程的质量，包括提供服务的可靠性、及时性、权威性和顾客认可，但很少提及向顾客提供的最终价值。对于一家火锅店，食品质量和味道就是服务的最终结果，但也往往被解读海底捞的人们所忽视。
人性化是万能灵药吗？
美味的菜品和人性化的服务往往是人们对海底捞最直接的感触，但海底捞不为人知的还有“非人性”的后台标准化生产。
如今海底捞火锅遍布全国：北京、上海、西安、郑州、天津和南京。同时，海底捞还与美国夏晖公司合作在四地分别建立了配送中心，这样的投资即使在其他优秀的火锅品牌中也不多见。
北京12家海底捞分店的全部菜品依靠位于大兴西红门的物流中心。这里有一整套先进的清洗、检验、冷藏或者冷冻设备，并组成了严格标准化的生产链条。每天下午从协议农户收购来的蔬菜会先经过专业品控检验进入冷库。第二天早晨这些蔬菜会经过第二步检验进入全自动化的清洗机床、甩干机，并在装箱前经过第三道检验，不合格的需要返工重洗。随后专门的检验室会对这些成品进行细菌含量等检验，通过的会根据各个分店需求装箱进入冷库，在下午由专门的消毒保鲜车运送到各个分店。严格完整的食物配送体系大大简化了各分店厨房的工作，他们只需将菜品拆箱、切片、按重量标准装盘上桌。
除此之外，海底捞后台配送中心与前台各分店餐厅的合作流程也已经高度标准化。为了减少库存并保证菜品的新鲜，各个门店每天需要根据营业情况估算并向计划部报送原料需求量。经过严格的数据分析后，计划部会向配送中心下达采购命令和生产任务。海底捞配送中心的标准化管理已经达到国际水准，在北京残奥会期间曾被选为指定食物配送中心。
“每次只需要一双手，来的却是一个人。”在工业革命初期，亨利•福特曾发出这样的感慨。在海底捞，所有能用“一双手”解决的事情都在通过严格标准化的流程完成，而每一位员工则被赋予了最大的自由与空间投入到为不同顾客提供满意服务中去。这些“非人性”的流程不但没有扼杀海底捞的创造性，反而将员工的热情发挥到了极致。
很多人都在尝试解读海底捞的成功秘诀，但当我们把太多精力放在一线服务的时候，我们忽略了一个事实：一线服务是战略选择的结果。海底捞下重金规划建设配送中心，旨在提高各个分餐厅的经营效率，而员工生产率直接决定其向客户提供的价值，从而影响顾客满意度与忠诚度。专业的后台支持使门店后厨工作量减到最低，不仅最大化了实际营业面积，还保证了足够的员工精力投入到对顾客的直接服务中。目前海底捞分店都配备了诸如自动的火锅加汤设备、自动洗碗机以及触摸屏点菜等自动化设备，以便做到最快速度上齐菜品。海底捞还在努力加强后台菜品配送流程，以期达到“分店无后厨”的最终境界。
故事背后的故事
员工比顾客重要
海底捞成名后，不少大学生慕名而来希望求得一个职位。但面对如何挑选员工的问题，海底捞董事长张勇坦诚地认为，餐饮业工作简单，但量大压力大，从来都是员工挑他，而不是他挑员工。
但这并不代表张勇不在乎员工。如果说有张勇不在乎的顾客，但几乎没有他不在乎的员工。在大多数餐饮业打工者居住在简陋的地下室时，海底捞不仅为员工提供公寓，还配套24小时热水与空调。公寓内电话、电视和网络一应俱全，有专人打扫卫生，换洗床单。员工生病了会送上药品和病号饭，下夜班的员工还能享受到夜宵服务。
家是一个人奋斗的最大动力。当海底捞努力为顾客提供家庭聚会的优质服务的同时，也在为员工提供家长式的全方位照顾。除去员工本人，海底捞还优先解决配偶及亲戚的工作机会。对于优秀员工，海底捞会每月把一定金额的奖金直接邮寄给员工的家长，让他们一起分享孩子进步的喜悦。
“员工比顾客重要”，张勇从不考察分店的营业额，他只关心员工的满意度。他把两眼只盯着利润的企业家称为糊涂，但他不重视利润并不代表不能获得。海底捞的利润有目共睹，相对于顾客付出的金钱与时间，海底捞不仅依靠优质服务为其营造轻松悠闲的就餐体验，更重要的是通过菜品创新为其提供味觉享受，这才是餐饮业为顾客提供的根本价值。而所有这些价值，取决于它们的直接传递者：员工。
“草根”更渴望人文关怀
海底捞的大部分员工来自现有员工的亲戚朋友，而不是社会招聘。他们大部分没有受过高等教育，但他们对美好生活一样充满向往。“双手改变命运”既是张勇自己创业的经验，也是他观察社会的感悟。对于一个餐饮企业，这样的企业文化和价值观并不容易让人理解，但与海底捞员工的“草根特色”契合在一起，它却给予了员工最大的激励和鼓舞。
海底捞员工的微笑最感染人的不仅是那份关切，还有自信，一下子拉近了和顾客的距离。这份自信来源于张勇对他们近乎溺爱的信任。海底捞的大区经理，拥有百万元的审批权，与其捆绑着的也正是犯错误的机会。如此高风险的授权制度，在私营企业中实属罕见。张勇如此大胆并非有规避风险的过人之处，而是一笔看似糊涂实则聪明的生意账。只有放开手脚，才能开动脑筋；也只有犯错误，才能把所学到的东西刻骨铭心。只有这样，才能加速员工的成长速度。
海底捞北京与上海区的总经理袁华强，年纪轻轻只有29岁，已经负责海底捞全国30多家分店中的12家。19岁时他因家庭条件不好没能进入大学，在海底捞从门童做起，经历了一条从普通员工——优秀员工——领班——分店经理——区域经理，直到大区经理的职业历程。袁华强在北京凭借自己的能力已经买房，初步实现了个人的奋斗目标。这样的故事在海底捞并不少见。几乎所有的大区经理都同袁华强一样，因为种种原因丧失了高等教育的机会，但他们善良和勤奋，希望通过自己双手的劳作改变自己的命运。海底捞给了他们希望变现实的平台，给了他们在实践第一线磨练自己的机会。
在海底捞并不是所有事情都是模糊的。任何新员工都有清晰的升迁路线，可以选择管理、技术和后勤三个方向，只要他们发挥自己的正直、诚实和勤劳，就可以复制袁华强的经历，实现自我价值。这种无视学历与工龄的选拔方式，既保证了员工升迁的公平与公正，又使服务员出身且经验丰富的管理层具备了对顾客满意度的直觉和判断能力。隐含在海底捞员工升迁制度中的还有一个独创的家访制度。 每提升一个员工到重要岗位，张勇都会亲自访问他的老家。一是获取家里的鼓励和期望，这对大多数承担养家责任的海底捞员工是非常重要的。另外，每一个来到海底捞的员工都很年轻，又都缺乏特殊技能，家访有助于了解他们的差异和真实性情。
将“双手改变命运”的价值观变为现实，是海底捞的首要公司目标。从张勇到袁华强，再到每一位努力在工作中创造价值的海底捞员工，这一理念在不断传递。目前海底捞的核心管理团队成员都是超过10年的老员工，他们的忠诚度直接带动了员工创新与生产效率。严格升迁制度保证下“公平公正”的内部环境，不仅为员工带来了尊严和自我实现的机会，更将这种满意与幸福自然而然地传递给每一位顾客，并最终推动公司整体的增长。
海底捞究竟能长多大，走多远，没有人比张勇更担心。当外界对海底捞的优质服务备加推崇时，他担心的是如何将企业文化在海底捞内部继续很好地传递下去，让“双手改变命运”的梦想永不破灭。在他眼里，服务已经不是普通顾客眼中的微笑与无微不至，服务是一张连系企业利润、顾客忠诚度与员工忠诚度的全景图。他依旧不会为企业利润或是任何一家分店的营业额而操心，他开始忧虑的是如何更好地衡量顾客满意度和忠诚度，以及员工的满意度和忠诚度，因为这才是最终决定企业赢利能力的关键。
2009年11月14日 星期六
The Art of the Exit
ANTHONY TJAN UPSTARTS AND TITANS
8:00 AM Wednesday October 21, 2009
http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/tjan/2009/10/the-art-of-the-exit.html
Tags:Entrepreneurship, Finance
If you think of the venture investment cycle as finding a deal, managing a deal, and then finally "monetizing" or exiting from a deal, then an interesting question is what is the most difficult part of this investment cycle? While critical to success, the first part of the cycle — "deal flow" and the decision to invest in a company — is the easiest part. Even if you miss a good deal opportunity, another one will emerge — they tend to be like trains in that you just need to be patient as another one will come by. The middle bucket of the investment cycle — managing the deal — is the most time-consuming and requires the most work. The trickiest part, though, is often the last part of the cycle: knowing the right time to let go and sell.
