别小看美英经济的反弹能力

REINVENTION HOLDS KEY TO ADROIT RESPONSE IN A DOWNTURN
作者：英国《金融时报》专栏作家约翰•普伦德(John Plender)
The English-speaking countries are widely perceived to be down and out after housing binges and financial busts. Bears of the US argue that a deteriorating fiscal position brings down the curtain on the era of American hegemony and that accelerating relative economic decline is the new reality.
For the UK, many predict a protracted recession and dismal underperformance relative to the big eurozone economies now that high finance is redundant. The winners in this downturn, so a common argument runs, will be high-saving countries with current account surpluses and big foreign exchange reserves.
This view sits oddly with the latest quarterly figures for Japanese and German gross domestic product, which are horrific. Also relevant here is the annual threat assessment of the US intelligence community unveiled last week by Admiral Dennis Blair.
This makes the case that recessions are a relative game and that historically the US has proved more adroit at responding to them than most because the US tradition of openness, developed skills and mobility put the country in a better position to reinvent itself relative to its competitors.
Nobody can be entirely sure how long it will take the US to extract itself from the mire. Yet if it does – and that is surely still the best guess in spite of the downbeat reception for Treasury secretary Tim Geithner's recent package – the sheer flexibility of the US economy will once again become apparent.
Relative economic decline is probably inevitable against Asia excluding Japan because developing countries have the benefit of catch-up growth. But if the eurozone outperforms the US in the next economic cycle, I will throw in the journalistic towel.
The British position is less strong, not least because the economy has been over-geared to financial services, which are now condemned to shrink. But apart from the point on skills, the same arguments apply.
Unlike such eurozone economies as Spain, Ireland or Italy, which have housing hangovers and/or competitiveness problems, Britain has exchange rate flexibility which will help rebalance the economy. The labour market, too, is more flexible.
To those like Jim Rogers, former partner of George Soros, who ask what Britain is going to sell, the answer is that this is the wrong question. In a recession, the problem is deficient demand, not supply. There is a strong parallel with the early 1980s when the industrial base declined under Margaret Thatcher. Nobody could predict at the time what would emerge to take the place of manufacturing, but things did emerge, notably in services, including finance.
For all its current problems, the UK is much closer to being a market economy than the eurozone. I suspect it will rebound sooner and more strongly than high savers with big current account surpluses across the Channel.
That certainly applies to Germany. As well as sustaining a bigger knock to its banks than expected, the economy is arguably more unbalanced than the UK because of its export dependence. This is a lethal condition, likewise for Japan, when the US is ceasing to act as borrower and spender of last resort in the global economy while other deficit countries such as the UK are rebuilding savings and putting the external account back into shape. It becomes even more lethal when a trade crash is pushing the world towards both explicit and covert forms of protection.
Germans have criticised manic Keynesianism in the UK. Yet without much looser fiscal policy, it is hard to see what will drag them from deep recession. In reality, none of the world's big economies will emerge from this trauma without a badly weakened fiscal position, with the possible exception of China, which starts from a position of substantial budget surplus and low public sector debt.
If an outright winner does emerge from the present dire economic plight – and that is by no means certain – China seems the most likely candidate, if it can rebalance an economy heavily dependent on exports towards domestic demand. Yet that is quite a challenge, especially as lower growth increases the risk of civil strife.
John Plender is an FT columnist and chairman of Quintain

别小看美英经济的反弹能力
作者：英国《金融时报》专栏作家约翰•普伦德(John Plender)
经历过住房热潮和金融崩溃之后，人们普遍认为英语国家将陷于穷困潦倒。看跌美国的人士提出，日益恶化的财政状况降下了美国霸权时代的帷幕，新的现实是，美国经济相对他国的下滑将不断加速。
许多人士预言，由于高端金融供过于求，英国将陷入旷日持久的衰退，相对欧元区经济大国的表现也将堕入可悲的落后境地。普遍观点认为，这场衰退中的赢家将是那些拥有经常账户盈余和巨额外汇储备的高储蓄国家。
这个观点与日本和德国最新公布的、吓人的国内生产总值(GDP)季度数据存在出入。与此相应的还有美国海军上将丹尼斯•布莱尔(Admiral Dennis Blair)上周公布的美国情报界年度威胁评估。
这表明，经济衰退是一场相对游戏；而且历史证明，美国在应对衰退方面比多数国家都更为娴熟，因为美国追求开放、发达技能与流动能力(Mobility)的传统，使该国在彻底改造自身方面处于比竞争对手更加有利的地位。
没有人能够完全肯定美国需要多久才会摆脱困境。可是，如果美国确实摆脱了困境——尽管市场对美国财政部长蒂姆•盖特纳(Tim Geithner)最近公布的计划反应并不乐观，但这无疑仍是最合理的猜测——该国经济将再次显露出十足的弹性。
美国经济相对亚洲国家（日本除外）的下滑可能是不可避免的，因为发展中国家享受着追赶性增长的益处。但是，如果在下个经济周期内欧元区的经济表现胜过美国，我情愿投笔认输。
英国的地位没有那么强势，相当重要的原因在于，英国经济过于依赖金融服务业，而该行业如今必须收缩规模。但除了有关技能这一点以外，适用于美国的论点同样适用于英国。
与拥有住房市场遗留问题和/或竞争力问题的西班牙、爱尔兰或意大利等欧元区经济体不同，英国的汇率弹性有助其恢复经济平衡。英国的劳动力市场同样更加富有弹性。
乔治•索罗斯(George Soros)的前合伙人吉姆•罗杰斯(Jim Rogers)等人曾问，英国打算拿什么来卖。我的答复是，你们提出了一个错误的问题。经济衰退中的问题是有效需求，而不是供应。现阶段与上世纪80年代初存在很强的相似之处，当时在玛格丽特•撒切尔(Margaret Thatcher)任内，英国的工业基础出现了衰落。那时候，没有人能够预见英国会出现什么东西来替代制造业，但这些东西真的出现了，尤其是在包括金融业在内的服务业中。
尽管当前存在各种问题，但英国比欧元区更接近于市场经济。我猜测，相对于英吉利海峡对岸那些拥有巨额经常账户盈余的高储蓄国家，英国经济的反弹会更早、更强劲。
这一结论当然适用于德国。除了其银行业承受着比预期更为严重的冲击外，可以说，由于出口依赖，德国经济比英国更为失衡。当美国不再充当全球经济的最后借款人和消费者，而英国等其它赤字国家开始重建储蓄并恢复对外账户的平衡时，依赖出口这一点就很致命（对日本来说也是如此）。当贸易冲突把全球推向显性和隐性的贸易保护主义时，这一点就变得更加致命。
德国人对英国狂热的凯恩斯主义提出了批评。然而，如果不施行大为宽松的财政政策，很难想象还有什么能把各国从严重衰退中解救出来。实际上，世界上任何一个经济大国都不可能不严重削弱自己的财政状况，就从这场创伤中恢复过来。中国可能是个例外，它在开始自救时拥有巨额预算盈余和较低的公共部门债务。
假如当前严峻的经济困境中真能出现一个彻底的赢家——这一点尚不能肯定——中国似乎是最有可能的候选者，前提是它能把严重依赖出口的经济调整到依赖内需。但是，这是一个相当艰巨的挑战，尤其是在其增长减速加大了内乱风险之际。
约翰•普伦德是英国《金融时报》专栏作家和Quintain的董事长
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