By Martin Wolf
Why has the European Union suffered so badly in a crisis that began in the US? The answer is to be found in four weaknesses: first, Germany, the EU's biggest economy, is heavily dependent on foreign spending; second, several western European economies are suffering from post-bubble collapses in demand; third, parts of central and eastern Europe are also being forced to cut spending; and, fourth, European banks proved vulnerable to both the US crisis and to difficulties nearer home. Given these realities, recovery is likely to be slow and painful.
According to the latest consensus forecasts, the EU economy is expected to contract by 3.6 per cent this year and the eurozone's by 3.7 per cent, while the US is forecast to shrink by only 2.9 per cent. Thus the crisis punishes the frugal more than the profligate. It seems so unfair. It is not: the frugal depend on the profligate.
A remark in the European Commission's spring forecast gets to the nub of the problem: “As exports are usually the first component to recover in the eurozone business cycle,” it argues, “the export outlook is key.” The eurozone is the world's second largest economy. Why should it depend for recovery on external demand? The answer lies with Germany. The Commission forecasts that the fall in net exports will account for three-fifths of its 5.4 per cent economic shrinkage this year.
One way of illustrating what is happening is in terms of sectoral balances – the difference between income and expenditure (or savings and investment) in the three principal sectors: government, private and foreign. By definition, these add to zero. Normally, changes in the private sector's balance drive the economy. When the private sector cuts back on its spending, the current account deficit shrinks and the fiscal balance deteriorates. Which of the two predominates depends on how a particular economy works.
We can derive implicit private sector balances from the Commission's forecasts. Within the eurozone, the Netherlands and Germany ran huge private surpluses in 2007, at 9.5 per cent and 7.8 per cent of gross domestic product, respectively. These were offset by current account surpluses, at 9.8 per cent and 7.6 per cent of GDP, respectively. Overall, however, the eurozone had almost no private sector and current account surpluses. Thus the German and Dutch surpluses were offset by deficits elsewhere. Spain's were the most important: its bubble-fuelled private sector deficit was 12.3 per cent of GDP in 2007 and its current account deficit 10.1 per cent. But Greece, Ireland and Portugal also ran large private sector – and current account – deficits.
Between 2007 and 2009, private sector balances of bubble countries are forecast to swing dramatically towards surplus, by 15.8 per cent of GDP in Ireland and by 14 per cent in Spain (see chart). In both countries, the principal offset will be a huge deterioration in fiscal positions, but external balances are also expected to improve, by 3.6 per cent and 3.2 per cent of GDP, respectively. The UK's private balance is also forecast to improve by 8.9 per cent of GDP, offset by the huge deterioration in the fiscal position. In the US, the private balance is forecast to shift from a deficit of 2.4 per cent of GDP to a surplus of 8.6 per cent over the two years, a swing of 11 per cent of GDP.
In essence, in post-bubble economies the private sector is expected to spend much less, relative to income, this year than two years ago. The impact on the surplus countries dependent on exports of manufactures has been devastating. In Germany, the private sector balance is barely expected to change but, as an export-dependent economy, it is badly affected by the declines in spending elsewhere.
The impact of the crisis on central and eastern Europe is also striking. According to the latest World Economic Outlook, capital flows to emerging Europe will fall from 9.5 per cent of GDP in 2007 to -0.7 per cent this year (see chart). This swing will force huge declines in external deficits and very big recessions. The figures for the tiny Baltic states are extraordinary: reductions in current account deficits forecast by the Commission of 21 per cent of GDP for Latvia, 17 per cent for Estonia and 13 per cent for Lithuania between 2007 and 2009. In Latvia, the private sector balance is expected to shift by 32 per cent of GDP in two years. No wonder the Commission forecasts that GDP may shrink by 13 per cent in Latvia, 11 per cent in Lithuania and 10 per cent in Estonia in 2009.