At a recent board meeting, one of my colleague directors declared, "Remember, you never make money by buying, only by selling." As obvious as that sounds, we tend to spend more time learning when to buy. Think about the legions of books and articles that focus on making you a savvier investor or more astute manager. Now think about how much you have read on how and when to sell an asset. There are too many entrepreneurial stories in which the "windows of liquidity" were sorely missed.
If the art of the exit is as challenging, or even harder, than the art of investing, what can be done? Here are five principles that might help:
Minimize the risk and need to sell. The first rule is to avoid the issue by smartly investing in assets with resounding long-term value and therefore very long hold periods. Buy things that have sound cash flow and where you at least in theory have "hold forever" potential. A long-term value creating mindset tends to land investors in fewer exit timing problems than a short-term value capture mindset.
Value maximizing will more often lead to value destruction than value satisfaction. It's been said best in a vivid cliché: hungry pigs can get fat, but greedy pigs will get slaughtered. Don't be that greedy pig: it just doesn't make sense to try and go for every last nickel.
If you have the chance, take some chips off the table along the way. I was fortunate when a business I founded was at the dizzying heights of the dot.com craze to have an opportunity to "recap" the business. Basically, it meant a large investment for the business whereby the founders could also take some money off the table. What looked like a premature move at the time turned out to be more lucky than prescient as the markets ended up sliding with the dot.com crash. J.P. Morgan said it well, "I made all my money by selling too early." Whether it is through a dividend, a recap, or straight sale of part or all of the company, if you have a chance to get some liquidity, take a long and serious look.
Remember why you liked the investment in the first place. Peter Lynch, one of the greatest investors of all time, once said, "If you know why you bought a stock in the first place, you'll automatically have a better idea of when to say goodbye to it. When you see core elements of a business or its market change, or when you can feel its customers getting tired, it is probably time to exit. A good friend, who also happens to be one of the smartest private and public equity investors I know, tells me that he always writes down the reasons why he is making an investment. When you do that, you can look back and objectively learn from poor investment choices.
Follow your contrarian instincts. Some of the most successful investors look at opportunities when others are looking elsewhere. The art of the exit is similar, in that if lots of people are buying than it may be time to start to consider selling. As some of my former Harvard Business School professors have observed and shared with me, the time to get out of something is when everyone from a graduating class wants to get into it.
These have been some trying and volatile times for private and public company investors. There is no clairvoyant or simple formula to determine exactly when one should exit a company. Amateur and professional investors who are ardent students of investing should balance the workload and opt for more insights on selling. After all, aren't you tired of the cocktail party chats about how much money someone has made on something they have not yet sold?
8:00 AM Wednesday October 21, 2009
http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/tjan/2009/10/the-art-of-the-exit.html
Tags:Entrepreneurship, Finance
If you think of the venture investment cycle as finding a deal, managing a deal, and then finally "monetizing" or exiting from a deal, then an interesting question is what is the most difficult part of this investment cycle? While critical to success, the first part of the cycle — "deal flow" and the decision to invest in a company — is the easiest part. Even if you miss a good deal opportunity, another one will emerge — they tend to be like trains in that you just need to be patient as another one will come by. The middle bucket of the investment cycle — managing the deal — is the most time-consuming and requires the most work. The trickiest part, though, is often the last part of the cycle: knowing the right time to let go and sell.
At a recent board meeting, one of my colleague directors declared, "Remember, you never make money by buying, only by selling." As obvious as that sounds, we tend to spend more time learning when to buy. Think about the legions of books and articles that focus on making you a savvier investor or more astute manager. Now think about how much you have read on how and when to sell an asset. There are too many entrepreneurial stories in which the "windows of liquidity" were sorely missed.
If the art of the exit is as challenging, or even harder, than the art of investing, what can be done? Here are five principles that might help:
Minimize the risk and need to sell. The first rule is to avoid the issue by smartly investing in assets with resounding long-term value and therefore very long hold periods. Buy things that have sound cash flow and where you at least in theory have "hold forever" potential. A long-term value creating mindset tends to land investors in fewer exit timing problems than a short-term value capture mindset.
Value maximizing will more often lead to value destruction than value satisfaction. It's been said best in a vivid cliché: hungry pigs can get fat, but greedy pigs will get slaughtered. Don't be that greedy pig: it just doesn't make sense to try and go for every last nickel.
If you have the chance, take some chips off the table along the way. I was fortunate when a business I founded was at the dizzying heights of the dot.com craze to have an opportunity to "recap" the business. Basically, it meant a large investment for the business whereby the founders could also take some money off the table. What looked like a premature move at the time turned out to be more lucky than prescient as the markets ended up sliding with the dot.com crash. J.P. Morgan said it well, "I made all my money by selling too early." Whether it is through a dividend, a recap, or straight sale of part or all of the company, if you have a chance to get some liquidity, take a long and serious look.
Remember why you liked the investment in the first place. Peter Lynch, one of the greatest investors of all time, once said, "If you know why you bought a stock in the first place, you'll automatically have a better idea of when to say goodbye to it. When you see core elements of a business or its market change, or when you can feel its customers getting tired, it is probably time to exit. A good friend, who also happens to be one of the smartest private and public equity investors I know, tells me that he always writes down the reasons why he is making an investment. When you do that, you can look back and objectively learn from poor investment choices.
Follow your contrarian instincts. Some of the most successful investors look at opportunities when others are looking elsewhere. The art of the exit is similar, in that if lots of people are buying than it may be time to start to consider selling. As some of my former Harvard Business School professors have observed and shared with me, the time to get out of something is when everyone from a graduating class wants to get into it.
