The shaming of John Thain

By Greg Farrell , Henny Sender
John Thain is giving us a tour of what is soon to become America's most infamous office, with its $87,000 rug, $68,000 sideboard, $28,000 curtains – all part of a $1.2m redecoration scheme. This was early December, a little under two months before Thain would be fired in the same room by his new boss, Ken Lewis, chief executive of Bank of America.
For now, before a price tag had been placed on every item in his office, the 53-year-old chief executive of Merrill Lynch was in high spirits. The worst year on Wall Street in nearly a century was coming to an end, and Thain could rightfully claim to have saved his bank from ruin. Over a weekend in mid-September, as Lehman Brothers collapsed into bankruptcy, Thain pulled off a coup: he persuaded BofA, one of the few financial giants in the US that didn't need government money to survive, to pay $29 per share for his own firm, even though Merrill was days away from following Lehman into bankruptcy.
Thain had taken over as Merrill chief executive nine months before that weekend deal. Now, he appeared to be one of the few Wall Street leaders who grasped the enormity of the credit crisis. Thanks to his analytical approach to the marketplace, it seemed, Merrill shareholders could look forward to a stake in Bank of America. “I have received thousands of e-mails saying, ‘Thank you for saving our company',” Thain told us that day. And yet he admitted that the decision to sell Merrill Lynch – a 94-year-old institution that was always “bullish on America” – had been painful. “This was a great job. This was a great franchise. Emotionally, it was a huge responsibility.”
What was his personal reaction? “You can't live through an event like this and not be changed,” he said. Before Merrill, Thain had gone from one success to another. He began his career at Goldman Sachs, where he rose swiftly through the ranks, then moved to the New York Stock Exchange, where he repositioned an outmoded institution for global growth. He had been hired by Merrill to save the company from the mountain of subprime-mortgage-related assets stockpiled by his predecessor, Stan O'Neal. But instead of saving the firm, he sold it to BofA. Or, from another perspective, he saved the firm by selling it.
But as the events of the next two months would show, despite what he told us that day, Thain had not been changed by his short and tumultuous tenure at Merrill. His 13 months at its helm and three weeks at BofA were to expose some blind spots. He appeared to be a man in a bubble, not good at listening to advice, and worse still at detecting changes of tone when it came to the public's tolerance for corporate excess. Even as he mused with us over the highlights of the previous year, the ground beneath him was eroding. Flashes of arrogance and misjudgment, not to mention the insubordination of his top lieutenants from Merrill Lynch, were becoming apparent to his new bosses at BofA – who were themselves keenly aware that the old Masters of the Universe banking model was done for. John Thain's world had changed, even if he hadn't.
A brilliant career
John Alexander Thain was born in Antioch, Illinois, the son of a doctor. He excelled at Antioch Community High School, captained the wrestling team and served as the school's valedictorian upon graduation.
The young man with ramrod posture and a head of thick, dark hair moved east at 18 to study electrical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology before earning a masters in business administration at Harvard. Upon graduation in 1979, he joined Goldman Sachs, working in corporate finance, then investment banking. His rise at Goldman accelerated when he was selected to help launch a mortgage-backed securities division, reporting to Jon Corzine, who was then partner in charge of government, mortgage and money markets trading at Goldman's fixed income group. By 1990, Thain had risen to treasurer at Goldman and four years later, chief financial officer.
In 1998, as chief executive, Corzine wanted to end Goldman's partnership structure and take the firm public. In the internal dispute over this and other management issues, Thain (now presiding over the bank's European operations) and several senior Goldman executives ousted Corzine, installing investment banker Hank Paulson as co-chief executive. (On the question of going public, Thain and his co-conspirators were on the wrong side of history: the firm's initial public offering in 1999 enabled it to thrive over the next decade.)
Even at Goldman Sachs, with a corporate culture of weeding out ageing partners and promoting devotion to the firm over loyalty to individuals, Thain's decision to turn on Corzine shocked many of his colleagues, enhancing a reputation for ruthlessness. A senior New York Fed official who worked with him in 1998, on the rescue of the failed hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, describes Thain at that time as “a stone-cold killer”.
In 2003, Thain left Goldman to become chief executive of the New York Stock Exchange. His predecessor, Richard Grasso, had been ousted following a furore over his $187m pay package, and because he favoured maintaining the NYSE's antiquated trading system. Thain forced the exchange to embrace electronic trading. His biggest achievement was to do what he'd initially resisted at Goldman and transform the “Big Board” into a public company. Thain continued the company's expansion by acquiring Euronext, a pan-European exchange. It successfully positioned the NYSE for global growth, as the results showed: in the two years after it went public, profits rose threefold. Seatholders at the old exchange – the owners of the 1,366 “seats” that confer the right to trade – reaped a bonanza when those seats were converted to shares. Taking the NYSE public also helped Thain earn some $9m in 2006, a modest amount compared with the more than $100m he made over his career at Goldman. But more than the money, the NYSE experience proved that Thain could run a company on his own.
By 2007, Thain was anxious for a new challenge. It arrived seven blocks north-west of the NYSE, at the World Financial Centre headquarters of Merrill Lynch, where the investment bank was in the process of imploding. Under the leadership of Stan O'Neal, Merrill had boosted its earnings from $4.4bn in 2004 to $7.5bn in 2006 – fuelled in part by the firm's aggressive position in the market for securities backed by subprime mortgages (so-called CDOs, collateralised debt obligations). But O'Neal's profits came in the absence of any meaningful risk controls.
In a quest to keep boosting its income statement, Merrill bought subprime mortgage lender First Franklin in September 2006 – at the height of the real estate bubble – for $1.3bn; in October 2007, the bank was forced to write down $8bn in losses on its dodgy assets, wiping out nearly a year's profits. O'Neal resigned six days later, and the company's board launched a hurried search for a replacement. Among the candidates were acting co-chief executive Greg Fleming, who headed Merrill's investment banking operations, and Larry Fink, chief executive of BlackRock, the massive asset management firm 49 per cent owned by Merrill. But according to a person involved in the selection process, Alberto Cribore, the lead director at Merrill, wanted Thain, the “Mr Fix-It” who had turned around the NYSE. The board moved quickly, and in November 2007, Merrill announced that Thain would become its 12th chief executive.
Mother Merrill
The new leader didn't come cheap. When Thain joined Merrill in December 2007, he was awarded a signing bonus of $15m and an incentive plan tied closely to the value of Merrill shares, then worth some $68m. What Thain did not receive upon being named chief executive was a crash course in the art of internal company politics. Merrill Lynch is best known in the US for being the brokerage firm that brought Wall Street to Main Street. After the second world war, the company aggressively courted retail investors across America, building a network of financial advisers that was unparalleled in terms of both assets under management and geographical reach. Although the company soon expanded into investment banking and trading in the markets on its own account, it remained best known for its “thundering herd” of 16,000 financial advisers. It was also a “family friendly” firm, where sons followed in their fathers' footsteps and personal loyalty trumped almost every other quality.