Europe's banking sector is also badly damaged. According to the International Monetary Fund's most recent Global Financial Stability Report, expected writedowns on bank assets in 2009 and 2010 are $750bn (€536bn, £471bn) in the eurozone and $200bn in the UK, against just $550bn in the US. Moreover, the equity needed to reduce leverage of eurozone banks to 25 to one would be $375bn and of UK banks $125bn, against $275bn for US banks. Western banks are also heavily exposed in central and eastern Europe: as the Commission remarks, “banks from the ‘old' member states account for about €950bn foreign claims in the ‘new' member states and the other European emerging markets, altogether around 82 per cent of total foreign claims. In absolute terms the largest exposure is by banks from Austria, Germany, Italy and France.”
The details may seem complex. But the fundamental point is not: the European economy gained an illusion of health from unsustainable spending in peripheral countries in its west, south and east. The asset price bubbles, credit growth and investment booms that characterised this spending have all collapsed, at the same time as an even more significant bubble burst in the US. This timing is not, of course, a coincidence. The collapse has devastated activity in the export-dependent countries, of which Germany is much the most important. Moreover, as a result of poor risk management, many European banks have also been badly damaged.
The question is whether the European economy can hope to return to health via a normal private-sector- led recovery. Unfortunately, in the post-bubble economies such a recovery is unlikely: one would have to hope for the piling of yet more debt on to the already highly indebted.
This leaves two European answers, one likely but undesirable, the second unlikely but desirable. The likely answer is that demand will be driven by unsustainable fiscal expansions in post-bubble economies. The unlikely answer is that private demand will pick up in creditworthy economies, particularly Germany. In the absence of either, Europe will wait for the US to spend itself back into (temporary) vigour. It is a sad picture, whatever the “green shoots” may seem to show.
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经济危机为何重创欧盟？
作者：英国《金融时报》首席经济评论员马丁•沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)