These have been some trying and volatile times for private and public company investors. There is no clairvoyant or simple formula to determine exactly when one should exit a company. Amateur and professional investors who are ardent students of investing should balance the workload and opt for more insights on selling. After all, aren't you tired of the cocktail party chats about how much money someone has made on something they have not yet sold?
The Goldman Bonuses: I'm Shocked, Shocked
10:17 AM Friday October 16, 2009
by Roger Martin
http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/cs/2009/10/the_goldman_bonus_a_casablanca.html?cm_re=homepage-061609-_-body-left-r4-_-recession
Tags:Compensation, Economy, Finance
In the debate surrounding the Goldman Sachs bonuses, it feels to me as though commentators are missing some fundamentals. They are looking at the size of the potential bonuses and, in the wake of the $10 billion of bailout money Goldman received in the darkest hours of the financial crisis, asking, "How could they?"
In my view, we should not be the least bit surprised. For the first 130 years of its 140-year existence, Goldman Sachs was a partnership; its sole purpose for that period was to use the partners' money to make as much more money for the partners as humanly possible.
In 1999, Goldman went public and its sole purpose changed: thereafter its purpose was to use the public shareholders' capital to make as much money for the partners as humanly possible. The story isn't much more complicated. So we should not be surprised that Goldman has chosen to use taxpayers' money to make as much money for the partners as humanly possible — after all, it's just another pool of capital to be used to achieve the end goal of enriching the Goldman partners.
I find that the capital markets are quite Pollyanna-ish about publicly traded professional service firms and have written about that in HBR previously ("Capital versus Talent: The Battle That's Reshaping Business"). The natural form of business organization for a professional service firm, such as an investment bank, law firm, consulting firm or ad agency, is a partnership rather than a public company.
The reason goes right back to a basic Michael Porter five-forces analysis. The key supplied input in a professional services firm is a group of talented professionals and their supplier power is immense. They have the power to extract a disproportionate amount of the profitability out of the enterprise by pushing up their own compensation.
How should the enterprise seek to ameliorate supplier power? Porter has the answer: backwards integrate. In the case of aluminum producers, that means buying your bauxite supplier. In the case of a law firm or investment bank, it means acquiring your supplier of talent by making the talent the owner. The way to do that is structure the enterprise as a partnership. The suppliers won't put a gun to their own heads and yell: "Give me more compensation or I will blow my own head off." That would be silly.
And so it was for investment banks for the longest time. They were money-making partnerships and the minute a talented associate got sufficiently powerful that he/she would be in a position to start extracting major remuneration from the partnership, the partnership counter-struck by making the associate a partner. The new partner would then have balanced incentives that would prevent him or her from overtaxing the firm to the point of its extinction.
But in due course, these partnerships recognized that if they could convince naïve external capital to give them more resources, they would have a brand new pool of capital from which to extract value. They could show what an impressive and profitable (before partner distributions) a business they were in order to entice external shareholders into the tent. And as soon as they had the external shareholders' capital, they would return to the sole purpose of making money for the partners-turned-senior executives.
Thanks to the external capital, they could engage in lots more sales and trading and principal investing activities. Eventually these would drive the major investment banks off the cliff in the fall of 2008. Even Goldman saw its share price fall to $52 in November 2008, in the middle of the Lehman Brothers/Bear Stearns crisis, a dollar less than its $53/share IPO price in May 1999. It wasn't much of a return for shareholders over ten years, though the Goldman bankers during that period earned wonderful compensation. But thankfully for those Goldman bankers, the taxpayers stepped in and stabilized the financial markets with a huge infusion of their current and future tax dollars and Goldman shares traded above $190/share within a year. Life is good again and it is time for the bonuses to flow, as they always have.
So this is not new at all. The order of priority is: Goldman bankers first, the external shareholders second, and everybody else last. This is not a secret and has never been. The Goldman bankers are not trying to be sneaky. In the current situation, if sounding sorrowful or giving a bit more money to charities helps preserve Goldman's primary imperative of maximizing banker earnings in the future, we will see a dollop of each. But there should be no confusion as to the purpose of any such gesture.
Roger Martin is the Dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto in Canada and the author of The Opposable Mind and The Design of Business.
by Roger Martin
http://blogs.harvardbusiness.org/cs/2009/10/the_goldman_bonus_a_casablanca.html?cm_re=homepage-061609-_-body-left-r4-_-recession
Tags:Compensation, Economy, Finance
In the debate surrounding the Goldman Sachs bonuses, it feels to me as though commentators are missing some fundamentals. They are looking at the size of the potential bonuses and, in the wake of the $10 billion of bailout money Goldman received in the darkest hours of the financial crisis, asking, "How could they?"
In my view, we should not be the least bit surprised. For the first 130 years of its 140-year existence, Goldman Sachs was a partnership; its sole purpose for that period was to use the partners' money to make as much more money for the partners as humanly possible.
In 1999, Goldman went public and its sole purpose changed: thereafter its purpose was to use the public shareholders' capital to make as much money for the partners as humanly possible. The story isn't much more complicated. So we should not be surprised that Goldman has chosen to use taxpayers' money to make as much money for the partners as humanly possible — after all, it's just another pool of capital to be used to achieve the end goal of enriching the Goldman partners.
I find that the capital markets are quite Pollyanna-ish about publicly traded professional service firms and have written about that in HBR previously ("Capital versus Talent: The Battle That's Reshaping Business"). The natural form of business organization for a professional service firm, such as an investment bank, law firm, consulting firm or ad agency, is a partnership rather than a public company.
The reason goes right back to a basic Michael Porter five-forces analysis. The key supplied input in a professional services firm is a group of talented professionals and their supplier power is immense. They have the power to extract a disproportionate amount of the profitability out of the enterprise by pushing up their own compensation.
How should the enterprise seek to ameliorate supplier power? Porter has the answer: backwards integrate. In the case of aluminum producers, that means buying your bauxite supplier. In the case of a law firm or investment bank, it means acquiring your supplier of talent by making the talent the owner. The way to do that is structure the enterprise as a partnership. The suppliers won't put a gun to their own heads and yell: "Give me more compensation or I will blow my own head off." That would be silly.
And so it was for investment banks for the longest time. They were money-making partnerships and the minute a talented associate got sufficiently powerful that he/she would be in a position to start extracting major remuneration from the partnership, the partnership counter-struck by making the associate a partner. The new partner would then have balanced incentives that would prevent him or her from overtaxing the firm to the point of its extinction.
But in due course, these partnerships recognized that if they could convince naïve external capital to give them more resources, they would have a brand new pool of capital from which to extract value. They could show what an impressive and profitable (before partner distributions) a business they were in order to entice external shareholders into the tent. And as soon as they had the external shareholders' capital, they would return to the sole purpose of making money for the partners-turned-senior executives.
Thanks to the external capital, they could engage in lots more sales and trading and principal investing activities. Eventually these would drive the major investment banks off the cliff in the fall of 2008. Even Goldman saw its share price fall to $52 in November 2008, in the middle of the Lehman Brothers/Bear Stearns crisis, a dollar less than its $53/share IPO price in May 1999. It wasn't much of a return for shareholders over ten years, though the Goldman bankers during that period earned wonderful compensation. But thankfully for those Goldman bankers, the taxpayers stepped in and stabilized the financial markets with a huge infusion of their current and future tax dollars and Goldman shares traded above $190/share within a year. Life is good again and it is time for the bonuses to flow, as they always have.