By 2002, when O'Neal took charge, Merrill was over-extended. O'Neal fired thousands of employees and campaigned against the “Mother Merrill” culture. As a result of O'Neal's purges, many of the firm's “culture carriers” departed, often acrimoniously. The talent drain was particularly apparent in 2006 and 2007, when Merrill dug itself into a huge financial hole. The Merrill Lynch that Thain took over in December 2007 was a shadow of its former self.
At first, Thain made the right moves, gathering allies quickly. In January 2008, he turned up at a conference of financial advisers in Arizona, pressed the flesh and declared his commitment to the thundering herd. Fleming, the head of investment banking who had survived the O'Neal era, pledged to help Thain from the start, joining him in an initial round of capital-raising. And Bob McCann, the street-smart leader of the thundering herd, also rallied round the new boss. It was hardly a holy trinity, however: Fleming and McCann weren't close to each other, and they both kept a watchful eye on their new leader even while pledging loyalty.
Over time, some Merrill executives started to complain – among themselves and to outsiders – about a perceived arrogance in Thain. Indeed, a cult of personality had sprung up around him during his tenure at the NYSE. Although the Big Board is tiny compared with Merrill, it occupies a disproportionately large share of the national attention when it comes to US financial markets. Thain's success there triggered reams of glowing press reviews, including a profile in Institutional Investor magazine titled “The Adventures of SuperThain”. The hype mattered: Thain's status helped him raise almost $20bn for a firm that had lost all credibility before his arrival. But some colleagues at Merrill felt all this had gone to his head. Shortly after arriving, Thain hired two of his closest aides from the NYSE, chief financial officer Nelson Chai and communications director Margaret Tutwiler. Tutwiler's philosophy, according to those who dealt with her, was to promote Thain as “the public face of Merrill Lynch”. That approach grated on some subordinates, who felt that no matter how hard they worked to turn the firm around, all the glory would accrue to one man.
Misjudgment
In our December interview, Thain admitted that he had underestimated the magnitude of the problems Merrill Lynch faced. At the time he joined, he told reporters that he didn't plan to end the bank's involvement in the already troubled CDO market, despite the $8bn in write-downs on those securities in the third quarter of 2007.
“I didn't focus on this when I took over,” he told us. “I didn't know how much the market was going to deteriorate over the course of the year.” He wasn't alone. Thain's generation of Wall Street leaders had never experienced anything akin to what lay before them in 2008.
It was only after the Fed brokered the sale of Bear Stearns, another famed Wall Street investment bank, to JPMorgan Chase in mid-March 2008 that Thain says he became alarmed. And yet, even in April, discussing Merrill's first-quarter losses in the wake of Bear Stearns' collapse, Thain told analysts he was staying the course. “We're not pulling back from our fundamental strategy,” he said. “We're not changing our view.”
Top lieutenants urged him to sell as many of Merrill's toxic assets as he could, but colleagues remember Thain dismissing suggestions from below with a curt, “No, we're not going to do that”. Throughout the spring and summer, Thain argued – internally and to investors and regulators – that Merrill was different from Bear, that the steady stream of fees generated by its thundering herd would protect it.
By early summer, however, with Merrill's share price continuing to fall, there was no evidence of a turnaround. Despite this, Thain didn't seem to grasp the gravity of some of his remarks. In a conference call in June, for example, when discussing the possibility of raising capital, he mentioned that Merrill might sell its stakes in the Bloomberg publishing group or BlackRock. Although he had vaguely raised such possibilities before, in the context of the conference call the remark came as a shock to BlackRock's top executives, including founder Larry Fink. Over the next few weeks, BlackRock's share price dropped by almost 25 per cent, enraging Fink.
By mid-July, Thain had abandoned the idea of selling BlackRock, but Fink and some of Thain's top deputies had already begun to question his authority. At one meeting, Thain would insist that the trading desk “lighten up” the balance sheet. But a week later, no action would have been taken. Or Thain would turn down a request to hire a high-profile investment banker, but negotiations with the individual would still take place. Making matters worse were Thain's own high-profile hires. In the spring of 2008, Merrill announced that Tom Montag and Peter Kraus would join from Goldman Sachs. The size of the pair's pay packages – $39m and $29m respectively – shocked Merrill executives who were preparing for pay cuts.
Merrill's second quarter was a disaster, encompassing a $9.4bn write-down and a $4.6bn loss. It was obvious that the group would need more capital. Thain sold the bank's investment in Bloomberg back to New York mayor Michael Bloomberg for $4.3bn, and accelerated an on-again, off-again plan to sell a big chunk of the firm's CDOs.
On July 29, Merrill announced the sale of $31bn in CDOs to Lone Star Funds for $6.7bn. Just weeks earlier, the CDOs had been valued at $11bn on Merrill's balance sheet. Merrill provided 75 per cent of the financing to make the deal happen, but it seemed worth it: with the sale, Thain had put Merrill's problems behind him. At the same time, the bank raised $8.5bn in new capital. It was a high-wire act that Thain pulled off with aplomb. “The CDOs were the source of the vast majority of losses at Merrill,” Thain told us in December. “There was a sense of relief. We had gotten rid of our most dangerous assets and we had raised capital.”
Turning point
The relief was shortlived. Come September, the market turned bearish, particularly towards Lehman Brothers, once regarded as the ultimate survivor. Richard Fuld, Lehman's longtime chief executive, tried to halt the slide in his company's stock price, announcing plans to put all of Lehman's bad assets into a separate bank, a feat that would have taken months to pull off. But on the evening of Friday September 12, after Lehman's share price had continued to plunge, federal regulators convened Wall Street's top bankers at the New York Federal Reserve to discuss the firm's troubles. It was clear that Lehman had three stark choices: find a partner with which to merge, hope for a bailout, or collapse into bankruptcy.
On Saturday morning, Greg Fleming called his boss at home at around 7am. Given Lehman's precarious situation, Fleming argued that Thain should start talking to BofA. The investment banking model was changing irrevocably and BofA was the best fit for Merrill: it was not a force in wealth management or international investment banking. Merrill also ran the risk that BofA might buy Lehman if Thain didn't act. Initially, Thain was unreceptive – he hadn't reached one of the pinnacles of Wall Street only to cash in his chips from a position of weakness a few months later.
Thain arrived at the New York Fed soon after. Within an hour or two, after New York Fed chief Timothy Geithner made it clear that Lehman wouldn't be rescued, Thain called BofA's chief executive, Ken Lewis, to initiate talks. Asked whether he was pushed to call Lewis by either Geithner or then Treasury secretary Hank Paulson (the same Paulson he helped install as chief executive of Goldman Sachs a decade earlier), Thain said no. The Fed and Treasury “were initially focused on Lehman but grew concerned about us”, Thain said. “They wanted to make sure I was being proactive [but] they didn't tell me to call Ken Lewis.”
