Double or quits in Washington

Editorial
Barack Obama did not base his campaign on saving a collapsing economy. But that was what he ended up being elected to do: he pulled definitively ahead of his rival when the scale of the crisis became clear. At stake in yesterday's presentation of the US bank rescue plan, therefore, was not only Treasury secretary Tim Geithner's authority but that of the administration as a whole – and with it Mr Obama's ability to push through his ambitious reform agenda.
Mr Geithner has to overcome pre-existing congressional ill-will from his predecessor's inept handling of the original Tarp request. Moreover, the administration's paranoia about being branded as socialist has made it do everything it can to avoid taking control of moribund banks or asking for more rescue money.
Instead, Mr Geithner seems absolutely determined to have markets solve the problem, even if it costs taxpayers dearly. Indeed, the paradox at the heart of this ostensibly clever and undoubtedly complex plan is its dependence on subsidies to private investors.
The Treasury will match private capital with remaining Tarp money to capitalise funds for purchasing assets from banks – both securities and conventional loans turned sour by the deepening recession. The funds will then be leveraged with federal loans or loan guarantees.
Mr Geithner aims to have markets establish prices for assets now burdening banks' balance sheets. His plan assumes buyers and sellers will agree on a price if the government is willing to subsidise them enough. But this implies that assets are not trading today mainly because of a lack of liquidity.
If, instead, the cash-flows behind the assets – such as subprime mortgage payments – have deteriorated too much, disposing of them at fair long-term values would crystallise heavy losses. Banks will avoid this unless forced to sell, no matter how liquid the market. The plan's success thus depend on the stress test – only vaguely defined – banks are supposed to undergo.
No one knows whether the market malfunction is due more to long-term losses or short-term liquidity risk. A virtue of this plan is that it should help us find out. But this is a gamble, which could fail in two ways. Even with subsidies, too few trades may take place, leaving the assets with the banks. And if private investors do take the subsidised risk, the assets may yet cause large losses for Congress to pay.
Either failure would erode the administration's authority further. Its plan may just work. If it does not, much more than the US banking system is at risk.

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盖特纳成败事关全球
英国《金融时报》社评(Editorial)
在竞选美国总统时，巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)没有将自己定位于挽救崩溃的经济，但最终这却是选民要他来做的事：当危机的规模渐趋明朗之后，他获得了领先于对手的绝对优势。因此，昨天有关美国银行业拯救计划的陈述，不仅牵涉到美国财政部长蒂姆·盖特纳(Tim Geithner)的权威，也涉及整个奥巴马政府的权威，乃至奥巴马推进其雄心勃勃的改革议程的能力。
盖特纳必须克服国会本已存在的反感，这源自其前任对初版“问题资产救援计划”(Tarp)请求的无能处理。此外，奥巴马政府近乎偏执地担心被贴上社会主义标签，以至于它尽可能避免控股奄奄一息的银行，或要求更多的救援资金。
相反，盖特纳似乎已下定决心让市场去解决问题，哪怕让纳税人付出沉重代价。的确，就这个表面上聪明且绝对复杂的计划而言，其核心矛盾是：它依赖于对私人投资者的补贴。
美国财政部将利用Tarp计划中的剩余资金来带动民间资本，为收购银行问题资产（随衰退加剧而出现问题的证券及常规贷款）提供资金。然后这些收购资金将借助联邦贷款或贷款担保得到杠杆化。
盖特纳旨在让市场为问题资产定价,这些资产如今是银行资产负债表上的沉重负担。他的计划假定，如果政府愿意提供足够的补贴，买方和卖方将商定一个成交价格。但这意味着，如今这些资产没有交易主要是因为缺乏流动性。
如果情况相反，这些资产背后的现金流——如次级房贷的还款——已经过度恶化，若以长期公允价值处置它们，巨额亏损将在账面上体现出来。除非被迫出售，否则银行将避免这种局面出现，无论市场流动性多么充沛。如此一来，该计划的成功将取决于银行将要参加的压力测试，而这一测试的定义还很模糊。
没人知道市场失灵的原因中，是避免长期亏损的因素多一些，还是短期流动性风险的因素多一些。这项救援计划的一个优点就是，它应会有助于我们找到答案。但是，这是一场可能以两种方式失败的赌博。即使有补贴，交易数量也可能极其稀少，使得问题资产仍留在银行。而如果私人投资者真的承担了得到补贴的风险，这些资产仍可能造成巨大亏损，等着美国国会去买单。
无论以哪一种方式失败，都将进一步削弱奥巴马政府的权威。这项计划还是可能奏效。但如果不管用的话，面临危险的将远不止是美国的银行体系。
译者/力文
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