So this is not new at all. The order of priority is: Goldman bankers first, the external shareholders second, and everybody else last. This is not a secret and has never been. The Goldman bankers are not trying to be sneaky. In the current situation, if sounding sorrowful or giving a bit more money to charities helps preserve Goldman's primary imperative of maximizing banker earnings in the future, we will see a dollop of each. But there should be no confusion as to the purpose of any such gesture.
Roger Martin is the Dean of the Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto in Canada and the author of The Opposable Mind and The Design of Business.
如何不为零售业的细节之处劳神
http://www.bwchinese.com/article/trend/2009-09/747.html
看看今年年初零售业的惨淡情形吧，对Liz Claiborne的首席执行官威廉·麦康姆来说，毫无疑问他需要对其生意模式进行大调整。这家身处纽约的公司曾努力以永远先人一步的速度推出高品质的流行服饰， 但较少在海外接触当地独立的供货商。目前的经济形势使麦康姆意识到应该采取一种更为合理的做法，因此在3个月前他决定以830万美元的价格将公司的采购业务出售给中国香港的利丰集团（Li & Fung Group），该业务涉及从寻找材料到成衣制作等整套生产流程。如今Liz Claiborne依然从事Juicy Couture、Kate Spade和Lucky Brand牛仔裤等品牌的设计和营销工作，但是其余事情则是由利丰来处理了。“经济衰退更像是达尔文现象，”麦康姆说，“现在该是彻底改变我们的模式的时候了，要使之更具竞争力。”
美国零售商在应对艰难时局的同时，越来越多地转向与利丰合作。这家香港公司在世界范围内为许多品牌和零售商管理着供应链，它正利用衰退的时机来接管其客户更多的生意，除了帮助它们寻找工厂或原材料以外，也接纳其生产方面最令人头疼的环节，以确保合作厂商满足生产标准并以确定的价格交付成品。1个月前，Talbots宣布准备让利丰成为其主要的全球采购商。年销售额143亿美元的利丰还接手了Toys ‘R’ Us、Timberland和日本凯蒂猫（Hello Kitty）的生产商Sanrio。利丰集团董事总经理冯国纶说，零售商们在寻找大幅削减成本的方式，他们在思考是否需要拥有自己的采购部。
对冯国纶来说，幸运的是上述问题的答案多是否定的。在40个国家设有80家办事机构的利丰运用其庞大的经营规模来为客户压低价格。Liz Claiborne的麦康姆作为利丰的一个客户，称其员工为利丰的效率和其全球网络而震惊。他说，他的员工所要做的就是提交设计和在世界范围内向制造商招标，以达成“产品质量、投放市场速度和价格的最佳组合”。
对利丰来说，接管客户更多的生意是其保持高增长率策略的一部分。公司在2004至2007年间收入翻番至119亿美元，并期望在明年达到200亿美元。冯国纶现年60岁，毕业于普林斯顿大学，与其毕业于麻省理工学院的哥哥、63岁的冯国经共同掌管着这家公司。冯国纶的策略是：买断美国客户全部的采购业务并进行重组，使其获得更多利润。去年利丰进行了7次收购，这可能在2009年为其增加1亿美元的收入。5月5日，公司宣布计划增发新股筹资3.48亿美元，部分资金将用于更多的收购活动。 “他们是生意场上的凯迪拉克，”零售顾问霍华德·戴维多维兹说，“他们的效率为零售商带来了更多的价值。”
可以肯定的是，美国零售业的衰败使得利丰难以从中全身而退。公司正试图通过拓展市场来摆脱对美国的依赖，但其收入的62%仍是在美国市场获得的。对于如今已破产的零售商（例如Mervyns和KB Toys）来说，利丰曾是它们的主要供货商。当地的商家曾在KB破产后威胁要起诉利丰，但是随后双方达成协议并撤消了诉讼。
信用紧缩
破产和仍在持续的次贷危机迫使利丰及其竞争对手改变了经营上的投资方式。几年前，工厂将等待90天或更长才能获得发往利丰客户的货款。可是现在，“工厂已不会再接受这样的长期信用条款”， 利丰总裁布鲁斯·洛克维兹说，“世界回到了起始处，合同条款愈加苛刻。”利丰希望通过自行为客户设计产品来进一步实行拓展。“我们不想成为另一家美国进口商，”冯国纶说，“我们做事更有效率。”
日益高涨的保护主义情绪使得很多公司不愿让自己参与到外包中来，但利丰并不在意这些。洛克维兹称美国的客户知道他们从其零售客户处购买的大部分产品都是在海外生产的。他说：“这些就业岗位早已不在美国了。”
投资者对利丰的机遇颇为看好。公司在香港上市的股票今年以来上涨了63%，而恒生指数仅上涨了6.7%。瑞士信贷预计其今年的收入将上涨33%，达4.2亿美元；销售额将为164亿美元，上涨15%。“我们正在扩大市场份额，”冯国纶说，“我们期待今后将会变得更加强大。”
作者： 布鲁斯·艾因霍恩（Bruce Einhorn），与艾利·麦康农（Aili McConnon）于纽约
商界精英告诉我们，他们大部分的灵感和有效的创意来源于每期阅读商业周刊。
本文来源《商业周刊/中文版》注册会员即可获样刊赠阅，现在订阅可赠美国畅销图书。
看看今年年初零售业的惨淡情形吧，对Liz Claiborne的首席执行官威廉·麦康姆来说，毫无疑问他需要对其生意模式进行大调整。这家身处纽约的公司曾努力以永远先人一步的速度推出高品质的流行服饰， 但较少在海外接触当地独立的供货商。目前的经济形势使麦康姆意识到应该采取一种更为合理的做法，因此在3个月前他决定以830万美元的价格将公司的采购业务出售给中国香港的利丰集团（Li & Fung Group），该业务涉及从寻找材料到成衣制作等整套生产流程。如今Liz Claiborne依然从事Juicy Couture、Kate Spade和Lucky Brand牛仔裤等品牌的设计和营销工作，但是其余事情则是由利丰来处理了。“经济衰退更像是达尔文现象，”麦康姆说，“现在该是彻底改变我们的模式的时候了，要使之更具竞争力。”