For Lewis, who had climbed to the top of the US banking industry through acquisitions, Merrill was the ultimate prize. A deal could transform Bank of America from the McDonald's of the industry into a financial services titan that would outstrip – in size, know-how and reputation – Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase. Lewis said he'd fly to New York from the bank's headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina, and the two men would meet at BofA's corporate apartment in the Time Warner Center at 2.30pm.
It was around lunchtime at the Federal Reserve, where meetings continued to take place. In the early afternoon, Morgan Stanley chief executive John Mack approached Thain. The men agreed to talk that evening. One competitor, spotting Thain and Mack in conversation, said that such a union would be like two drunks trying to prop each other up. Executives at Goldman Sachs also wanted to discuss an investment in Merrill, plus a line of credit.
That afternoon, Thain met Lewis ready to discuss the sale of a minority stake in Merrill Lynch. Lewis said he wanted to buy the entire company.
“I didn't come here to sell the whole company,” Thain replied. Yet Thain recalls that as he and Lewis talked, the strategic logic behind a full deal became apparent. Bank of America was the dominant retail bank in the US, flush with consumer deposits. It was also a leader in the commercial banking business, where Merrill Lynch was weak. Meanwhile, Merrill's strongest unit, its 16,000 investment advisers, would fill a gaping hole in BofA's product offerings. Merrill also wielded tremendous clout in the capital markets, where BofA was just a small player.
“The logic of it made a lot of sense to both of us,” Thain says. And yet he still didn't like the idea of a deal. That evening, he and his two top Goldman hires – Montag and Kraus – met John Mack to discuss a deal with Morgan Stanley. But according to Merrill executives, by Sunday morning, Thain had dismissed the Morgan Stanley option.
Fleming, who was still pushing for a merger with BofA, was holed up at the offices of Wachtell Lipton, the bank's law firm. He argued that BofA should move quickly to buy all of Merrill to prevent the events of the coming week from derailing the discussions. He pushed for a sale price in the high 20s or low 30s for Merrill stock, a significant premium over the $17 at which the shares had closed the previous Friday.
At the Fed that morning, Paulson laid it on the line with Thain: Merrill's very existence depended on whether or not he could cut a quick deal. To more than one observer, Thain seemed shaken by the weekend's events. For the New York Fed official who had described Thain as a “stone-cold killer”, the transformation of the Merrill chief executive over the weekend was remarkable. “He had lost his confidence,” the official said.
By Sunday afternoon, it was apparent that BofA would offer a rich price, $29 a share, to acquire Merrill Lynch. Selling the firm was not what Thain had been hired to do, but at least, given the cataclysmic market conditions, he'd got what seemed to be a good price. At 6pm, he convened a telephone board meeting to go over the details. At 8pm, he rode up to Wachtell Lipton's offices, on 52nd Street and Sixth Avenue, to sign the final agreement. A conference room was stocked with champagne, so that at around 9pm, Thain and Lewis could toast the deal. But both sides kept finding fresh details to iron out. When the two chief executives finally made their toast, around midnight, much of the bubbly was warm and flat.
On Monday September 15 2008, after Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy protection, Bank of America announced the acquisition of Merrill Lynch in an all-stock transaction worth $50bn. When Thain convened a “town hall” meeting that afternoon to discuss the deal with Merrill Lynch employees, whatever misgivings he had about the sale were assuaged by the huge round of applause that greeted him.
Bonus time
Over the next few weeks, as some 200 BofA employees – members of a transition team – flocked to Merrill's offices, Thain found himself managing a new relationship – with Andrea Smith, the human resources executive dispatched from BofA headquarters to serve as his shadow.
One of the key issues in the acquisition agreement concerned the payment of bonuses. By selling to BofA, Merrill's executives knew that the days of multi-million-dollar bonus payments would come to an end. As a concession, in a non-public side-agreement, BofA allowed Merrill to pay out bonuses of about $4bn before the deal closed. Neither Lewis nor Thain realised that this small amendment to the contract would eventually spark a state investigation requiring them and others to testify under oath about what they knew about the payments and when they knew it.
Shortly after the deal was announced, Thain made it clear to his future employers that he expected a bonus of $40m for putting Merrill together with BofA. That number came as a shock. In a long conversation, BofA's chief administrative officer, J. Steele Alphin, urged Thain to revise the number downwards. Alphin told Thain that BofA didn't reward bankers simply for getting deals done, but for creating deals that worked over time. If Thain harbored any ambitions to succeed Lewis as chief executive of BofA, Alphin warned, a bonus of that size would undermine him with BofA's board.
Thain agreed, reducing his bonus request over the course of the next two months. Following the creation of a $700bn government bailout fund for US banks, public disgust with multi-million-dollar bonuses and golden parachutes was more than apparent. In November, top executives at Goldman Sachs were the first to declare that they would not accept bonuses for 2008, even though they made a profit for the year.
Thain ultimately came to an understanding with Lewis that his own bonus would be lower than that of his new boss. Presuming that the BofA chief might get as much as $10m for his stewardship of the bank that year, Thain calculated that he deserved a similar, but slightly smaller sum for himself, especially for steering Merrill clear of the bankruptcy that befell Lehman. But on the morning of December 8, the day that Merrill's board would meet to sign off on bonuses, the Wall Street Journal published a story indicating that Thain was planning to ask for as much as $10m. That afternoon, Thain recommended that neither he nor his top executives receive bonuses for the year.
The board did agree to $3.6bn in bonuses to be paid out to other Merrill Lynch executives. At BofA's request, most of the money would be paid out in cash later in the month, before the deal closed. The early payment would actually reduce expenses for BofA in 2009, making it easier for the bank to hit its first-quarter numbers. Thain's work for the year was essentially done. On December 19, he decamped with his family to their vacation home in Vail, Colorado, where they would spend the holidays. When the transaction closed on January 1, Thain, the 12th and final chief executive in Merrill's 94-year history, was 1,700 miles away from the company headquarters in New York.
The fall
Before leaving for Colorado, Thain had negotiated a new title for himself: president of global banking, securities and wealth management at BofA. He would be responsible for planning and executing the merger of Merrill's banking and trading business with that of BofA. In this portion of the deal, Merrill employees would emerge the winners, with thousands of BofA staffers laid off and replaced by their Merrill counterparts.
But in early January, signs of dissatisfaction towards Thain erupted within Merrill. McCann, head of the firm's “thundering herd”, resigned. The news was no surprise to employees who attended the town hall meeting in September, just after the merger was announced. In response to a question, Thain chided McCann for leaking a story to the press, then continued to rebuke him to such an extent that others were embarrassed. Following that encounter, Thain declined to promote McCann to the management level directly beneath him in the merged company, a slap in the face.
