美国资产何时“无毒”

作者：英国《金融时报》专栏作家吉莲•邰蒂(Gillian Tett)
有毒资产什么时候“没毒”了？当它们在华尔街手上和美国政府的宣传机器之中时，看上去可能就不那么有毒了。
一年前，当美国首次意识到其金融乱局规模惊人时，政治家和金融家们觉得用“有毒”来形容不良资产没什么不光彩的。但后来，华盛顿和华尔街的头头脑脑们觉得这个词过于危言耸听，便开始转而使用政治上正确的词汇——“问题”资产。
如今，美国财政部(Treasury)部长蒂姆•盖特纳(Tim Geithner)似乎觉得连“问题”这个词都过于吓人了。于是，财政部的新流行说法变成了“遗留”(legacy)资产。
但问题在于，新的计划和名称的改变能否真正解决问题。毕竟，过去两年来财政部为解决银行业问题而进行的努力都以失败告终。现在，如果盖特纳的最新动议再次受挫，将对经济和市场信心造成极具毁灭性的影响。不管你想用哪个词，风险从未如此之高。
至少从理论上讲，与先前的计划相比，我们的确有理由对这次的项计划报以更高的希望。别的不说，这套计划至少表明盖特纳和他的“班子”（就好象他真拥有一个班子似的）理解了问题的根源所在——即银行无力捅破它们有毒的“遗留”资产所催生的毒疖。
两年前，当美国次贷市场的违约现象首次突现时，市场的普遍看法是，银行会承担所有的抵押贷款损失。随后，在2007年秋季，随着次贷问题升级，银行开始寻找其它机构来接手这些资产。
但当银行意识到它们必须以较为现实的价格出售资产时，金融体系已遭受了沉重打击，以至于再没有任何机构拥有足够的资金或风险意愿，来收购这些资产。银行由此陷入了困境，无力移除这些有毒垃圾，同时又无法忽视它们的存在并继续履行银行的正常职能。
从本质上看，盖特纳的计划试图向私人投资者提供政府资金，让他们能够购买有毒债务，由此解决这一问题。其基本思路是对15年前清债信托公司(RTC)成功模式的老调重弹。该机构解决了储蓄与贷款危机。
当时，RTC将85%的无追索权贷款交给私人投资者，以启动储蓄贷款机构资产的交易市场。而这一次，盖特纳的计划也会将大量政府债务，用于向愿意购买有毒资产的投资者提供资金（同时还将注入一些股权资本）。
此外，正如RTC尝试通过公开贱卖和竞价来削弱此类资产定价方面的政治影响，盖特纳的计划也打算通过自由竞争，为计划出售的资产定价。如此一来，就没有人能说有人为了银行或投资者的利益而“操纵”了价格，或者说盖特纳希望如此。
“这是又一个RTC，”RTC前负责人提姆•赖安(Tim Ryan)激动地说道。“7个月来我一直呼吁建立类似的机制——如今我们终于这么做了。”然而，问题仍然存在。盖特纳的新计划能否为这些资产创造出“真实的”市场（或者说，其真实程度足以避免有失公平的抱怨）还远未可知。鉴于市场对于形形色色的金融家怀有恶毒而不可预知的反感情绪，会有多少投资者投身其中，同样也不清楚。
交给私人投资者的公共资金的绝对数额，也可能引发众怒。同样，想到如果银行开始以合理的“市场”价格出售资产，它们可能会需要更多资金，公众可能也会感到愤怒。此外，在世界上大多数投资者本已觉得极度困惑之际，就市场人气而言，最新计划的复杂性也会构成另一种风险。
但最终，真正的考验将在于能否达成切实的交易。如果资产出售能够迅速进行，或许能由此启动乐观心理自我强化的良性循环，如同15年前RTC的境遇一样。如果数周内毫无进展，市场犬儒主义会再次溺杀此项计划。无论怎样，目前真正重要的是行动而不是（政治上正确的）言辞。决定盖特纳——以及金融体系——命运的时刻即将来临。
译者/管婧

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US TREASURY HOPES ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS
By Gillian Tett
When is a toxic asset not really “toxic”? When it is in the hands of the Wall Street and Washington spin machine, it might seem.
A year ago, when America first realised the horrendous scale of its financial mess, politicians and financiers saw little shame in articulating the word “toxic” in relation to bad assets. But then the best minds in Washington and Wall Street deemed that term too alarmist – and started to use the politically correct word “problem” asset instead.
Now, Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, seems to feel even the word “problem” is too scary. Instead, the new buzz phrase in the Treasury is “legacy”.
The question, though, is whether a new plan and name change can really fix the woes. After all, the efforts the Treasury has made to resolve the banking problems during the past two years have failed. And if Mr Geithner's latest initiative now crumbles too, the ensuing damage to the economy and market confidence could be truly devastating. Rarely have the stakes been higher, whatever word you wish to use.
On paper, at least, there is certainly reason to feel more hopeful than with earlier schemes. If nothing else, this plans shows that Mr Geithner and his “team” (insofar as he has one) understand the root of the problem – namely, the inability of banks to lance the poisonous boil created by their toxic-cum-“legacy” assets.
When defaults in America's subprime market first cropped up two years ago, it was widely presumed that banks would simply absorb any mortgage losses. Then, in the autumn of 2007, when the subprime problems spiralled, banks hunted for somebody else to take those assets off their hands.
But by the time the banks recognised the need to sell at half-way realistic prices, the financial system was already in such shock nobody else had enough capital, or appetite for risk, to buy. Thus, banks have been left trapped, unable to remove the toxic mess but unable to ignore it and perform the normal functions of a bank.
Mr Geithner's plan essentially tries to fix this problem by handing government money to private investors so they can purchase the toxic debt. The basic idea is a rehash of the formula successfully adopted 15 years ago by the Resolution Trust Corporation, the body that resolved the Savings and Loans crisis.
Back then, the RTC extended 85 per cent non-resource loans to private investors to kickstart a market for trading S&L assets. This time, the Geithner plan will also offer large dollops of government debt to investors wanting to buy toxic assets (and kick in some equity capital too.)
Moreover, just as the RTC tried to depoliticise the pricing of these assets by conducting open firesales and competitive bids, Mr Geithner's plan aims to use free competition to establish a price for these planned sales. That way nobody can claim that the price has been “fixed” to the benefit of either banks or investors, or so it is hoped.
“This is RTC II,” enthuses Tim Ryan, the former head of RTC. “I have been crying out for something like this for seven months – now we have it at last.” Yet, as ever, the problems remain. It is far from clear that the new Geithner plan will be able to produce a “true” market for these assets (or, true enough to prevent complaints about foul play.) It is also uncertain how many investors will jump in, given the vicious, unpredictable backlash against financiers of all stripes.
The sheer size of public money being handed to private investors could also spark public outrage. So could the idea that banks may need even more capital if they start selling assets at a reasonable “market” price. Moreover, in a world where most investors are already feeling utterly confused, the sheer complexity of this latest plan presents another risk, in terms of sentiment.
But in the last resort, the real test will be whether tangible deals are done, or not. If sales do occur quickly, a virtuous self-reinforcing cycle of optimism might get underway, just as it did at the RTC 15 years before. If nothing happens for weeks, market cynicism will yet again drown the plan. Either way, it is actions, not (politically correct) words, that really matter now. The clock on Mr Geithner – and the system – is ticking.
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