美国零售商在应对艰难时局的同时，越来越多地转向与利丰合作。这家香港公司在世界范围内为许多品牌和零售商管理着供应链，它正利用衰退的时机来接管其客户更多的生意，除了帮助它们寻找工厂或原材料以外，也接纳其生产方面最令人头疼的环节，以确保合作厂商满足生产标准并以确定的价格交付成品。1个月前，Talbots宣布准备让利丰成为其主要的全球采购商。年销售额143亿美元的利丰还接手了Toys ‘R’ Us、Timberland和日本凯蒂猫（Hello Kitty）的生产商Sanrio。利丰集团董事总经理冯国纶说，零售商们在寻找大幅削减成本的方式，他们在思考是否需要拥有自己的采购部。
对冯国纶来说，幸运的是上述问题的答案多是否定的。在40个国家设有80家办事机构的利丰运用其庞大的经营规模来为客户压低价格。Liz Claiborne的麦康姆作为利丰的一个客户，称其员工为利丰的效率和其全球网络而震惊。他说，他的员工所要做的就是提交设计和在世界范围内向制造商招标，以达成“产品质量、投放市场速度和价格的最佳组合”。
对利丰来说，接管客户更多的生意是其保持高增长率策略的一部分。公司在2004至2007年间收入翻番至119亿美元，并期望在明年达到200亿美元。冯国纶现年60岁，毕业于普林斯顿大学，与其毕业于麻省理工学院的哥哥、63岁的冯国经共同掌管着这家公司。冯国纶的策略是：买断美国客户全部的采购业务并进行重组，使其获得更多利润。去年利丰进行了7次收购，这可能在2009年为其增加1亿美元的收入。5月5日，公司宣布计划增发新股筹资3.48亿美元，部分资金将用于更多的收购活动。 “他们是生意场上的凯迪拉克，”零售顾问霍华德·戴维多维兹说，“他们的效率为零售商带来了更多的价值。”
可以肯定的是，美国零售业的衰败使得利丰难以从中全身而退。公司正试图通过拓展市场来摆脱对美国的依赖，但其收入的62%仍是在美国市场获得的。对于如今已破产的零售商（例如Mervyns和KB Toys）来说，利丰曾是它们的主要供货商。当地的商家曾在KB破产后威胁要起诉利丰，但是随后双方达成协议并撤消了诉讼。
信用紧缩
破产和仍在持续的次贷危机迫使利丰及其竞争对手改变了经营上的投资方式。几年前，工厂将等待90天或更长才能获得发往利丰客户的货款。可是现在，“工厂已不会再接受这样的长期信用条款”， 利丰总裁布鲁斯·洛克维兹说，“世界回到了起始处，合同条款愈加苛刻。”利丰希望通过自行为客户设计产品来进一步实行拓展。“我们不想成为另一家美国进口商，”冯国纶说，“我们做事更有效率。”
日益高涨的保护主义情绪使得很多公司不愿让自己参与到外包中来，但利丰并不在意这些。洛克维兹称美国的客户知道他们从其零售客户处购买的大部分产品都是在海外生产的。他说：“这些就业岗位早已不在美国了。”
投资者对利丰的机遇颇为看好。公司在香港上市的股票今年以来上涨了63%，而恒生指数仅上涨了6.7%。瑞士信贷预计其今年的收入将上涨33%，达4.2亿美元；销售额将为164亿美元，上涨15%。“我们正在扩大市场份额，”冯国纶说，“我们期待今后将会变得更加强大。”
作者： 布鲁斯·艾因霍恩（Bruce Einhorn），与艾利·麦康农（Aili McConnon）于纽约
商界精英告诉我们，他们大部分的灵感和有效的创意来源于每期阅读商业周刊。
本文来源《商业周刊/中文版》注册会员即可获样刊赠阅，现在订阅可赠美国畅销图书。
如果美元崩溃
http://www.bwchinese.com/article/developments_global/2009-10/878.html
BW中文网讯，《商业周刊》10月16日发表评论文章称，美元崩溃，必然导致美国的通货膨胀的集中爆发，并完全失控，这时的经济轻则衰退重则崩溃。没有人知道美元是否会走向崩溃，但只做最好的打算是很危险的。然而，当美指跌破人的心理承受极限，那末世界又将会变成什么样子？
美元崩溃将会产生严重后果，贸易大战将会爆发，风险敞口过高的银行可能会倒闭，同时通货膨胀将会飙升，届时联储将不得不在经济回稳乏力的时候大幅提高利率。
这场金融危机告诉我们，市场跌起来可能比任何人所预料的幅度更深、速度更快。以房地产为例，房价从2006年开始已经连跌了3年，尽管在泡沫破裂之前大家都觉得房价一点也不能再跌了。
下面我们用这血的教训来看美元。美元也被大家认为不会出现崩溃。自从2002年以来，美元逐步贬值，直到去年的金融危机才转跌为升。然而今年3月份以来，随着投资者转向其他收益率更高的货币，美元已经贬值大约15%。一般人的看法是，美元现在的点位已经非常便宜，应该会出现反弹了。
但是至少思考一下美元崩溃的可能性也是有价值的。原因是房地产市场的崩溃产生如此毁灭性的后果是大家始料未及的：包括贷款商、监管者、信用评级机构在内的所有人都没有料到房价会如此这般跌法。
银行可能内爆
让我们想象一下，假设美元对所有全球主要货币再快速贬值25%，这一幅度与房地产史无前例的30%下跌大致相当。这将意味着2美元才能换1欧元。从好的方面来讲，美国制造商的全球竞争力可能会提升，同时外国游客会涌入美国。坏的方面来讲，由于进口产品成本上升，美国的通胀将会飙升。同时，随着外国买家撤出债务市场，美国人获得贷款将更为困难。从国外来讲，美元大幅贬值将使得其他国家更难把产品出口到美国，贸易大战不可避免。那些没有料到美元会出现崩溃的、风险敞口过大的银行将会内爆。
赤字打压美元
在美元贬值背后是接近于零的美国短期利率。就跟当初的日元一样，投资者现在以极低的成本借入美元，然后卖出美元，买入那些股市和债券回报率更高的国家的货币。联储维持低利率的目的是刺激经济和拯救银行，然而其副作用是美元已经成了国际投机交易的首选燃料。另一股打压美元的力量是美国持续的贸易赤字。一些经济学家和交易者相信美国将被迫实施货币贬值，这样它才能承受其全球债务。尽管今年第二季度贸易逆差占国民生产总值的比重已经从2006年6%的峰值降到了3%，但从历史标准来看依然很高。
最糟糕的情况
到目前为止，奥巴马政府对美元滑坡似乎无动于衷。美元贬值能够让美国生产的产品在世界市场上更有竞争力，从而有助于缩小贸易赤字。然而，一旦金融市场感觉到美元的下跌将像滚雪球一样失去控制，美国政府这种淡定将会在一夜之间消失。美元最糟糕的情况就是下跌不断自我强化，卖出导致更多的卖出。到时候全球各国央行行长和财长可能会出来支撑美元，但尝到胜利果实的投资者却不会被吓住。看多美元的人可能会指出去年在经济危机最严重的时候美元大幅上涨。然而现在无论是美元还是美国经济，都难以找到支撑。
通胀可能迅速升温
对于财政部长盖特纳和其他政府官员支持强势美元的言论，外汇交易者并不怎么买账。他们注意到，从克林顿时期开始，财长们就一直在说支持强势美元，然而自从1995年以来美国一直没有通过购买来支持它的货币。
如果美元果真暴跌，进口价格的飙升速度将会超过大部分经济学家的意料。根据两位哥伦比亚大学经济学家的研究，由于数据不足，从货币贬值到进口价格上涨的传导力度被大大低估。换句话说，通胀可能会比大家普遍认为的来得更快。如果到时候联储不得不大幅提高利率来对抗通胀和防止货币继续贬值，这在增长依旧很疲软的情况下无疑是一场灾难。美元贬值使得美元的购买力下降，从而让美国人变得更为贫穷，而且它也不一定能够提升美国的制造业。20世纪80年代，美元贬值让日元购买力上升并提升了日本汽车制造商的实力，于是底特律非但没有收益，反而受到美元贬值之害。