A few days later, Fleming tendered his resignation to accept a teaching position at Yale Law School, his alma mater. More than McCann's departure, Fleming's resignation caused concern about Thain in North Carolina. Fleming had been the prime mover behind the BofA merger, and was well liked in Charlotte. If Lewis had had any illusions about how some of Thain's top deputies felt towards their boss, those illusions vanished.
On January 16, BofA and Merrill reported their fourth-quarter numbers. Merrill's were disastrous: $21bn in operating losses, the worst performance in the bank's history, even worse than the poor performances of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs. Still, Lewis told listeners in a conference call that he was happy that Thain had joined the BofA management team.
Lewis had other problems. In early January, BofA's share price sunk from $14 towards $10 per share. Shortly before the earnings announcement, it emerged that Lewis had lobbied the government in late December for an infusion of as much as $20bn in new capital, and a guarantee for some of Merrill's weakest assets, in order to consummate the deal. BofA's stock price plunged into single digits, shareholders were outraged and several class-action lawsuits were filed, accusing Lewis of withholding important information prior to the December 5 vote to approve the Merrill deal. The bank issued a carefully worded statement saying that up until the second week of December, Merrill's losses were in line with expectations.
A week after the earnings announcement, the FT published a story about early payment of the nearly $4bn in bonuses to Merrill Lynch employees. Outraged, Andrew Cuomo, New York State's attorney-general, launched an investigation. Even though BofA executives had been actively involved in the timetable and payment of the bonuses, the bank sent a statement to the FT blaming Thain.
They had found the opportunity they'd been looking for: Thain would take the fall – for bonuses and for as much else as they could lump on him. The BofA statement was a clear sign that the end was near for Thain. But in his office on the 32nd floor, the former chief executive didn't seem to notice. He had just purchased 8,400 shares of his new company's stock and was finalising plans for a forthcoming trip to Davos for the World Economic Forum.
Lewis flew up to New York on January 22 to fire Thain. While he was still aboard the BofA corporate jet, the purpose of his trip was disclosed in the media, along with the damning details of Thain's $1.2m office redesign. On BofA's trading floor in New York, where employees were angry about what the purchase of Merrill had done to their stock, a televised image of Lewis prompted a round of boos. Subsequently, the news that Thain was about to be fired sparked enthusiastic applause.
And so, just before noon, with all of Wall Street tipped off, the embattled Lewis fired the only executive in the organisation capable of replacing him at that moment as chief executive. It was a move designed for self-preservation in more ways than one. Criticism of Lewis had reached deafening levels as it became apparent that he had overpaid for Merrill. Although Fleming was the prime negotiator on Merrill's side of the transaction, it seemed as though Thain had got the better of Lewis during that frenzied September weekend.
