Geithner's big plan

Lex
After lambasting past announcements for being too broad brush, it is churlish to accuse Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, of obscuring his latest taxpayer-funded giveaway with excessive detail. In fact, the latest plan to cleanse the system of bad assets is appropriately nuanced. It is better crafted, using private involvement to lessen taxpayer risk. And there is the odd nice touch, such as using a portion of fees to bolster deposit insurance funds.
There are two main components to the plan, one targeting loans, the other securities. In the first, banks put loans up for sale to competing private sector bidders. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guarantees debt of up to six times the equity in the winning fund. The Treasury takes up to 50 per cent of the equity, or about 7 per cent, of the fund. In the second part of the plan, the Treasury selects managers to run funds to buy real estate-backed securities, matching private investors dollar for dollar. Managers can top up with limited Treasury loans. The term asset-backed securities loan facility will also be expanded to finance purchases of legacy securities.
Equity stakes give bidders an incentive not to overpay while competition between private funds should deter low-balling. But it is unclear that cheap leverage can close the gap between the prices at which banks will sell and investors will buy. The former depends on where banks' assets are marked (and if they can sell without rendering themselves demonstrably insolvent.) But only one fifth of all assets are marked to market, says Credit Suisse, with ailing fundamentals yet to be recognised.
The dross inevitably will be first on the block. After all, in the loan programme banks can choose what to sell and reject the result of the auction. This suggests price discovery only to the extent that prices are above banks' marks. A tougher regulatory stick is needed to force banks to face reality. Instead, generous terms may help bridge the pricing gulf – further reason for investors fearful of a political backlash to stay clear.

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盖特纳计划顶用吗？
英国《金融时报》Lex专栏(Lex)
在抨击美国财政部长蒂姆•盖特纳(Tim Geithner)之前的几项声明过于笼统之后，再指责他在纳税人资金资助的最新救援计划中，用过多的细节令其晦涩难懂似乎有些无礼。实际上，旨在清理银行体系不良资产的最新计划在分寸上拿捏得当。该计划设计更精巧，让私人投资者参与进来，以降低纳税人的风险。此外，其中还包括一两个出色念头，例如动用一部分收费来加强存款保险基金。
这项计划有两个主要组成部分，一个针对贷款，另一个针对证券。对于计划的第一个部分，各银行向私人部门的竞购者出售贷款资产。联邦存款保险公司(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)为胜出的基金提供至多6倍于股本的债务担保。财政部承担至多一半的股本，即基金的约7%。在计划的第二部分，财政部将挑选经理人管理资金，以购买房地产支持的证券，拿出与私人投资者完全等额的资金。经理人可用有限的财政部贷款进行补充。还将扩大短期资产支持证券贷款工具(Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility，简称Talf)，为购买遗留证券提供资金。
股权鼓励竞购者不过多支付，同时私人基金之间的竞争应可以防止出价过低。但尚不清楚廉价杠杆能否缩小银行愿意卖出的心理价位与投资者愿意买入的心理价位之间的差距。前者取决于银行资产的计价依据（以及它们能否在不会暴露自身资不抵债的情况下出售这些资产）。但瑞士信贷(Credit Suisse)表示，全部资产中仅有五分之一是按市价计值的，有问题的基本面因素仍有待全面暴露。
糟粕资产必然会最先出售。毕竟，在贷款计划中，银行可以选择出售些什么，并拒绝拍卖结果。这意味着，价格发现将仅限于高于银行标价的区间。需要出台一项更强硬的监管措施，来迫使各银行面对现实。相反，慷慨的条款可能有助于越过定价鸿沟——这更加说明，投资者有理由担心政治上的反对而不加入。
译者/陈云飞
Lex专栏是由FT评论家联合撰写的短评，对全球经济与商业进行精辟分析
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