从近期来看，最大的风险将是那些所持有的高杠杆衍生品容易受美元下跌冲击的金融机构倒闭。美元暴跌不仅仅会影响到外汇交易，也包括利率衍生品和信用违约掉期。在今年第二季度，美国五大银行所持衍生品的信用风险敞口占整个银行体系的88%。
没有人知道美元是否会走向崩溃，但只做最好的打算是很危险的。
BW中文网讯，《商业周刊》10月16日发表评论文章称，美元崩溃，必然导致美国的通货膨胀的集中爆发，并完全失控，这时的经济轻则衰退重则崩溃。没有人知道美元是否会走向崩溃，但只做最好的打算是很危险的。然而，当美指跌破人的心理承受极限，那末世界又将会变成什么样子？
美元崩溃将会产生严重后果，贸易大战将会爆发，风险敞口过高的银行可能会倒闭，同时通货膨胀将会飙升，届时联储将不得不在经济回稳乏力的时候大幅提高利率。
这场金融危机告诉我们，市场跌起来可能比任何人所预料的幅度更深、速度更快。以房地产为例，房价从2006年开始已经连跌了3年，尽管在泡沫破裂之前大家都觉得房价一点也不能再跌了。
下面我们用这血的教训来看美元。美元也被大家认为不会出现崩溃。自从2002年以来，美元逐步贬值，直到去年的金融危机才转跌为升。然而今年3月份以来，随着投资者转向其他收益率更高的货币，美元已经贬值大约15%。一般人的看法是，美元现在的点位已经非常便宜，应该会出现反弹了。
但是至少思考一下美元崩溃的可能性也是有价值的。原因是房地产市场的崩溃产生如此毁灭性的后果是大家始料未及的：包括贷款商、监管者、信用评级机构在内的所有人都没有料到房价会如此这般跌法。
银行可能内爆
让我们想象一下，假设美元对所有全球主要货币再快速贬值25%，这一幅度与房地产史无前例的30%下跌大致相当。这将意味着2美元才能换1欧元。从好的方面来讲，美国制造商的全球竞争力可能会提升，同时外国游客会涌入美国。坏的方面来讲，由于进口产品成本上升，美国的通胀将会飙升。同时，随着外国买家撤出债务市场，美国人获得贷款将更为困难。从国外来讲，美元大幅贬值将使得其他国家更难把产品出口到美国，贸易大战不可避免。那些没有料到美元会出现崩溃的、风险敞口过大的银行将会内爆。
赤字打压美元
在美元贬值背后是接近于零的美国短期利率。就跟当初的日元一样，投资者现在以极低的成本借入美元，然后卖出美元，买入那些股市和债券回报率更高的国家的货币。联储维持低利率的目的是刺激经济和拯救银行，然而其副作用是美元已经成了国际投机交易的首选燃料。另一股打压美元的力量是美国持续的贸易赤字。一些经济学家和交易者相信美国将被迫实施货币贬值，这样它才能承受其全球债务。尽管今年第二季度贸易逆差占国民生产总值的比重已经从2006年6%的峰值降到了3%，但从历史标准来看依然很高。
最糟糕的情况
到目前为止，奥巴马政府对美元滑坡似乎无动于衷。美元贬值能够让美国生产的产品在世界市场上更有竞争力，从而有助于缩小贸易赤字。然而，一旦金融市场感觉到美元的下跌将像滚雪球一样失去控制，美国政府这种淡定将会在一夜之间消失。美元最糟糕的情况就是下跌不断自我强化，卖出导致更多的卖出。到时候全球各国央行行长和财长可能会出来支撑美元，但尝到胜利果实的投资者却不会被吓住。看多美元的人可能会指出去年在经济危机最严重的时候美元大幅上涨。然而现在无论是美元还是美国经济，都难以找到支撑。
通胀可能迅速升温
对于财政部长盖特纳和其他政府官员支持强势美元的言论，外汇交易者并不怎么买账。他们注意到，从克林顿时期开始，财长们就一直在说支持强势美元，然而自从1995年以来美国一直没有通过购买来支持它的货币。
如果美元果真暴跌，进口价格的飙升速度将会超过大部分经济学家的意料。根据两位哥伦比亚大学经济学家的研究，由于数据不足，从货币贬值到进口价格上涨的传导力度被大大低估。换句话说，通胀可能会比大家普遍认为的来得更快。如果到时候联储不得不大幅提高利率来对抗通胀和防止货币继续贬值，这在增长依旧很疲软的情况下无疑是一场灾难。美元贬值使得美元的购买力下降，从而让美国人变得更为贫穷，而且它也不一定能够提升美国的制造业。20世纪80年代，美元贬值让日元购买力上升并提升了日本汽车制造商的实力，于是底特律非但没有收益，反而受到美元贬值之害。
从近期来看，最大的风险将是那些所持有的高杠杆衍生品容易受美元下跌冲击的金融机构倒闭。美元暴跌不仅仅会影响到外汇交易，也包括利率衍生品和信用违约掉期。在今年第二季度，美国五大银行所持衍生品的信用风险敞口占整个银行体系的88%。
没有人知道美元是否会走向崩溃，但只做最好的打算是很危险的。
美元见底
本文来源于《财经网》 2009年11月05日 15:50 共有2条点评
【《财经网》专稿/特约作者 陈勇】在美元弱势成为共识的时候，最近有两个因素促使我们更新对美元汇率的看法，第一，在没有直接触发因素的情况下，美元汇率近期连续反弹；第二，还有一个未被市场充分认识的因素，即美元对外供给正在减少。
缓慢下降的美元需求，对应正在减少的供给，美元的供需状况可能没有一些分析人士认为得那么悲观。在美元储备货币地位下降的过程中，美元汇率不大可能同步下滑。
中长期的“微笑曲线”
一个争议较少的结论是，美元走势长期向下。其最重要的理由是，长期看，美国相对国力将下降，从而导致美元作为储备货币地位的降低。但是，储备货币地位下降对美元的影响是长期而缓慢的。
在中期，美元走势形如“微笑曲线”，即在美国经济很好或者很差的时候，美元表现强劲；而在中间状态，美元走势相对较弱。
下一段的“微笑曲线”，右顶点已经明确。现在的问题是，当前美元汇率处于曲线的什么位置，是左侧还是底部区域？
回答这个问题的关键是，对汇率的中期走势有关键影响的实际变量将如何发挥作用。影响汇率中期走势的关键变量是赤字和利率，其中，赤字包括财政赤字和贸易赤字。
美国2009财年的财政赤字达1.42亿美元，约为GDP的10%，为“二战”以来的最高纪录。但有两点可以说明，美国财政赤字最严重的时候已经过去，第一，实际数据显著低于美国国会预算办公室预期的1.8万亿美元；第二，根据美国国会预算办公室的规划，无论是财政赤字绝对额，还是其占GDP比重，2010年以后都将显著下降。
贸易赤字减少也将成为趋势，这是全球经济再平衡的自然结果。
目前，联邦基金利率已经处于零的水平，显然，未来利率走势将只有一个方向：升息。我们预期，升息将使美元汇率走势面临实质性转折。
短期均衡或已出现
影响汇率短期走势的主要因素包括，短期资金供求和市场情绪，且两者相互作用。
量化美元的短期供求不是一件容易的事，但可以通过其价格变化进行推断。用美元LIBOR利率与联邦基金利率的利差（下称利差）表示美元的供求变化，当前利差水平已接近零，美元资金面的宽松程度显著低于正常时期。如果不发生大的金融市场动荡，利差向上修复的可能性较大，这将带动美元汇率短期反弹。
影响短期走势的另一个因素是市场情绪。2008年以来，反映市场恐慌程度的VIX指数与美元走势正相关。2009年10月，美元指数下探至74.9，VIX指数为20.7。这意味着，市场避险情绪的释放已经到了一个接近临界值的水平。