In the wake of his firing – when Thain apologised for the office redecoration and promised to reimburse the company – many of his former charges unburdened themselves about his failings, real and perceived. His supporters lashed back, blaming a venomous culture at Merrill that never embraced Thain as its new leader.
Was Thain the man in the bubble – brilliant at understanding the complex technical issues surrounding turn-of-the-century banking but deaf to the world beyond Wall Street, or even to dissenting voices in his own ranks? And if so, was he really so different from his peers?
On October 6, Richard Fuld testified before congressmen about the collapse of his bank, Lehman Brothers. In what amounted to an admission of Wall Street's blindness towards the financial mess it created, he said: “Not that anyone on this committee cares about this, but I wake up every single night thinking, ‘What could I have done differently? What could I have said? What should I have done?' And I come back to this: at the time I made those decisions, I made those decisions with the information I had. I can look at you and say, this is a pain that will stay with me the rest of my life.”
It was a speech more human than Thain has given. But then again, Merrill did not fail. It's also the sort of speech the rest of Wall Street has yet to deliver – even as it asks for billions more in taxpayer support.
Back in his office – the office that even some of his supporters feel betrayed by – John Thain is neither superhero nor the robotic demon he's made out to be by detractors. He shows us a favourite item in the room. For all the money lavished elsewhere by his designer, this – a painting from Steven Spielberg – cost nothing. It was a gift to commemorate Dreamworks Animation's initial public offering in 2004 and it depicts the ogre Shrek alighting from a carriage with his bride, Princess Fiona. It's not a castle they're bound for: the pair are about to ascend the steps of the New York Stock Exchange.
Greg Farrell is the FT's Wall Street correspondent. Henny Sender is chief correspondent, international finance.

美林末代CEO
作者：英国《金融时报》格雷格•法雷尔(Greg Farrell)、 汉妮•桑德尔( Henny Sender)
约翰•塞恩(John Thain)正带领我们参观办公室，一个很快就会在美国声名狼藉的办公室：8.7万美元的地毯、6.8万美元的侧柜、2.8万美元的窗帘——所有这些都是一项120万美元装修计划的内容。此刻是2008年12月初，不到两个月后，就在同一个房间里，塞恩被他的新老板——美国银行(Bank of America)首席执行官肯•刘易斯(Ken Lewis)解雇了。
就目前而言，在他办公室里的每样东西都被贴上价格标签之前，这位53岁的美林(Merrill Lynch)首席执行官心情非常不错。华尔街在近一个世纪中最糟糕的一年即将结束，塞恩可以理直气壮地宣布，他挽救了美林，使之避免了破产的命运。去年9月中旬的一个周末，就在雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)黯然破产的时候，塞恩一鸣惊人：他说服美国银行以每股29美元的价格收购了美林，尽管那时的美林距离步雷曼后尘已然不远。而美国银行是当时美国少数几家不需要靠政府注资也能生存下去的金融巨头之一。
在那个周末的交易之前，塞恩接任美林首席执行官已有九个月。这时候，他似乎是华尔街上抗住了信贷危机巨大破坏力的少数领袖之一。看起来，由于他对市场判断准确，美林的股东可以期待在美国银行分到一杯羹了。“我收到了数以千计的电子邮件，内容都是‘谢谢你拯救了我们的公司'，”接受采访那天塞恩告诉我们。但他承认，出售美林这家总是“看好美国经济形势”、有着94年历史的机构是一项令人痛苦的决策。“这是一项伟大的工作。美林一家伟大的公司。从感情上说，这是一份巨大的责任。”
他个人作何反应呢？“经历这样的事件你不可能毫无改变，”他说。来美林之前，塞恩已经历过一个又一个成功。他的职业生涯始于高盛(Goldman Sachs)，在那里迅速升至高层，然后来到纽约证券交易所(NYSE)，在那里他奠定了一个过时的机构全球性扩张的基础。美林聘请他来，是为了将公司从堆积如山的次级抵押贷款相关资产中解救出来。这些资产是他的前任斯坦•奥尼尔(Stan O'Neal)积累下来的。但他没能拯救公司，而是将之出售给了美国银行。或者从另一个角度来说，他通过出售挽救了公司。
然而，尽管塞恩那天说他不可能毫无改变，但随后两个月里发生的事情将表明，在美林短暂而动荡的任期并没有改变他。他在美林掌舵的13个月和在美国银行的三个星期暴露了他的“盲点”。他似乎是一个生活在幻觉中的男人，不善于听取意见，更不善于察觉公众对企业放纵行为容忍度的变化。即便当他与我们共同回顾前一年的经营亮点时，他的根基也正被逐渐腐蚀。他在美国银行的新老板们日益明显地感觉到，傲慢的姿态和错误的判断像闪电一样不时迸发，更不用提他在美林的高级助手对新老板的不服从了。美国银行的新老板们自己也敏锐地意识到，过去那种“宇宙巨人”式的银行模式已经失灵。塞恩的世界已经改变，虽然他自己并没改变。