一场始于美国的危机，为何令欧盟(EU)遭受如此重创？我们可以从欧盟自身的四大弱点中找到答案。首先，欧盟最大的经济体——德国——严重依赖外国支出；其次，几个西欧经济体正饱受泡沫破灭后需求骤降的折磨；第三，中东欧部分国家也正被迫削减支出；第四，事实证明，无论是在美国的危机、还是在更临近本土的困难面前，欧洲各银行都十分脆弱。考虑到这些现实情况，经济复苏过程可能会是缓慢而痛苦的。
根据最新的普遍预期，预计欧盟经济今年将萎缩3.6%，欧元区萎缩3.7%，而预计美国经济仅缩水2.9%。如此看来，危机对节俭者的惩罚，要比对恣意挥霍者更为严厉。这似乎太不公平了。但事实并非如此：节俭者要依靠挥霍者。
欧盟委员会(European Commission)春季经济预测中发表的评论抓住了问题的症结：“由于出口通常是欧元区商业周期中率先复苏的部分，出口前景是关键。”欧元区是全球第二大经济体。其经济复苏为何要依赖于外部需求呢？我们可以从德国身上找到答案。欧盟委员会预测，今年德国经济将缩水5.4%，其中五分之三要归咎于净出口的下降。
可以从部门收支平衡的角度，来阐明目前所发生的情况。部门收支平衡是指三个主要部门——政府、私人及对外贸易部门——收入与支出（或储蓄与投资）之间的差别。按照定义，这些差额的总和为零。通常，经济是由私人部门收支平衡的变化所驱动的。如果私人部门削减开支，经常账户赤字就会收窄，财政收支平衡也会恶化。二者之中由谁主宰，取决于特定经济体是如何运作的。
从欧盟委员会的预测中，我们能够推导出隐含的私人部门收支平衡情况。在欧元区内，荷兰和德国的私人部门2007年都出现了高额盈余，分别占到了国内生产总值(GDP)的9.5%和7.8%。这些盈余分别被高达GDP 9.8%和7.6%的经常账户盈余所抵消。然而，总体而言，欧元区几乎不存在私人部门及经常账户盈余。因此，德国与荷兰的盈余被其它国家的赤字所抵消。其中，西班牙的赤字最高：2007年，该国由泡沫推动的私人部门赤字占到了GDP的12.3%，经常账户赤字为10.1%。不过，希腊、爱尔兰和葡萄牙的私人部门及经常账户赤字同样也很高。
从2007年到2009年，泡沫国家的私人部门收支平衡预计会大幅转向盈余，其中，爱尔兰和西班牙的转移幅度将分别达到GDP的15.8%和14%（见图表）。这两个国家的主要抵消手段将是财政状况的大幅恶化，但预计外部收支平衡状况也会有所好转，经常账户赤字将分别缩小GDP的3.6%和3.2%。英国私人部门平衡的转移幅度，预计也将达到GDP的8.9%，被财政赤字的大幅上升所抵消。同期内，美国的私人部门平衡预计将从占GDP 2.4%的赤字，转向占GDP8.6%的的盈余，转移幅度为GDP的11%。
实质上，与收入相比，预计泡沫后经济体私人部门今年的支出将远低于两年前。对于依赖制造业出口的盈余国家，这将造成毁灭性的影响。在德国，私人部门收支平衡预计几乎不会有什么变化，但作为一个依赖出口的经济体，它受到了其它国家支出下降的巨大冲击。
危机对中东欧的影响同样惊人。最新的《世界经济展望》(World Economic Outlook)显示，流向欧洲新兴地区的资本流动将从2007年的占GDP的9.5%，降至今年的-0.7%（见图表）。这一转移将促使外部赤字大幅下降，并导致非常严重的衰退。波罗的海各小国的数据格外反常：欧盟委员会预计，2007年至2009年间，拉脱维亚的经常账户赤字下降了GDP的21%，爱沙尼亚与立陶宛分别为17%和13%。这两年里，拉脱维亚私人部门平衡的转移幅度预计将达到GDP的32%。难怪欧盟委员会预测，2009年拉脱维亚GDP可能会萎缩13%，而立陶宛和爱沙尼亚将分别缩水11%。
欧洲的银行业也受到了严重损害。国际货币基金组织(IMF)最新公布的《全球金融稳定报告》(Global Financial Stability Report)显示，预计欧元区2009年和2010年银行资产的减记规模为7500亿美元，英国为2000亿美元，相比之下，美国仅为5500亿美元。此外，欧元区各银行将杠杆比率降至25比1，所需的资金为3750亿美元，英国各银行需要1250亿美元，而美国各银行仅需2750亿美元。西方银行在中东欧的风险敞口也很大：正如欧盟委员会的评论中所言，“‘新'成员国及其它欧洲新兴市场的国外产权额中，‘老'成员国的银行占了约9500亿欧元，总共占到国外产权总额的82%左右。按绝对价值计算，银行敞口最大的是奥地利、德国、意大利和法国。”
细节可能看上去有些复杂。但基本点却并不复杂：欧洲经济从自己西部、南部及东部周边国家不可持续的支出中，得到了一种经济发展健康的错觉。伴随着美国一个更大泡沫的破灭，作为上述支出特点的资产价格泡沫、信贷增长及投资热已全部崩溃。当然，这一时间点并非巧合。这种崩溃摧毁了出口依赖型国家的活力，这些国家中，德国差不多是最重要的。此外，由于糟糕的风险管理，许多欧洲银行也严重受损。
问题在于，欧洲经济能否指望通过私人部门引领的正常经济复苏恢复健康。不幸的是，在后泡沫经济体中，这样的复苏是不太可能的：人们将只能预计，在本已高筑的债台上累积更多的债务。
这将使欧洲只剩下两种答案，一种很有可能，但人们不希望看到；第二种不大可能，但是人们愿意看到的。可能的答案是：泡沫后经济体不可持续的财政扩张将推动需求。而不大可能的答案是：在那些信誉卓著的经济体（尤其是德国），私人需求将有所提升。在两者都没有出现的情况下，欧洲将等待美国通过加大支出，重新（暂时）恢复元气。无论看上去“萌芽”会表明什么，这都是一种可悲的场景。
译者/陈云飞
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。
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