总体来说，影响美元汇率的短期因素接近了临界水平，这预示着美元走势需要重新寻找方向。
在现在的时点上，美元汇率处于底部区域，向上的概率和空间已经大于向下的概率和空间。未来一段时间，美元汇率以盘整的方式寻找方向，带领美元走出盘整的因素应该是加息。
对美元汇率，最需要关注的美联储和欧洲央行谁先加息。这是因为欧元兑美元汇率决定了美元指数走势，在美元指数的构成中，欧元的比重为57.6%。
我们认为，美联储领先加息的可能性较大。这是因为，第一，相对于欧元区，美国经济调整的时间更早、幅度更深、速度更快，刺激政策的力度更大，因此经济恢复和政策正常化比欧元区早；第二，全球经济再平衡和美元持续走弱，刺激了美国出口，也抑制了作为欧洲经济发动机的德国的出口，在美元趋势性反弹之前，这个因素还将发挥作用，因此美国经济回升比欧元区更快更早。
新变化：美元供给减少
市场主要关注美元需求的减少，但还有另一个被忽略的因素，即全球新格局意味着美元供给将减少。
全球经济系统正面临转折性变化，其主要动力是全球经济再平衡，其直接后果是美元的国际供给将减少。
在布雷顿森林体系后的历史上，美元作为最重要的国际储备货币，其输出的方式先是对外投资，20世纪80年代中期以后则是贸易逆差。
2003年以后，美国贸易逆差迅速扩大，资本和金融项目顺差的增长持续不能弥补贸易逆差，美元国际供给显著增加。这也许可以部分解释美元2002年以来的持续疲软。
最新的情况是，美国的贸易逆差正在缩小。美国月度商品贸易赤字，从2008年的约700亿美元，快速下降到2009年的约400亿美元。全球经济再平衡作为一个长期过程才刚刚开始，因此美国贸易逆差的减少有持续性。
美元的国内供给也将减少。从2008年10月开始，美联储史无前例的货币扩张并没有造成货币供给显著增加。随着经济好转，货币扩张力度减弱，国内货币供应量的减少将是一个确定的趋势。■
作者是联合证券研究所副总经理
本文网址:www.caijing.com.cn
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Copyright 2007 Caijing Magazine. All Rights Reserved.
【《财经网》专稿/特约作者 陈勇】在美元弱势成为共识的时候，最近有两个因素促使我们更新对美元汇率的看法，第一，在没有直接触发因素的情况下，美元汇率近期连续反弹；第二，还有一个未被市场充分认识的因素，即美元对外供给正在减少。
缓慢下降的美元需求，对应正在减少的供给，美元的供需状况可能没有一些分析人士认为得那么悲观。在美元储备货币地位下降的过程中，美元汇率不大可能同步下滑。
中长期的“微笑曲线”
一个争议较少的结论是，美元走势长期向下。其最重要的理由是，长期看，美国相对国力将下降，从而导致美元作为储备货币地位的降低。但是，储备货币地位下降对美元的影响是长期而缓慢的。
在中期，美元走势形如“微笑曲线”，即在美国经济很好或者很差的时候，美元表现强劲；而在中间状态，美元走势相对较弱。
下一段的“微笑曲线”，右顶点已经明确。现在的问题是，当前美元汇率处于曲线的什么位置，是左侧还是底部区域？
回答这个问题的关键是，对汇率的中期走势有关键影响的实际变量将如何发挥作用。影响汇率中期走势的关键变量是赤字和利率，其中，赤字包括财政赤字和贸易赤字。
美国2009财年的财政赤字达1.42亿美元，约为GDP的10%，为“二战”以来的最高纪录。但有两点可以说明，美国财政赤字最严重的时候已经过去，第一，实际数据显著低于美国国会预算办公室预期的1.8万亿美元；第二，根据美国国会预算办公室的规划，无论是财政赤字绝对额，还是其占GDP比重，2010年以后都将显著下降。
贸易赤字减少也将成为趋势，这是全球经济再平衡的自然结果。
目前，联邦基金利率已经处于零的水平，显然，未来利率走势将只有一个方向：升息。我们预期，升息将使美元汇率走势面临实质性转折。
短期均衡或已出现
影响汇率短期走势的主要因素包括，短期资金供求和市场情绪，且两者相互作用。
量化美元的短期供求不是一件容易的事，但可以通过其价格变化进行推断。用美元LIBOR利率与联邦基金利率的利差（下称利差）表示美元的供求变化，当前利差水平已接近零，美元资金面的宽松程度显著低于正常时期。如果不发生大的金融市场动荡，利差向上修复的可能性较大，这将带动美元汇率短期反弹。
影响短期走势的另一个因素是市场情绪。2008年以来，反映市场恐慌程度的VIX指数与美元走势正相关。2009年10月，美元指数下探至74.9，VIX指数为20.7。这意味着，市场避险情绪的释放已经到了一个接近临界值的水平。
总体来说，影响美元汇率的短期因素接近了临界水平，这预示着美元走势需要重新寻找方向。
在现在的时点上，美元汇率处于底部区域，向上的概率和空间已经大于向下的概率和空间。未来一段时间，美元汇率以盘整的方式寻找方向，带领美元走出盘整的因素应该是加息。
对美元汇率，最需要关注的美联储和欧洲央行谁先加息。这是因为欧元兑美元汇率决定了美元指数走势，在美元指数的构成中，欧元的比重为57.6%。
我们认为，美联储领先加息的可能性较大。这是因为，第一，相对于欧元区，美国经济调整的时间更早、幅度更深、速度更快，刺激政策的力度更大，因此经济恢复和政策正常化比欧元区早；第二，全球经济再平衡和美元持续走弱，刺激了美国出口，也抑制了作为欧洲经济发动机的德国的出口，在美元趋势性反弹之前，这个因素还将发挥作用，因此美国经济回升比欧元区更快更早。
新变化：美元供给减少
市场主要关注美元需求的减少，但还有另一个被忽略的因素，即全球新格局意味着美元供给将减少。
全球经济系统正面临转折性变化，其主要动力是全球经济再平衡，其直接后果是美元的国际供给将减少。
在布雷顿森林体系后的历史上，美元作为最重要的国际储备货币，其输出的方式先是对外投资，20世纪80年代中期以后则是贸易逆差。
2003年以后，美国贸易逆差迅速扩大，资本和金融项目顺差的增长持续不能弥补贸易逆差，美元国际供给显著增加。这也许可以部分解释美元2002年以来的持续疲软。
最新的情况是，美国的贸易逆差正在缩小。美国月度商品贸易赤字，从2008年的约700亿美元，快速下降到2009年的约400亿美元。全球经济再平衡作为一个长期过程才刚刚开始，因此美国贸易逆差的减少有持续性。
美元的国内供给也将减少。从2008年10月开始，美联储史无前例的货币扩张并没有造成货币供给显著增加。随着经济好转，货币扩张力度减弱，国内货币供应量的减少将是一个确定的趋势。■
作者是联合证券研究所副总经理
本文网址:www.caijing.com.cn
免费登陆《财经》杂志网站（www.caijing.com.cn）阅读更多独家报道。
有好的建议 请联系《财经》编辑部（newsroom@caijing.com.cn)。
本栏目文字内容归《财经》杂志所有 任何单位及个人未经许可 不得擅自转载使用。
Copyright 2007 Caijing Magazine. All Rights Reserved.