辉煌的职业生涯
约翰•亚历山大•塞恩(John Alexander Thain)出生在美国伊利诺伊州的安蒂奥克(Antioch)，父亲是一名医生。他在安蒂奥克社区高中是一名佼佼者，曾担任学校摔跤队队长，并在学校的毕业典礼上致告别辞。
这位身材挺拔、一头浓密黑发的年轻人在18岁时搬到美国东部，前往麻省理工学院(MIT)攻读机电工程，之后又在哈佛大学(Harvard)拿到了工商管理硕士(MBA)学位。1979年毕业后，他加入高盛(Goldman Sachs)，先在企业融资部门工作，然后又转到投资银行领域。不久他被挑选出来，帮助成立住房抵押贷款证券部门，直接向乔恩•科赛因(Jon Corzine)汇报工作。乔恩·科赛因当时是高盛合伙人，负责固定收益部门的政府、抵押贷款和货币市场交易。之后塞恩开始在高盛加速升职。到1990年，他已升任高盛的司库，4年后更是坐上了首席财务官的位置。
1998年，已是首席执行官的科赛因希望结束高盛的合伙制架构，并公开上市。在这件事和其它管理问题的内部争论中，塞恩（已在负责高盛的欧洲业务）和一些高管联手，将科赛因赶下台，然后请来投资银行家汉克•保尔森(Hank Paulson)担任联席首席执行官。（在上市问题上，塞恩和当年与之同谋的同事代表了错误的历史方向：该公司1999年的首次公开发行令其在后来的十年中迅猛发展。）
高盛的企业文化是抛弃跟不上形势的合伙人，鼓励对公司而不是对个人忠诚。但即使是在这里，塞恩把矛头对准科赛因的决定依然震惊了他的很多同事，加强了他冷酷无情的名声。纽约联邦储备银行(New York Fed)一名高级官员曾在1998年与塞恩共事，营救破产的对冲基金长期资本管理公司(LTCM)。这位官员将当时的塞恩形容为“冰冷如石的杀手”。
2003年，塞恩离开高盛，来到纽交所担任首席执行官。他的前任理查德•格拉索(Richard Grasso)因为1.87亿美元薪酬引发的公愤而被驱逐，同时也因为他赞成保留纽交所陈旧的交易系统。塞恩迫使该交易所采取电子交易系统。他最大的成就，正是他当初在高盛所抵制的事情：将这个“大行情板”（Big Board，纽交所的代称）改造成了一家上市公司。塞恩收购了泛欧交易所(Euronext)，延续了纽交所的扩张势头。此举为纽交所在全球的成功扩张奠定了基础，其结果就是：在上市后的两年里，该交易所的利润增长了三倍。旧交易所的交易席位持有者——有交易权的1366个“席位”的所有者——也大赚了一笔，因为这些席位被转换成了纽交所的股票。交易所上市也帮塞恩在2006赚得了900万美元——相比他在高盛职业生涯中挣得的1亿多美元，这只是一笔小钱。但除了挣钱之外，在纽交所的经历证明，塞恩自己可以单独掌管一家公司。
到了2007年，塞恩开始渴望新的挑战。新的挑战在纽交所西北七个街区处出现了，这里是美林总部所在地——世界金融中心大厦(World Financial Centre)。这家投资银行正处于内爆过程。在斯坦•奥尼尔的领导下，美林的利润从2004年的44亿美元增加到2006年的75亿美元，部分原因在于公司在市场中大举购入次级抵押贷款支持证券（即所谓的CDOs，债务抵押债券）。但奥尼尔在带来利润的同时却未辅以任何有针对性的风险控制措施。
为继续提高业绩，2006年9月——正是房地产泡沫高峰时期——美林出资13亿美元，收购了次级抵押贷款机构First Franklin。2007年10月，该行因高风险资产亏损被迫减记80亿美元，几乎抹掉了近一年的利润。6天后奥尼尔辞职，公司董事会匆忙开始寻找替代者。候选人包括代理联席首席执行官、美林投资银行业务负责人格雷格•弗莱明(Greg Fleming)和大型资产管理公司贝莱德(BlackRock)首席执行官拉里•芬克(Larry Fink)。美林持有贝莱德49%的股份。但据参与甄选的一位人士介绍，美林董事会中的领袖人物阿尔伯特•克里波尔(Alberto Cribiore)相中了塞恩这位让纽交所华丽转身的“搞定先生”(“Mr Fix-It”)。董事会迅速采取行动。2007年11月，美林宣布，塞恩将成为其第12任首席执行官。
美林母亲
这位新的领导人并不便宜。塞恩2007年12月加入美林时，得到了一笔1500万美元的签约金和一份与美林股价相关的奖金计划，当时价值约6800万美元。但有一样东西塞恩在上任之时没有得到，那就是公司内部管理艺术的速成培训。在美国，美林作为经纪公司的最出名之处，就在于它将华尔街推广到了美国的大街小巷。第二次世界大战后，该公司积极拉拢全美各地散户投资者，建立了一个在管辖资产规模和地理跨度方面均无与伦比的财务顾问网络。虽然该公司很快扩张到投资银行领域，并在市场中展开自营交易，但其最有名的仍是由1.6万名金融顾问组成的“庞大团队”(thundering herd)。它也是一个“家庭友好型”公司，常常有子承父业的现象，且个人忠诚的重要性几乎超过其它所有品质。
到了奥尼尔开始主政的2002年，美林已经扩张过度。奥尼尔解雇了数千名员工，采取了种种背离“美林母亲”文化的措施。由于奥尼尔的清洗，公司的许多“文化传承者”离去了，而且通常都是在争吵中离去。人才流失状况在2006年和2007年尤为明显，当时的美林使自己陷入了一个巨大的金融深渊。到2007年12月，塞恩接手的美林已经大不如前了。
一开始，塞恩采取了正确的举措，迅速聚集起一批盟友。2008年1月，他出现在亚利桑那州的一次金融顾问会议，和顾问们一一握手并宣布了对这个庞大团体的忠诚。投行业务负责人、奥尼尔时代的幸存者弗莱明从一开始就发誓要帮助塞恩，并与他一起展开了最初的一系列融资行动。金融顾问们的领袖、精明的鲍勃•麦肯(Bob McCann)也聚拢到了新老板的周围。但这很难说是种和谐的“三位一体”(holy trinity)组合：弗莱明和麦肯彼此并不亲近，而且甚至在宣誓效忠的同时，两人也都对新老板留了个心眼。
随着时间的推移，一些美林高管开始了抱怨——既相互抱怨，也向外界抱怨——称他们感觉到了塞恩的傲慢。事实上，在塞恩供职纽交所期间，就迅速培养出了对他的个人崇拜。虽然纽交所与美林相比微不足道，但在美国金融市场，它却吸引了与其规模并不相称的全国性关注度。塞恩在那里的成功催生了大量热情洋溢的新闻评论，其中《机构投资者》杂志专门发表一篇人物评论，题为《超人塞恩的冒险》(The Adventures of SuperThain)。这种天花乱坠的吹捧非常有用：塞恩的地位帮他为美林募集了近200亿美元，而在他上任之前，这家公司已然信誉扫地。但是，美林的一些同事认为，这一切冲昏了塞恩的头脑。到任后不久，塞恩就从纽交所挖来了他的两名亲信——首席财政官纳尔逊•沙伊(Nelson Chai)和公关主管玛格丽特•塔特怀勒(Margaret Tutwiler)。在与塔特怀勒打过交道的人士眼中，她的哲学就是将塞恩作为“美林的代言人”进行宣传。这种做法激怒了塞恩的一些下属，他们觉得，无论自己多么努力工作来改善公司，所以的荣耀都将归集在一个人身上。
误判
去年12月接受我们采访时，塞恩承认，他低估了美林所面临问题的严重性。在他加入美林时，他对记者表示，不打算让公司退出已经陷入困境的CDO市场，尽管在2007年第三季度，美林所持有的这类证券已带来80亿美元的亏损减记。
“我接手之初并没有十分在意这个问题，”他告诉我们，“我并不知道市场会在一年的时间里恶化成这副模样。”他并不唯一这样想的人。2008年所呈现给他们的场景是塞恩这一代华尔街领袖从未经历过的。
塞恩说，直到2008年3月中旬美联储(Fed)出面斡旋，促成摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)收购另一家华尔街著名投行贝尔斯登(Bear Stearns)之后，他才警惕起来。然而，就在去年4月，也就是贝尔斯登破产之后不久，在讨论美林第一季度亏损之时，塞恩还向分析师表示，他会坚持到底。“我们不会改变我们的根本战略，”他说。“我们不会改变我们的观点。”