2009年11月9日 星期一
AMERICA'S CHANGING ROLE AS AN ECONOMIC ANCHOR
By Mohamed El-Erian, Ramin Toloui 2009-11-10
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001029612/en
It has become fashionable to speculate on the future of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency. Amid an average 10 per cent decline in the past six months, analysts have tended to favour one of two conclusions. Some argue that, since you cannot replace something with nothing, the dollar's global role is secured. Others feel that America's medium-term prospects are now inconsistent with such a role.
As with many post-crisis issues, the reality is much more complex. This is not just because the dollar will be caught between these two extremes in the muddled middle for the foreseeable future, but also because the dollar is part of a bigger picture that concerns the evolving role of the US as the sole provider of a range of global public goods. At a time when the global system needs such anchors, this uncertainty raises a set of important policy issues.
A couple of decades ago, Charles Kindleberger, the economist best known today as the author of Manias, Panics and Crashes, identified five public goods that support a growth-oriented global economy: (1) acting as a consumer of last resort, (2) coordinating macro-economic policies, (3) supporting a stable system of exchange rates, (4) acting as a lender of last resort, and (5) providing counter-cyclical long-term lending.
In today's globalised financial world, we would add two more goods to this list: providing the risk-less – a true AAA – asset to benchmark other instruments and activities, and supplying deep and predictable financial markets, which other countries can use to improve their financial intermediation processes.
On the eve of the crisis, the US was the unquestioned provider of all these public goods. But, with the crisis having originated at the core of the global system rather than the periphery, almost every one of them is weaker. As a result, there are two policy questions that need to be addressed: first, which of the public goods can be restored, which can be jointly provided and which need to be replaced; and, second, how will this take place.
On the question of what can be restored, re-establishing the credibility and predictability of US financial markets requires well-designed reform of financial supervision and a credible medium-term programme to rein in the budget deficit and limit the growth of US government debt.
On the question of what can be jointly provided, the expanded new role for the G-20 and reform agenda for the International Monetary Fund underscore the extent to which the management of global macroeconomic policy aspires to become more inclusive. This is positive. However, the jury is still out on whether these fora have sufficient teeth to resolve policy differences and convince governments to assume shared responsibilities.
We should also expect to see more discussion in the next few years on new types of reserve assets. While the discussion will include supranational vehicles (like an expanded role for the special drawing rights), the more interesting question is the broader use of currencies like the Chinese yuan. These options will not replace the central role of the US dollar, but supplement it at the margin.
There is one public good that needs to be replaced: the key role that the US has played as the engine of global growth. This role is now constrained by the debt of US households. A sustainable global economy needs other major sources of internal demand, particularly among economies such as China that have historically been focused on export-led growth.
The manner in which these transitions take place is critical. One risk is that key actors will resist these secular changes and seek to reconstitute an outmoded system that no longer fits post-crisis realities. At the other extreme is the risk that major powers go their own way, forsaking effective coordination of policies in favour of more nationalistic moves, such as aggressive currency management or trade and financial protectionism.
The best defence against these outcomes is early recognition and coordinated action. Key economic powers must shape their expectations and policy strategies to the changed contours of the global economy. They must also actively manage policy changes at the national and multilateral level in a way that broadens the provision of global public goods.
Mohamed El-Erian and Ramin Toloui are, respectively, chief executive and executive vice-president at Pimco
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001029612/en
It has become fashionable to speculate on the future of the US dollar as the world's reserve currency. Amid an average 10 per cent decline in the past six months, analysts have tended to favour one of two conclusions. Some argue that, since you cannot replace something with nothing, the dollar's global role is secured. Others feel that America's medium-term prospects are now inconsistent with such a role.
As with many post-crisis issues, the reality is much more complex. This is not just because the dollar will be caught between these two extremes in the muddled middle for the foreseeable future, but also because the dollar is part of a bigger picture that concerns the evolving role of the US as the sole provider of a range of global public goods. At a time when the global system needs such anchors, this uncertainty raises a set of important policy issues.
A couple of decades ago, Charles Kindleberger, the economist best known today as the author of Manias, Panics and Crashes, identified five public goods that support a growth-oriented global economy: (1) acting as a consumer of last resort, (2) coordinating macro-economic policies, (3) supporting a stable system of exchange rates, (4) acting as a lender of last resort, and (5) providing counter-cyclical long-term lending.
In today's globalised financial world, we would add two more goods to this list: providing the risk-less – a true AAA – asset to benchmark other instruments and activities, and supplying deep and predictable financial markets, which other countries can use to improve their financial intermediation processes.
On the eve of the crisis, the US was the unquestioned provider of all these public goods. But, with the crisis having originated at the core of the global system rather than the periphery, almost every one of them is weaker. As a result, there are two policy questions that need to be addressed: first, which of the public goods can be restored, which can be jointly provided and which need to be replaced; and, second, how will this take place.
On the question of what can be restored, re-establishing the credibility and predictability of US financial markets requires well-designed reform of financial supervision and a credible medium-term programme to rein in the budget deficit and limit the growth of US government debt.
On the question of what can be jointly provided, the expanded new role for the G-20 and reform agenda for the International Monetary Fund underscore the extent to which the management of global macroeconomic policy aspires to become more inclusive. This is positive. However, the jury is still out on whether these fora have sufficient teeth to resolve policy differences and convince governments to assume shared responsibilities.
We should also expect to see more discussion in the next few years on new types of reserve assets. While the discussion will include supranational vehicles (like an expanded role for the special drawing rights), the more interesting question is the broader use of currencies like the Chinese yuan. These options will not replace the central role of the US dollar, but supplement it at the margin.
There is one public good that needs to be replaced: the key role that the US has played as the engine of global growth. This role is now constrained by the debt of US households. A sustainable global economy needs other major sources of internal demand, particularly among economies such as China that have historically been focused on export-led growth.
The manner in which these transitions take place is critical. One risk is that key actors will resist these secular changes and seek to reconstitute an outmoded system that no longer fits post-crisis realities. At the other extreme is the risk that major powers go their own way, forsaking effective coordination of policies in favour of more nationalistic moves, such as aggressive currency management or trade and financial protectionism.
The best defence against these outcomes is early recognition and coordinated action. Key economic powers must shape their expectations and policy strategies to the changed contours of the global economy. They must also actively manage policy changes at the national and multilateral level in a way that broadens the provision of global public goods.
Mohamed El-Erian and Ramin Toloui are, respectively, chief executive and executive vice-president at Pimco
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