高级助手们劝他尽可能多地出售美林的问题资产，但同事们都记得，塞恩一口回绝了下属的建议，“不，我们不能这样做。”在整个春天和夏天，塞恩一直主张（既在内部也向投资者和监管机构），美林不同于贝尔斯登，其金融顾问队伍创造的稳定佣金收入将为公司提供保护。
但到了夏初，美林股价持续下跌，却没有出现任何形势逆转的迹象。尽管如此，塞恩似乎仍未意识到自己一些言语的严重性。例如，在6月份的一次电话会议中，当谈到募集资金的可能性时，他提到美林可能出售所持有的彭博出版集团(Bloomberg publishing group)或贝莱德的股份。虽然之前他也曾含糊地提到过这种可能性，但在电话会议上说出这番话依然大大震惊了贝莱德的高管，包括其创始人拉里•芬克。在接下来的几周里，贝莱德的股价下跌了近25%，令芬克大为光火。
到了7月中旬，塞恩已经放弃了出售贝莱德的想法，但芬克和塞恩的一些高级副手已开始质疑他的权威。比如，在某次会议上，塞恩坚持要求交易部门的资产负债表“瘦身”。但一个星期后，都没有采取任何措施。或者，塞恩会拒绝雇用某个著名投资银行家的请求，但与银行家本人的谈判仍会进行。塞恩自己高调的招募行动使情况更糟。2008年春，美林宣布，来自高盛的汤姆•蒙塔格(Tom Montag)和彼得•克劳斯(Peter Kraus)将加入公司。两人的薪酬分别为3900万美元和2900万美元，让那些正准备接受减薪的美林高管大为震惊。
美林2008年第二季度的业绩惨不忍睹：减记94亿美元，加上亏损46亿美元。很明显，公司需要更多资金。塞恩以43亿美元的价格，将公司在彭博的投资卖回给纽约市长迈克尔•布隆伯格(Michael Bloomberg)，并加速实施出售公司大部分CDOs资产这个时断时续的计划。
7月29日，美林宣布以67亿美元的价格将价值310亿美元的CDOs资产出售给孤星基金(Lone Star Funds)。就在几个星期前，这些资产在美林的资产负债表上还价值110亿美元。美林为这笔交易的进行提供了75%的融资，但这似乎是值得的：交易完成之后，塞恩便将美林的问题抛在脑后。与此同时，公司募集了85亿美元的新资本。这是一个高空走钢丝的危险行为，但塞恩冷静地完成了。“CDOs是美林绝大部分亏损的根源，”塞恩在12月的采访中告诉我们。“我们感到一阵轻松。我们已经摆脱了最危险的资产，而且我们募集到了资金。”
转折点
轻松的感觉只是昙花一现。2008年9月，市场进入熊市，对一度被视为终极幸存者的雷曼兄弟来说尤其如此。长期担任雷曼首席执行官的理查德•富尔德(Richard Fuld)试图阻止公司股价的下滑。他宣布，公司计划把所有不良资产归入一家独立的银行，这是个需要花费数月时间才能完成的计划。但在9月12日那个周五的晚上，在雷曼股价持续暴跌之后，联邦监管机构召集华尔街顶级银行家在纽约储备银行(New York Federal Reserve)就这家公司的问题展开讨论。很显然，雷曼兄弟只有三个极端选择：寻找合作伙伴与之合并；等待政府纾困；或宣布破产。
周六上午7点左右，格雷格•弗莱明致电塞恩家中。鉴于雷曼兄弟的情况岌岌可危，弗莱明认为，塞恩应该开始与美国银行谈判了。投资银行的模式正发生不可逆转的改变，而美国银行最适合美林：它既不是财富管理公司也不是国际性投资银行。而且，如果塞恩不采取行动，美林还将面临美国银行收购雷曼的可能。起初，塞恩不太接受这种观点——他刚刚登上华尔街的制高点之一，并不打算在仅仅几个月后就认输出局。
之后不久，塞恩抵达纽约储备银行。一两个小时后，纽约储备银行行长蒂莫西•盖特纳(Timothy Geithner)明确表示，没有人会去拯救雷曼。于是塞恩给美国银行首席执行官肯•刘易斯打电话，开始了双方的谈判。当被问及他是不是在盖特纳或当时的财政部长汉克•保尔森（就是那个10年前在他的帮助下成为高盛首席执行官的保尔森）的敦促下才给刘易斯打电话时，塞恩说，没有人敦促他。美联储和财政部“最初很关注雷曼，但后来越来越担心我们了”，塞恩说。“他们想确保我能积极主动些，（但）他们没有要求我给肯•刘易斯打电话。”
对于通过并购登上美国银行业顶峰的刘易斯来说，美林乃是他的终极战利品。这项收购交易可以使美国银行从金融业的麦当劳(McDonald's)变成一个在规模、经验和声誉上超越花旗集团(Citigroup)和摩根大通的金融服务巨头。刘易斯表示，他将乘飞机从美国银行在北卡罗莱纳州夏洛特的总部前往纽约，于下午2时30分和塞恩在时代华纳中心(Time Warner Center)的美国银行公司公寓中会面。
这时正是美联储的午餐时间，相关会议仍在进行中。下午早些时候，摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)首席执行官麦晋桁(John Mack)找到了塞恩。两人同意当晚谈一谈。一位看到塞恩和麦晋桁交谈的竞争对手说，这样的联盟就像是两个酒鬼试图搀扶对方。高盛的高管也曾希望与塞恩讨论对美林投资并给予信用额度的事宜。
那天下午，塞恩会见了刘易斯，准备讨论将美林少数股权出售给美国银行的问题。但刘易斯表示，他希望购买整个公司。
“我到这里来不是要卖掉整个公司的，”塞恩回答说。然而，塞恩回忆道，随着他和刘易斯交谈的继续，整体出售背后的战略逻辑变得清晰起来。美国银行是美国最大的零售银行，有着充沛的客户存款。它在商业银行业务中也是一个领导者，而美林在这方面比较薄弱。与此同时，美林最强大的部门——1.6万名投资顾问——将填补美国银行产品种类的空缺。美林在资本市场也拥有巨大影响力，而美国银行在这方面只是一个小角色。
“其中的逻辑对我们双方都有很大意义，”塞恩说。但他仍然不喜欢被并购的想法。那天晚上，他和两名来自高盛的助手——蒙塔格和克劳斯——与麦晋桁会面，讨论与摩根士丹利达成交易的可能性。但据美林高管透露，到了周日早上，塞恩已经将摩根士丹利排除在选项之外。
弗莱明仍在努力促成与美国银行的合并，他悄悄来到后者的律师事务所Wachtell Lipton。他认为，美国银行应迅速采取行动，买下整个美林，防止未来一周的事态进展破坏双方的谈判。他强烈要求将美林的售价定在每股30美元左右，大大高于周五收盘时的17美元。
当天上午在美联储，保尔森对塞恩把话挑明：美林的存亡取决于他能否迅速敲定交易。不止一个人都表示，塞恩似乎被这个周末发生的事情所震动。在那位称塞恩为“冰冷如石的杀手”的纽约储备银行官员看来，这位美林首席执行官在那个周末发生了显著的转变。“他已经失去了信心，”这名官员说。
到星期日下午，局势已然分明：美国银行将以每股29美元的优厚价格收购美林。出售公司并非美林当初聘请塞恩的目的，但鉴于市场状况急转直下，他至少争取到了一个看起来不错的价钱。下午6点，塞恩召集董事会进行电话会议，讨论具体出售事宜。晚上8点，他驱车前往位于纽约第六大道与52街交界处的Wachtell Lipton办公室，签署最后协议。会议室里早就准备好了香槟，以便晚上9点左右协议签署完毕之后，塞恩和刘易斯可以举杯相庆。但双方发现有一个又一个的细节性问题需要解决。当两位首席执行官最终在午夜前后举起酒杯时，冰镇过香槟已经凉了，也跑了气。
星期一，即2008年9月15日，在雷曼兄弟申请破产保护后，美国银行宣布以全股票交易方式收购美林，交易总值为500亿美元。当天下午塞恩召开全体员工会议，与美林员工讨论这项交易。不管他对这笔交易存在多大疑虑，迎接他的热烈欢呼声都让他心里踏实了许多。
奖金风波
接下来的几周，随着约200名美国银行员工（过渡团队成员）涌进美林的各个办公室，塞恩发现自己要处理一种新的关系——与安德烈•史密斯(Andrea Smith)的关系，后者是美国银行总部派来的人力资源经理，负责和他同步协调相关事宜。
并购协议中的关键问题之一涉及奖金发放。在被美国银行收购之后，美林的高管们知道，享受数百万美元奖金的日子结束了。作为让步，在一份未公开的附属协议中，美国银行允许美林在合并交易完成之前发放约40亿美元的奖金。但无论是刘易斯还是塞恩均未意识到，这个小小的合同附录最终会引发政府调查，要求他们和其他人就所知的奖金发放内容以及得知时间宣誓作证。
在交易宣布后不久，塞恩向他未来的雇主明确表示，他希望得到4000万美元，作为他实现美林与美国银行合并交易的奖励。这个数字不啻一声惊雷。美国银行首席行政官J•斯蒂尔•艾尔芬(J. Steele Alphin)与塞恩进行了一次长时间的对话，力劝他缩减奖金数额。艾尔芬告诉塞恩，美国银行不会仅仅因为完成交易就奖励银行家，如果他们完成的交易能长期创造价值，才能得到奖励。艾尔芬警告他，如果他有野心在日后接替刘易斯担任美国银行的首席执行官，那么如此巨额的奖金将破坏他在美国银行董事会心中的形象。
塞恩被说服了，在接下来的两个月内减少了他的奖金要求。在美国政府推出7000亿美元银行纾困基金后，公众对数百万美元奖金和“金降落伞”条款的厌恶之情已经再明显不过。到了11月，高盛的高管率先宣布，他们将放弃2008年的奖金，虽然他们当年实现了盈利。
塞恩最终与刘易斯达成谅解：他的奖金将低于他新老板的奖金。塞恩认定美国银行的首席执行官当年可获得高达1000万美元奖金，他推测自己应该获得与之类似但数额略小的奖金，尤其是他还使美林免于遭受雷曼兄弟那样的破产命运。但在12月8日上午——当天美林公司董事会将举行会议，确定奖金发放问题——《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal)发表文章，称塞恩计划提出高达1000万美元的奖金要求。当天下午，塞恩建议，他和主要高管都主动放弃当年的奖金。
不过董事会的确同意向美林其他高管发放总额36亿美元的奖金。应美国银行的要求，大部分奖金将在当月晚些时候、合并交易完成之前以现金方式付清。提早付款实际上将减少美国银行在2009年的费用开支，使之更容易实现第一季度的财务目标。塞恩本年度的工作基本上完成了。12月19日，他与家人一同前往他们位于科罗拉多州韦尔的度假屋，并在那里度过新年假期。当合并交易于1月1日划上句号之时，塞恩——美林94年历史上的第12任也是最后一任首席执行官——正身处远离美林公司纽约总部1700英里之外的地方。
谢幕
在前往科罗拉多之前，塞恩已经为自己成功赢得了一个新头衔：美国银行全球银行、证券和财富管理业务总裁。他将负责规划并执行美林与美国银行旗下银行和交易业务的合并。在这部分交易中，美林员工将成为赢家，数千名美国银行员工将被辞退，取而代之的是他们在美林的同行。
但到了1月初，美林内部出现了对塞恩不满的迹象。公司庞大金融顾问团队的负责人麦肯辞职离去。对于参加了9月份合并消息公布后那次全体员工大会的人来说，这条消息并不令人意外。当时塞恩在回答一个问题时，先是指责麦肯将消息泄漏给了新闻媒体，然后不断地对他大加训斥，以至于其他人都感到尴尬。自那次冲突后，塞恩拒绝将麦肯提拔至新公司的管理层直接受他领导，这等于是直接扇了麦肯一记耳光。
几天后，弗莱明递交了辞呈，回到他的母校耶鲁大学法学院(Yale Law School)担任教职。与麦肯的离去相比，弗莱明的辞职更能引发美国银行高层对塞恩的担心。弗莱明是美国银行收购美林的首要推动者，在美国银行总部很受欢迎。即使刘易斯对于塞恩的副手会如何看待他们的老板曾有过任何幻想，此时这些幻想也都消失了。
1月16日，美国银行和美林公布了第四季度财报。美林的业绩惨不忍睹：营运亏损达210亿美元，创下历史最差纪录，甚至比表现不佳的摩根士丹利和高盛还要糟糕。尽管如此，刘易斯还是在一次电话会议中向听众表示，他很高兴塞恩加入了美国银行的管理团队。
刘易斯还面临其它问题。1月初，美国银行的股价从每股14美元跌至10美元。就在第四季度业绩公布前不久，有消息称，刘易斯在12月下旬曾游说政府向美国银行注入多达200亿美元的新资本金，并对美林最糟的一些资产提供担保，以成就这桩交易。美国银行的股票价格随之跌到个位数，愤怒的股东提起了一些集体诉讼，指控刘易斯在12月5日投票批准收购美林之前隐瞒了重要信息。美国银行发表了一份措辞谨慎的声明称，直到12月的第二个星期，美林的亏损都是完全符合市场预期的。
第四季度业绩公布一周后，英国《金融时报》发表了一篇文章，报道了提前向美林员工支付近40亿美元奖金的事情。纽约州总检察长安德鲁•库默(Andrew Cuomo)勃然大怒，随即展开调查。虽然美国银行高管一直积极参与了奖金支付的过程和具体发放事宜，该行仍然给FT发来一份声明，将责任推给了塞恩。
他们找到了他们一直在寻找的机会：塞恩将成为替罪羊——对奖金问题和其它一切可以推到他身上的问题负责。美国银行的声明清楚表明，塞恩的末日已经不远了。但是，在他位于32楼的办公室里，这位前首席执行官似乎并没有察觉。他刚刚购买了8400股新公司股票，并正在敲定前往达沃斯参加世界经济论坛(World Economic Forum)的行程计划。
1月22日，刘易斯乘坐美国银行的公务飞机前往纽约去解雇塞恩。他人还在飞机上时，他此行的目的已经被媒体曝光，同时曝光的还有塞恩办公室120万美元新装修方案的详情，这些细节足以给塞恩定罪。在纽约美国银行的交易大厅，员工们对于收购美林给其股票带来的结果怒不可遏，当刘易斯的身影出现在电视上时，大厅里嘘声一片。但随后，塞恩将被解职的消息引起了热烈的掌声。
因此，在正午之前，在整个华尔街都事先得到消息的情况下，四面楚歌的刘易斯解雇了当时唯一能够取代他成为首席执行官的高管。从多个角度来看，这都是一个自我保护的行为。当他对美林出价太高的事实明朗之后，对刘易斯的批评可谓震耳欲聋。虽然弗莱明是此次交易中美林一方的主要协商者，但看起来，在去年9月那个疯狂的周末，是塞恩战胜了刘易斯。
被解雇之后，塞恩为重新装修办公室一事道歉，并承诺向公司补偿这笔费用。这时许多他过去的下属开始无所顾忌的评论他的缺点，有些属实，有些只是个人感觉。他的支持者则毫不留情的加以回击，指责美林充满恶意的文化从未接受塞恩作为其新的领导人。
塞恩是一个生活在幻觉中的人吗？在理解世纪之交银行业的复杂技术问题上敏锐出众，但对华尔街以外的世界充耳不闻，甚至也听不到他自己队伍中的反对声音？如果是这样的话，他真的迥然有别于同行吗？
10月6日，理查德•福尔德在美国国会就雷曼兄弟的破产作证。他实际上承认了华尔街对它自己造成的金融业糟糕局面视而不见，他说：“或许这个委员会中不会有人关心这一点，但每天夜里，当我从梦中醒来，总是在想：‘我还能怎么做？我还能怎么说？我（当时）应该怎么做？'然后我依然得出这样的结论：当初我是依据所知信息做出那些决定的。我可以正视你们的眼睛说，这将是我一辈子都难以摆脱的痛苦。”
这番话比塞恩的话更有人情味。但话说回来，美林并没有破产。这也是华尔街幸存者们将来可能会说的话，尽管它们正在要求纳税人提供数十亿美元的支持。
镜头转回到他的办公室（即使是他的一些支持者也有被这个办公室出卖的感觉）。塞恩既不是超级英雄，也不是诋毁者口中的那种机器恶魔。他向我们展示了房间中他最喜欢的一件摆设。尽管设计师在房间其它地方耗资惊人，这幅来自史蒂芬•斯皮尔伯格(Steven Spielberg)的油画却没有花费一分钱。这是一件纪念梦工厂(Dreamworks Animation) 2004年首次公开发行的礼物，画中怪物史莱克(Shrek)与他的新娘菲奥娜公主(Princess Fiona)正迈下一辆马车。他们的目的地不是城堡：这对新人即将登上纽交所门前的台阶。
格雷格•法雷尔是英国《金融时报》驻华尔街记者。汉妮•桑德尔是国际金融首席记者。
译者/力文
未经英国《金融时报》书面许可，对于英国《金融时报》拥有版权和/或其他知识产权的任何内容，任何人不得复制、转载、摘编或在非FT中文网（或：英国《金融时报》中文网）所属的服务器上做镜像或以其他任何方式进行使用。已经英国《金融时报》授权使用作品的，应在授权范围内使用。